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This thesis explores and models the relationships between offers of credit products,
credit scores, consumers' acceptance decisions and expected profits generated using
data that records actual choices made by customers and their monthly account status
after being accepted. Based on Keeney and Oliver's theoretical work, this thesis esti¬
mates the expected profits for the lender at the time of application, draws the iso-profit
curves and iso-preference curves, derives optimal policy decisions subject to various
constraints and compares the economic benefits after the segmentation analysis.
This thesis also addresses other research issues that have emerged during the explo¬
ration into profitability and acceptance. We use a Bivariate Sample Selection model to
test the existence of sample selection bias and found that acceptance inference may not
be necessary for our data. We compared the predictive performance of Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) vs. Logistic Regression (LR) on default data as well as on accep¬
tance data, without finding that SVMs outperform LR. We applied different Survival
Analysis models on two events of interest, default and paying back early. Our results
favoured semi-parametric PH-Cox models separately estimated for each hazard.
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1.1 Aim of thesis
Over the last two decades the growth in consumer debt has been rapid. In the US the
total consumer credit outstanding has tripled from 0.8 to 2.5 trillions of dollars from
1990 to 2008'. The UK total consumer credit outstanding quadrupled from £52 to
£229 billions from 1993 to 20082. One of the forces facilitating such a fast pace of
growth is the wide application of Credit Scoring techniques, which automatically as¬
sesses the risk and profit involved in lending to an individual applicant and therefore
make millions of lending decisions economically possible.
When a customer fills in the application for a credit product (a fixed term loan, for
example), the lender will firstly evaluate his/her credit worthiness by assessing the risk
of default. If the credit score is higher than the cut-off threshold set by the lender, an
offer (involving an interest rate) will be made to the customer. Subject to the attrac-
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g 19/Current/
2Bank ofEngland statistics, code LPMVZRD
1
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tiveness perceived by the customer, the offer might be accepted or rejected. Having
accepted the offer and received the loan amount (in the case of a fixed loan amount),
the customer will be obliged to make monthly payments until the end of the term when
the balance is cleared. During this payment period, some will choose to close the ac¬
count by paying back the remaining balance before the end of the term. Some will stop
making payments and default. The rest of the customers will keep making payments
until the end of the term.
In a competitive retail lending market, given the business objectives of either maxi¬
mization profit or market share, lenders need to develop models taking into considera¬
tion profit and market share. This thesis explores and models the relationships between
offers of credit products, credit scores, consumers' acceptance decisions and expected
profit generated using data that records the actual choices made by customers and their
monthly account status after being accepted. Specifically, this thesis attempts to ad¬
dress the following issues:
1. How can we model the profitability of making a loan, unconditional on the ac¬
ceptance by the applicants, and how can iso-profit and iso-acceptance contours
be empirically estimated and presented?
2. Is acceptance inference needed?
3. How do novel approaches like support vector machines (SVMs) perform (com¬
pared to logistic regression) in predicting default and acceptance ?
4. How to model the chance of default and paying back early and how to incorpo¬
rate them into a profit estimation?
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1.2 Importance of the research
Profit Scoring has been a promising research direction in the Credit Scoring litera¬
ture (see Hopper and Lewis (1992), Oliver (1993), Marshall and Oliver (1995), Hand
and Kelly (2001) Li and Hand (2002), Somers and Whittaker (2007), Trench et al.
(2003), Andreeva et al. (2007), Keeney and Oliver (2004), Keeney and Oliver (2005)
for example). Most of the research in Profit Scoring models the profitability either of
each customer or of a whole portfolio (except Keeney and Oliver (2005)). Those anal¬
yses are based on data collected from existing customers. Unfortunately, customers
who have rejected offers made to them by lenders and therefore who are not existing
customers in the previous analysis have been neglected in the profit predictions. The
analysis of the profitability without considering the acceptance of offers, we argue, is
not complete in a competitive market where no lender can guarantee all of its offers
are accepted.
In previous acceptancemodelling research Jung et al. (2003), Seow and Thomas (2005)
and Thomas et al. (2006) modelled acceptance behaviour using data relating to a hypo¬
thetical student bank account where participants (first year students at the University
of Southampton) chose offers of different features. The hypothetical nature of the data
collected together with the small sample size limits the applicability of their results. A
large data set of actual responses of applicants to real offers made to them is exactly
what is needed for acceptance modelling.
Another question that remains unanswered in previous acceptance modelling research
is the possible need for "acceptance inference". Similar to the scenario of the need for
Reject Inference, customers who rejected offers might do so because they have bet-
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ter scores (low default probabilities) which enable them to shop around to find good
deals. On the other hand, customers who accept offers may do so just because of
low scores (high risk of default) and have limited choices. If such sample selection
leads to biased parameter estimates of the probability of default, models built on the
applicants who have accepted the offers will be different from models built on all the
applicants (which include those who have accepted and rejected the offers put to them).
Apart from acceptance modelling, two other important factors affecting profitability
are the likelihood of default and of paying back early. In the literature on default mod¬
elling, many studies have proposed and compared different approaches to separating
the defaulters from the non-defaulters by assuming that the probability of default is
dependent on a set ofpredictive variables. Recently more and more lenders have come
to use Risk Based Pricing instead of charging a flat interest rate for all customers. Risk
Based Pricing generally involves charging riskier customers higher interest rates. The
probabilities of default perceived by the lenders' credit scoring systems are therefore
reflected in the interest rates charged. If future predictions are to be made based on
the models built on such data, the existence of a reverse influence of the probability of
Default on the Interest Rate cannot simply be ruled out.
As another crucial factor contributing to profitability estimation, the probability of
paying back early has not received as much attention as the probability of default in
the literature. In fact, the average probability of paying back early is observed to be
more than 10 times larger than the average probability of default in our data. This
contrast indicates the high level of competition between lenders during the period in
which this set of data was collected. Without modelling the probability of paying back
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early it will not be possible to accurately calculate expected profits .
The scarcity of studies that model the probability of paying back early leads to the
lack of investigations estimating the probabilities of default and paying back early un¬
der a competing risk framework in the credit scoring literature. These two events of
interest can be assumed to be independent and estimated separately. But once this as¬
sumption of independence is questioned, it will be interesting to see how the competing
risk approach can be applied and whether improvements can be made to our model as
a result of using this approach.
1.3 Contributions to knowledge
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it is the first em¬
pirical academic study to estimate expected profits at the time ofapplication. Previous
literature predicts the profits of customers who have already accepted an offer (for
example, see Somers and Whittaker (2007), Trench et al. (2003) and Andreeva et al.
(2007)). We estimate expected profits by combining the results from acceptance mod¬
elling, survival analyses of default and of paying back early.
Second, the research is based on a unique data set reflecting the actual acceptance
choices made by customers of a real financial product, and which records their default
performance and early repayment behaviour. Previous research used a data set record¬
ing undergraduate students' acceptance choices towards offers of a hypothetical bank
account (see Jung et al. (2003) and Seow and Thomas (2005)). The findings from our
model will be closer to what will be observed in the practical retail lending industry
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than those in the literature.
Third, this thesis provides iso-preference curves and iso-profit curves as an empir¬
ical implementation of Keeney and Oliver's theoretical model. However, our iso-
preference curves, which were drawn based on estimates from the data, indicate that
the customers prefer lower loan amounts, rather than larger amounts which may be
contrary to the assumptions of a preference for higher credit lines in the K-0 model.
Fourthly, using iso-preference curves and iso-profit contours, this thesis illustrates
how to maximize unconditional profit under different objectives which the lender may
choose. Previous literature such as Keeney and Oliver (2005) discusses optimal strate¬
gies using assumed numerical cost and profit figures as example cases while this thesis
uses results estimated from industry sourced data.
Fifthly, this thesis also provides a segmentation analysis by separately estimating the
profits on Internet and Non-Internet groups. The optimal interest rates are then cho¬
sen separately for each segment for each given loan amount requested. Our results
demonstrate that when offerings in the fixed term loan market are segmented in this
way, markedly different policy decisions would be made, compared with those drawn
from non-segmented data.
Sixthly, we explore the possible existence of sample selection bias due to estimating a
default model using a sample that omits those who rejected a loan offer made to them
after application. Previous literature has suggested why a limited improvement can be
achieved through reject inference unless very high cut-off values are used (see Crook
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and Banasik (2004), Banasik and Crook (2005)). The finding in this thesis suggests
it is highly unlikely that our default models suffer from sample selection bias when
only the customers having accepted the offer have performance data recorded and are
included in the default models. Utilising the acceptance data, a bivariate probit sample
selection model does not give higher predictive performance compared with a simple
probit model based on the default data only for borrowers who accepted a loan offer.
We also find a significant correlation between the residuals of the default and accep¬
tance models only when a lean model is used. This suggests that acceptance inference
might not be necessary.
A further contribution is a comparison between classification methods: SVM (support
vector machines) vs logistic regression, which has been carried out to model default
and acceptance probabilities. The SVM, albeit found to record good performance in
the literature (Baesens (2003), Baesens et al. (2003)) , does not predict as well as the
logistic regression on our Default data in terms of the Area under ROC curves. But
SVMs have never been applied in the acceptance modelling literature before and we
find that in this context, SVM gives equally good results as the logistic regression
model. The varied performance on different data by the SVM can be explained by the
class distribution in the data where the Default data is much more unbalanced than the
Acceptance data. This makes Default Modelling a more challenging task for the SVM
as it is more sensitive to the class distribution.
Although frequently used in statistical medical research for modelling multiple fail¬
ure events, competing risk survival models have rarely been used in the Credit Scoring
literature (Banasik et al. (1999)). This thesis presents a comparative study of the pre-
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dictive performances of competing risk survival models. We find little improvement in
the predictions over previous survival models estimated separately for each hazardous
event. This suggests that little benefit can be achieved by using the competing risk
survival models on this type of data.
1.4 Thesis structure
The structure of the rest of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the recent
literature. The details of the theoretical model on which much of this project is based,
the K-O model, will be introduced and discussed. This chapter continues to review the
previous research in the areas of acceptance modelling and Profit Scoring. Both are
essential to the implementation of the K-0 model.
Chapter 3 presents the modelling of default. Two different approaches to default mod¬
elling, logistic regression and support vector machines, are compared. SVM, with
its more complex model structure, does not seem to be as competitive as logistic re¬
gression in the prediction of default. Relaxing the assumption that there is one way
dependence between the probability of default and the interest rate, a simultaneous
equations model was used to investigate the mutual influence between the rate and the
default. However, the predictive performance of this model was not as good as was
achieved by a logistic regression model.
Chapter 4 shows the results of modelling consumer acceptance behaviour. The pre¬
dictive performances of logistic regression models and SVMs are compared. The re¬
sults show that SVMs, although giving a better predictive performance than they do
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in the prediction of default, do not outperform logistic regression when modelling ac¬
ceptance. Chapter 4 also looks into the need for acceptance inference. An attempt has
been made to improve the default estimation by applying bivariate probit with sam¬
ple selection models, assuming that the residuals of the two equations are normally
distributed. The insignificant improvement leads to the conclusion that our default
models do not seem to suffer from the sample selection bias 3. Finally, indifference
curves have been drawn in APR vs. Loan Amount space. A difference between the
shape of the indifference curves and that assumed in Keeney-Oliver model is observed
and commented on.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to applying survival analysis to model two types of hazardous
events that affect the profitability of customers who accepted a loan offer, default and
paying back early. In this chapter non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates are used
to compare and illustrate the differences observed between the hazard and survivor
functions for the two types of hazardous events on the whole data and on different data
segments. Afterwards, different parametric models and semi-parametric PH-Cox mod¬
els have been fitted and assessed before their predictive performances are compared.
Finally, competing risk models have been applied to estimate the probabilities of de¬
fault and paying back early jointly. Their predictive performances are also compared.
Chapter 6 calculates the expected profits for the lender at the time of application using
estimates from the acceptance modelling and survival models of default and paying
back early. The equation to calculate the expected conditional profits together with
the assumptions made are explained in detail. Plugging into the profit equation the
3Although this is conditional on the validity of the normality assumption.
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estimates from the acceptance and PH-Cox models, the expected unconditional profits
at the time of application (and so before an offer is made) are calculated and plotted
in three dimensional space of profit, interest rate and loan amount. Dependent on dif¬
ferent constraints on the optimization objectives, optimal decision policies have been
discussed. This chapter also analyses the difference between models built on each of
the Internet and Non-Intemet segments, comparing the economic benefit of this seg¬
mentation under two different modelling assumptions.
Chapter 7 will conclude this dissertation by summarising the findings, noting some





Today's consumer credit markets are growing very fast. The total consumer credit
outstanding (combining revolving and non-revolving) totalled over 2.5 trillion dollars
in the US according to the Federal Reserve Statistical Release at Q4 2007 1. Widely
applied credit scoring techniques have helped financial institutions to design new prod¬
ucts for customers and to accept them at much lower costs than before their use.
Lenders have traditionally focused on modelling the risk of default to make a deci¬
sion of accepting or rejecting a new applicant. Using data on previous applicants and
assuming the relationship between the probability of default and the predictive in¬
dependent variables remains constant over time, lenders build models to predict the
probability of default. Default could be defined as the chance that an applicant misses
3 or more consecutive payments in the next 12 months although other definitions are
possible (see Kelly and Hand (1999)).
'http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/Current/
11
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However, lenders have recognized business objectives other than the risk of default.
Some research (Hopper and Lewis (1992)) has discussed the idea that profit as a mea¬
sure of performance is an alternative to the probability of default. They discussed
strategies that included consideration of individual account profitability instead ofport¬
folio profitability. Keeney and Oliver (2004) and Keeney and Oliver (2005) pointed out
that both profit and market share are fundamental objectives to achieve. They built a
theoretical model to identify the set of win-win situations to integrate both the con¬
sumers' preferences for price and credit line and the lenders' preferences for profit
and market share for a revolving credit product. The implementation of their model
depends on the availability of information on
• the consumer's preferences;
• the probabilities of the consumers to accept offers from lenders;
• estimates of the consequence to the lender conditioned on the offer being ac¬
cepted by the consumer;
• the lender's preference for portfolio performance.
The next four sections in this chapter will discuss in detail Keeney and Oliver's analysis
of consumers' preferences, how the consumers' iso-preference can be presented using
the probability of offer acceptance, the consequence to the lender under such situations
and how the win-win situation set can be identified considering both the lender's and
the consumer's preferences and how the lender shall express his/her preference when
selecting optimal offers for the consumer. After that, implementation issues regarding
how the acceptance probabilities and how the customer preferences can be estimated
will be discussed.
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2.1.1 Consumer's preference
Keeney and Oliver (2004)& Keeney and Oliver (2005) assumed that in a two dimen¬
sional space of Credit Line and APR Rate, a consumer wishes to get as much Credit
Line as possible and to be charged as low an APR Rate as possible. Therefore, in
CreditLine-APR space, it is reasonable to assume that the combinations ofCredit Line
and APR in the top left of Fig 2.1 are preferred by a consumer than points in the bot¬
tom right. Some points shall share a similar preference to the consumer. Connecting
those points which yield the same preference by the consumer we gain iso-preference
curves. The consumer who receives any offer on an iso-preference curve shall have the
same probability of accepting this offer.
APR
Figure 2.1: Consumers' iso-preference curves. The lines represent contours around a
utility hill where the third dimension is utility. Figure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
Different consumers will have different iso-preference maps. The shape of the iso-
preference curves represents the preferences of an individual consumer for the offer
characteristics, and so the trade off between those characteristics. A consumer with
extremely high price sensitivity will show nearly vertical iso-preference curves on the
D
C
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2 dimensional space of Credit Line and APR Rate and a consumer with almost no sen¬
sitivity to APR will have almost horizontal iso-preference curves.
The iso-preference curves Keeney and Oliver illustrated reside in a two dimensional
feature space. In a real world case, the iso-preference curves could reside in a larger
dimensional space. Other features like insurance take up, length of loan, gifts such as
free travel money may also be included in a consumer's utility function as empirically
shown by Jung et al. (2003).
2.1.2 Consequence to the lender
A consumer is indifferent between all points on the same iso-preference curve. How¬
ever, for the lender offering them, the story is different when the lender's objectives
are towards the profit generated from the consumer accepting the offer.
APR
Figure 2.2: Lender's profits are different along the consumer iso preference curve. Fig¬
ure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
r
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In Fig 2.2, although the probability of a consumer accepting the offer is equal along
the iso-preference curve, the revenue generated by the customer will increase when
moving along the line from bottom left to top right. This is because the lender receives
payments from a higher interest rate and it is applied to a larger loan amount. At the
same time, the expected losses are also increasing because the probability of default
is growing together with the amount ofmoney that would be lost if default occurred.
In summary, Keeney and Oliver argued that "a contribution to the expected profit is
initially small, increases to a single high point and then decreases monotonically along
any individual iso-preference curve".
So along each iso-preference curve of the consumer, there should be a point indicating
the maximum expected profit generated by the consumer for the lender if the consumer
takes the offer. As shown in the Fig 2.3 below, the points A and B are both the points
that yield maximum expected profit while A' and B' are the points giving less profit to
the lender than point A and B.
APR
Figure 2.3: Offers yielding maximum expected profit for the lender. Figure based on
Keeney and Oliver (2005)
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Keeney and Oliver also argue that if we compare the maximum expected profit con¬
ditional on acceptance of the loan by the applicants of different APRs, the expected
profit is low, rises, and reaches a maximum and then declines. The reason is that at
low APRs little interest is received, at higher APRs more interest is earned with the
probability of default rising. At still higher APRs the probability of default is so high
that expected profit falls. Thus:
Expected Profit {given take A } < Expected Profit {given take B}
and
Expected Profit {given take C} < Expected Profit {given take B}
Maximum E [Profit I Take]
Figure 2.4: Maximum expected profit at each probability of take. Figure based on
Keeney and Oliver (2005)
Since all points on each iso-preference curve indicate the same probability of taking
the offer for the consumer, Fig 2.3 could be mapped into the Fig 2.4, which shows the
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maximum expected profit at each probability of take. Note that:
Prob{take A} = Prob{take A'} > Prob{take B} = Prob{take B1}
The y-axis shows the expected profit conditional on taking the offer
Expected Profit {given take A} > Expected Profit {given take A'}
Expected Profit {given take B} > Expected Profit {given take B'}
By multiplying the probability of take by the conditional maximum expected profit
given the probability of take, unconditional expected profit can be derived, as shown
in the Fig 2.5. Keeney and Oliver have assumed the profit is zero when the offer is
not taken and are not explicitly taking the costs of acquisition into account, fn Fig 2.5,
the curve where offer R,S and T reside is the unconditional expected profit, while the
other curve is for the conditional expected profit given that the offer has been taken.
Any points under the unconditional expected profit curve are contributing less profit to
the lender and therefore not desirable to the lender in terms of profitability.
Figure 2.5: Unconditional expected profit. Figure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
The lender's utility is assumed to depend partially on market share and revenue. The
dominant set of offers is shown in Fig 2.5 and consists of those on the thicker part
E [ Profit I Take ]
Set of dominant offers are
thicker part of the curve
Pr{Take}
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of the curve. For each point not in the dominant set, we can always find an offer in
the dominant set to beat it with higher probability of take and getting similar expected
profit for the lender. Thus point T is preferred by the lender to point R.
Combining the utility function of the consumer with the profit function for the lender
in a CreditLine-APR space, Figure 2.6 shows the iso-profit contours for the lender as
well as the iso-perference curves for the customer. Note the expected profits for the
lender at point Q,R,S,T,U,V are KQ,nR,ns,nT,Ku,Ky. The offer S will bring the lender
the highest expected profit ns while the offer V, as it is located further away from the
zero-profit-contour (where offer U and Q reside), will bring the lender negative ex¬
pected profit. Offer T and R, residing on the same iso-profit contour, will bring the
same amount of expected profit for the lender. The size of those expected profits is
compared below
/ / / / / /
Ks ]> Kj — KR > K(j = KQ = 0 > Ttj/
Also note that the acceptance probabilities for the customer at point Q, R, S, T, U are
Pq,Pr,Ps,Pt,Pu- Since it has been assumed that the customer will prefer a lower rate
and a higher credit line, the acceptance probabilities are increasing from Q to U
Pq < PR < Ps < PT < Pu
The set of points that start from S linking T U and V is the set of dominant offers
for the lender. Those are called dominant offers because for whatever offer that is not
residing on this line of dominant offers, an equally profitable offer can be found on the
line of dominant offers by moving the offer along the iso-profit contour towards the
point which is tangent to the iso-preference curve that has the highest probability of
acceptance.
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Pl
APR
Figure 2.6: Iso-profit contours for the lender in the consumer iso-preference map. Fig¬
ure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
For example, to the lender the offer R is equally profitable as the offer T since they
are both on the same iso-profit contour. However, T is at the tangency point between
this given iso-profit contour and the iso-preference curve with highest probability of
acceptance (Pt > Pr)■ Provided the lender gains utility from both greater market share
and more profit (assuming the lender is not extremely risk averse), the lender will
always favour the offer T than offer R because the latter one means lower market share
and equal profits.
2.1.3 Set of win-win offers
As discussed previously, any offers, like point M in Figure 2.7 below sitting on the
iso-preference curves below where point S resides, are less desirable to the consumer
than point S.







Figure 2.7: Set of win win offers. Figure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
The case for offer N, is different. From the lender's perspective, N is not profit max¬
imizing. The shadowed area between A, B and N is the place where the lender and
the consumer can negotiate an offer price of credit line and rate that is more preferable
to both parties. Moving along the lender's iso-profit curve from N to A, the lender
keeps the same amount of profit and the consumer receives an offer more acceptable.
Following a different path along the consumer's iso-preference line from N to B, the
consumer is indifferent to the changes but the lender will see an increasing profit until
the arrival of offer B.
The lender wishes to be at the points which are on the tangency between lender's
iso-profit contors and consumer's iso-preference curves. For any given profit, such
combinations maximise probability of take. In the Fig 2.7 above, these tangencies
form the line S-T-U-V. On the other side, the consumer wishes to be at the points that
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Since the lender is in the position of making the offers, the offers made to the con¬
sumer from a profit maximizing lender are the points along line S-T-U. The consumer
wishes to move top-left towards point V while the lender prefers the other direction
towards point S. An agreed deal is likely to lie somewhere on that line. The offers
that are on the line from U to V are not likely to be considered by a profit-maximizing
lender as they are making a loss. The offers on the line between U and S have the
lender's expected market volume maximized (maximized probability of take by a typ¬
ical applicant), conditional on not making a loss or making a given amount of profits.
In general the expected profit earned by the lender can be expressed as
ExpectedProfit = p(accept\offer) {L(offer)p(G\offer)-D(offer)p(B\offer)}
where L(offer) is the profit for the lender when the consumer that takes the offer is a
good customer in the sense of not defaulting 2 and D(offer) is the loss for the lender
should the consumer take the offer and then default. p{G\offer) and p(B\offer) are
the corresponding conditional probabilities of these good and bad cases.
2.1.4 Lender's preferences
The lender makes his decision by valuing trade-offs between profits and market share,
selecting an optimal offer from the set ofwin-win offers outlined in the sections above.
Keeney and Oliver described this situation using utility functions and letting a lender's
objective be to maximize the expected utility of the business u(n,s), n for profits and s
for market share. Keeping u constant and letting tc and 5 vary, the iso-preference curves
for the lender can be plotted, as in the below figure.
2A customer not defaulting may also pay back the loan early and therefore not a good one in terms
of profitability for the lender







Figure 2.8: Lender's iso-preference curves. Figure based on Keeney and Oliver (2005)
The OP1 point in the figure above shows the lender's current operating point, indicated
by its current market share and expected profits. The lender's current trade off value of
market share and profit can be found by calculating the slope of the tangent line to the
lender's iso-preference curve at point OP1. OP2, compared to OP1, on another lender
iso-preference curve, implies higher expected profit and a much higher trade off value
(in terms of expected profit) for each additional customer.
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For a specific consumer, the optimal offer for the lender to make depends on its current
operating point and current preference. If profit is the only target, the value trade off
between profit and customer number is 0 dollars for each additional customer. Then
the offer S in Figure 2.9 is the optimal choice. If the lender is operating at OP2 and
working on increasing its market share then the offer at U or between U and V in Fig¬
ure 2.9 is the optimal offer it can make.
A weakness of the model of Keeney and Oliver is that it does not take the compe¬
tition between lenders into consideration. Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) simulated
the competition between lenders but many assumptions they made results in oversim¬
plification. A lender's best strategy depends on other lenders' market position and
business objectives. The lenders may seek a Nash equilibrium in a mature market. If a
lender wishes to maximize the profit only without considering itself and other lenders'
market position, it will see itself squeezed out of the market due to relatively high
price. If a lender is eager to enlarge market share without considering itself and other
lenders' profitability, even at a risk of accepting zero or negative profit loan requests
since profitable customers are hard to attract, it will see itself accumulating too much
risk, placing itself in an adverse position in a downward economic cycle. Finally this
model assumes lenders are risk neutral.
2.2 Previous research in acceptance modelling
Casual observations shows that current competition between lenders is intense. Efforts
have to be made to attract new customers and retain them afterwards. Lenders are
building various models to predict customers' acceptance behaviours such as whether
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to respond to marketing mail, whether to accept an offer of a credit product or whether
to switch to other lenders.
Jung et al. (2003) modelled the likelihood of consumers accepting student bank ac¬
counts when being given different offers. Those offers had six features, including 5
choices of overdraft limit, 4 choices of credit card options, fee for foreign currency,
discounts on insurance, interest paid on account surplus and 10 choices of free gifts.
Their data set, named the Fantasy Student Current Account(FSCA), was gathered from
a dedicated website, which was (and is) widely publicized to first year students at the
University of Southampton with prize winning draws as enticement.
Using those hypothetical six offers and 18 applicant characteristics of 331 web partic¬
ipants, they estimated the probability of acceptance for each offer characteristic using
three different modelling approaches, logistic regression, linear programming and an
accelerated life model approach. Because of the particular nature of the samples of
undergraduate students and the possibility of the 'testing effect'3 of the data collected,
the results may not be generalizable. In addition, the consumer's iso-preferences are
not explicitly estimated.
Seow and Thomas (2005) modelled the probabilities of an applicant taking different
offers using decision trees. Their analysis was based on the same data set used by Jung
et al. (2003). A two layered decision tree structure was used whereby the enforced
upper layer used applicant characteristics only and the lower layer used only offer
characteristics. This structure offers the convenience for the lender to build an adap-
3The students were making choices towards hypothetical products rather than real ones.
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tive application process by asking a customer about the applicant's characteristics first
and afterwards providing the offer that is the mostly likely to be taken by this customer.
Different tree settings were examined with and analysed in their paper. These were
an applicants characteristics only tree, an offer characteristics only tree, both types of
characteristics and even with more flexibility allowed in the tree structure (so called
alternate best tree) to generate a better fit to the data. They also explored the situation
when imposing a limited number of questions asked as a restriction on the tree building
process.
2.3 Previous research in profit scoring
Many issues arise when implementing profit scoring systems. The first one is how
to build a fully integrated information system to identify and capture profit related
information such as transactions, the merchant service charge for each account and
how to aggregate them together. Other decisions are
• Should profit be measured for each product individually or calculated in total
for all the products put together? Counting all products' profit considers the
cross selling marketing opportunities that could be neglected when measuring
individual product profit.
• Economic conditions. Crook et al. (1992) explored the differences observed in
the cut-off scores and functions estimated when using data for different years.
Their results showed the importance of economic condition changes over a busi¬
ness cycle and called for careful attention from the credit grantors. Bellotti and
Crook (2007b) demonstrated that including macroeconomic variables in survival
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analysis models as time-varying covariates significantly boosted the predictive
performance of the default compared with logistic regression.
• How to maximize profit using default based score? Subsection 2.3.1 will discuss
that in detail.
• How much to charge to maximize profit without losing the customer by charging
too much? Subsection 2.3.3 will discuss that in detail.
• The implication of the timing of the profits. To calculate the exact amount of
expected profit, not only the propensity for each customer to default will be
needed, but the timing of the defaults will also be important. Apart from defaults,
the timing and likelihood of early repayment behaviour is also crucial in the
profitability calculation. Subsection 2.3.4.2 will discuss the survival analysis in
detail.
2.3.1 Maximize profit using default based score
Following the approach ofMarshall and Oliver (1995) and Oliver (1993), Thomas et al.
(2002) described how to make accept and reject decisions to maximize profit based on
a traditional default credit scoring system and how to maximize the expected profit for
a portfolio. They assumed that the profit from a consumer R is 0 when he is rejected. If
the account is accepted and becomes good, a fixed amount of profit L is gained for the
lender. A fixed amount of loss D is incurred for the lender when the customer defaults
after being accepted. The expected profit E(R\s) for a customer with score s is then:
E(R\s) = Lp{G\s) - Dp(B\s) - Cost = (L+D)p{G\s) -D-Cost (2.1)
where Cost is fixed cost per customer. /?(G|s) is the conditional probability that a
customer with credit score s will be good. /?(5|s) is the conditional probability that
Chapter 2. Literature Review 27
customer with score s will be bad. Therefore p{B\s) = 1 - />(G|s) The profit maxi¬
mization decision to accept this customer can be derived through from equation 2.1 by
setting E(R\s) >= 0, implying a customer is/?(G|j) >= D2+o'
The total profit expected for the whole customer population that was accepted is
F*(R) = ^(ePgp(s\G) -DpBp{s\B)) (2.2)
s>c
where pc and pg are the probabilities of good and bad respectively. Here the fixed cost
is ignored. Assume p{G\s) is monotonically increasing with s. The cut off value c is
the score where for all the scores s >— c, p(G|j) >=
2.3.2 Relationship between Profit, Volume and Loss in a portfolio
Oliver and Wells (2001) have discussed the effect of different cut off policies on the
expected profit and volume as well as on loss. If all applicants with a score above sc
are accepted we can write:
poo
Expected fractional Volume E[V(sc)} = / f(s)ds=\—F(sc)
Jsc
poo
Expected Loss E[L(sc)\ = / Dp(B\s)f(s)ds — Dps(l — Eb(sc))Jsc
poo
ExpectedProfit E[P(sc)\ = / {Lp{G\s) Dp(B\s))f{s)ds
— LPG(\—FG(SC))—Dpb{\—FB{SC))
where f(s) is the density function of score and F(sc) is the proportion of scores below
the cut off score sc■ With no other constraints, the expected profit can be maximized
poo
MaxscE[P(sc)\ = Maxsc / {Lp(G\s)-Dp[B\s))f(s)ds
Jsc
= Maxsc [ Lp(B\s)(w(s)-y)f(s)ds (2.3)Jsc L
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where w(s) is the odds for score s. p(B\s) is monotonically increasing with 5. L and
f(s) are both positive. The unconstrained optimal cut off score sG is found when
wfac) = j
When the lender wants to minimize expected losses with a certain amount of expected
profit as the lower bound, the problem can be written as:
Mins E[L\ = Mins DpB( 1 -FB(s))
Subject to
X:LpG(l-FG(s))-DpB(\-FB(s))>P0
where X is positive and called the shadow price. Using non-linear programming (Kuhn-
Tucker conditions) to solve the optimality equations, the shadow price X is
where w* is the optimal cutoff odds for a constrained problem and w is the optimal
cutoff odds for an unconstrained profit maximizing problem. This can be illustrated
in Figure 2.10, where the efficient frontier is the set of points forming the solid line.
Moving along this efficient frontier in an anti-clockwise direction both expected profit
and expected losses go up until reaching the intersection point with the dotted line.
This intersection point is where the cutoff score equals After that point, the lowered
cutoff scores bring more bads which means more loss. The expected profit decreases
while the expected losses continue to increase. Therefore, the operating points on the
solid line make up the efficient frontier which is optimal.
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Figure 2.10: Efficient Frontier when the objective is to minimize expected loss subject
to given expected profit, Figure based on Oliver and Wells (2001)
Similarly, Oliver and Wells show that non-linear programming can be used to solve
the optimality equations when the lender has an optimizing target to maximize the
expected profit subject to a lower bound on the expected volume.
Maxs £[/%?)] = MaxsLpG( 1 -FG(s))-DpB( 1 ~FB(s))
Subject to:
p: (1 -F(s))>V0
This can be illustrated in Figure 2.11, where the efficient frontier is the set of points
forming the solid line. Moving along this efficient frontier in clockwise direction ex¬
pected profit decreases while expected volume increase. The operating points on this
efficient frontier are always satisfying the minimum volume constraint set above when
maximising the expected profit.








Figure 2.11: Efficient Frontier when the objective is to maximize expected profit subject
to given expected volume, Figure based on Oliver and Wells (2001)
Using non-linear programming techniques, other business objectives can be incorpo¬
rated in as extra constraints. For example, if the lender wants to add another constraint
of minimum market volume Vq when minimizing expected loss subject to minimum
expected profit Pq.
Mins E[L\ = Mins DpB( 1 -FB(s))
Subject to
A: LpG( 1 -FG(s))-DpB( 1 -Fb(s)) > P0
p: (1 —F(s)) > Vq
Similar Kuhn Tucker conditions are
-DpBfB{s) - A.(-Lpofais) +DpBfB(s)) - p(-f(s)) = 0
X{LPc( 1 -Fg(s))-DPb( 1 -Fb(s))-P0) = 0
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ju(\ — F(s) — Vo)=0
X>0
ju> 0
If ju = 0 and X = 0, Dpb/b{s) has to be 0, which cannot be true. If p = 0 and X > 0,
= LPGfX)-DPBfB(s) If Z7 > 0 a"d X = Q, p — If// > 0 and A. > 0, the condi¬
tions will be invalid unless both equations lpc{ \ — Fg(s)) — dps(1 — Fb(s)) — po = 0
and (1 - F(s) — Vq) — 0 are satisfied. Under such conditions, the cut off that yields
minimal expected profit Po will also bring minimal market volume Vo-
Beling et al. (2005a) continued the discussion of the optimal scoring cut off policies
based on the trade-off between the lender's multiple business objectives, with whom
the relationship to the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves have been il¬
lustrated. After presenting the policies to adopt for a single scorecard or dominant
scorecards, they showed policies for those with two scorecards, none ofwhich is dom¬
inating. In the presentation given by Beling et al. (2005b), the risk-neutral assumption
had been replaced with various risk-averse assumptions in the study of optimal portfo¬
lio selection policies.
All the derivations depend on the assumption that we have exact information on the
profit L for a good account and the loss D when the account is bad. Also they are not
assumed to change with the score s, which is more likely to happen when risk based
pricing is applied. Generally in risk based pricing, higher scores will be given lower
interest rate charges and lower scores (more risky customers) will be charged with
higher interest rates. The implication under such situations will be discussed in later
subsection 2.3.3.
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2.3.3 Risk based pricing
Often a lender charges customers the same fixed interest rate and rejects customers
with poor credit scores that are below a cut off value to control the risk. This is com¬
monly used for credit cards. Recently lenders have been separating customers into
different groups using credit scoring techniques. The customers having the highest
credit score are thought by the lender to be the lowest risk and are offered the lowest
interest rates. Those customers without good scores are accepted anyway if the scores
are higher than the cut off value. But they are not given such a low interest rate.
Thomas et al. (2002) used the example below to show how to set risk based inter¬
est rates according to the credit score. Assume in a scoring system the application
characteristics x will be given a score s. pc and p& are the proportion of goods and
bads in the whole population. p(s) is the proportion of the population that has score s.
p(s|G),/?(s|i?) are the conditional probabilities. Now
p(s) =p(s\G)pG+p(s\B)pB
and the probability of being good at score 5
ms) = rmm
by Bayes Theorem. Likewise,
ms)=emm
P{s)
Also assume that the interest rate i charged is a function of the credit score s, noted as
i(s). Assume the cost will be a constantD when the customer defaulted no matter what
the interest rate charged. The profit from a good customer, L(i), depends monotoni-
cally on the interest rate i charged. The lender just needs to decide whether to accept
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customers at each score 5 and what interest rate i to charge.
Denote the probability that customers with credit score 5 takes the offer with inter¬
est rate i as as(i). as(i) is decreasing in i. For a score s, highest expected profit can be
obtained by solving the equation below
max{(Z,(z)/?(G|s, /) — Dp(B\s, /))aJ(/), 0} (2.4)
i
The optimal interest rate i for a score s yielding the maximum expected profit can be
found by differentiating equation 2.4 with respect to i and setting the derivative to 0.
-L {i)p{G\s,i)as(i) - (L(i)p (G\s,i) -Dp (B\s,i))as(i) = (L(i)p(G\s,i) -Dp(B\s,i))a's{i)
(2.5)
As a special case with many simplified assumptions, assume interest rate i is the only
factor that influences a customer's acceptance behaviour and as(i) = The
customer with score s will be exponentially less likely to accept an offer of interest
rate i when it is larger than i*. Also assume L(i) = yjrf-yr — The payment is
R during time T charged interest rate i, at the cost of funds interest rate i*. Further
assume /?(G|s) = p(G\s,i). Interest rate i has no effect on the odds of goods given the
score. Then equation 2.5 becomes
(a(s)+rb)= (2-6)
Solving equation 2.6 will give the optimal interest rate i to charge for customers with
credit score s.
To get to this result, Thomas et al. (2002) implicitly made a lot of assumptions, which,
may not necessarily hold. The first assumption is that the loss D, which is assumed
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constant across all considerations. Banasik et al. (1999) have estimated expected time
to default as well as the expected time to pay off early using survival analysis tech¬
niques. The earlier a customer of a fixed term loan product defaults, the less payments
will be received by the lender, therefore the greater the losses incurred for the lender.
Their estimation of pay off early time also invalidates the assumed form of profit term
L{i), which not only increases with the interest rate charged but also varies with the
time for the customer to pay off early. The earlier the customer pays off or switches to
other lender, the less profit for the lender. Considering the high attrition rates due to
the current extremely competitive market, the inclusion of time to pay off early in the
function of profit L(i) cannot be omitted.
A practical argument against the implementation of risk based prices according strictly
to the score is that ill-intentioned fraudsters may be able to work out the mappings be¬
tween interest rates and credit scores. The latter are and should be kept secret during
operations.
In a simulation study Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) compared three different lend¬
ing strategies. The first one was a policy which selects a threshold cut off point on the
ROC curve and striking a zero profit. The second was a risk based pricing strategy
where the risk premium was linked with the credit score rather than a constant. The
third one was called the mixture regime but in fact was largely a risk based pricing
policy with the risk premium rounded towards the next quarter of a percentage point.
They simulated the competition in the loan market where 3 lenders fight for profit and
market shares when employing different lending strategies. The difference between
them is the predictive ability (quantified using AuROC) of the credit rating methods
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the lenders are using. The results were not surprising. The better the scoring model the
more economic benefit and market share for the lender. The significance of the ben¬
efit was more evidenced when risk based pricing oriented strategies were used across
lenders rather than a cut off strategy.
2.3.4 Other profit scoring approaches
Four different approaches to profit scoring have been considered in the literature. The
first one is to build indirect score cards separately for each profit related variable such
as default, acceptance, attrition and usage. Then combine the intermediate information
together to determine a final decision (see Li and Hand (2002)). But this approach is
open to the criticism that indirect scoring may propagate errors from the estimation
of the intermediate stage model to the final decision. Compared with such indirect
approaches, a reversed approach is to directly regress the profit on explanatory appli¬
cation variables.
The second one is to directly regress the profit on a linear function of the predictor
variables. One recent example is Somers and Whittaker (2007), which used linear and
kernel smoothed quantile regressions to model the revenue on a credit card portfolio
and loss given default on a mortgage portfolio.
The third approach, the Markov chain approach will be discussed in section 2.3.4.1.
The fourth approach, survival analysis will be discussed later in section 2.3.4.2 .
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2.3.4.1 Markov Chain approaches
Cyert et al. (1962) developed a Markov chain process model to describe the behaviour
ofcurrent accounts to estimate profit related variables like loss expectancy rates and al¬
lowances for doubtful accounts. Liebman (1972) formulated the credit control problem
using an infinite horizon Markov decision model to model the transition probability be¬
tween customer states. The customer state model is optimized in terms of minimizing
total credit costs using linear programming techniques after the definition of the cost
matrix is formulated.
Frydman (1984) argues that a mover-stayer model, a special mixture of two indepen¬
dent Markov chains, one for the 'stayer' in which the transition probability matrix
is equal to the identity matrix and the other for the 'mover', in which the transition
probability matrix is a nonnal one, describes the dynamics in payment states. She pre¬
sented a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the parameters of the mover-stayer
model. Then, Frydman et al. (1985) compared stationary and non-stationary Markov
chain models with the mover-stayer model. They applied those models to data of retail
revolving credit accounts and found that the mover-stayer model provided a better de¬
scription of the data when dealing with a heterogeneous population of credit accounts.
Till and Hand (2001) modelled repayment behaviours of credit card customers using
two kinds of Markov chains, stationary model and mover-stayer model. They found
most accounts stay in the state of being up to date from period t to t + 1. For those
who do not stay, the chance that they miss a further payment in t + 1 goes up and not
levels off until state 5. They also showed that although mover-stayer model describes
data better than the stationary model, first order MCs may not be appropriate.
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Trench et al. (2003) designed and implemented a system using Markov decision pro¬
cesses to make decisions on whether to grant offers to reduce APR or to increase credit
lines. Their model utilized account level historical information on credit card cus¬
tomers and estimated probabilities of the customer transferring from his/her current
state to other states using a transition matrix. After the estimation of the transition
matrix, a set of actions that will maximize the expected future profits in the future 36
months are selected using a recursive calculation method.
Ho et al. (2004) applied Markov chain models on a large sample of current account
data. They found that a first-order Markov chain is not appropriate to fit the data and
describe the customer behaviour. Instead, they applied higher order Markov chains on
the individual segments to address the non-homogeneity in the data yielding scorecards
that perform better than normal application based scorecards.
2.3.4.2 Survival analysis
Survival analysis is one of the statistical techniques widely used in medical research
and also in analysing system reliability. Survival analysis answers the question ofwhen
certain events occur rather than just how likely they are to happen, which has tradition¬
ally been the aim of credit scoring.
For each individual case we will record its time to the event happening(a 'failure'
or 'default' for example) or no such events because of censoring. When the observa¬
tion is censored, the only information we can infer is that the time to such an event
is greater than our observation time period. Denote T as the time of the event, the
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survival function S(t) can be expressed as
S(t)=p(t<T)
A hazard function h(t) is defined as the event rate at time / conditional on that the event
has not happened until time t or later.
(A p(t<T<t +dt\t<T) f(t) S'(t){> dt S{t) S{t)
where /(/) is the density function f(t) = S> (t) — P(t-T<t+dt) xhe three functions, den¬
sity function, hazard function and survival function are interchangeable in describing
the time distribution in survival analysis.
The survival function S(t) can be modelled parametrically using an Exponential dis¬
tribution S(t) — d or Weibull distribution S(t) = e~^k. Log-normal or log-logistic
models have also been tried. Kaplan and Meier (1958) suggested a non-parametric
approach (K-M estimator) to estimate the survival function.
Cox (1972) proposed regression models to analyse the relationship between survival
time and explanatory variables x = (x\,X2, ■■■xp). The hazard function is
h(t)=f(x)h0(t) (2.7)
where f(x) = ewx and w is a corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated.
ho(t) is called the baseline function and takes the form a certain time distribution. In
Accelerated Life models, the hazard function is in the form of
MO = f(x)ho(f(x)*t) (2.8)
where f(x) = ew'x . The difference between the two models is that in accelerated life
models explanatory coefficients w and variables x together are interacting with the time
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variable t in the baseline function ho so that explanatory variables x can accelerate or
decelerate the ageing of the subject studied. For the Proportional Hazard model, the
ratio of hazard for i and hazard for j is independent of ho
hi(t) ewx'
hj(t) ~
Narain (1992) applied the Accelerated Life Exponential Model to loan data and showed
that estimated survival time could be be used to support a better credit granting deci¬
sion. Banasik et al. (1999) applied three types of Proportional Hazards models and
an Accelerated Life model to data for a personal loan and compared their results with
logistic regression approaches. The results suggest PH models are competitive against
logistic regression in predicting default probabilities. They also showed how compet¬
ing risks (propensity to pay off early and propensity to default) can be accommodated
in credit scoring systems.
Bellotti and Crook (2007a) introduced macroeconomic variables in survival analysis
as time-varying covariates. Their results confirmed the influence of macroeconomic
factors on the probability of default and showed that their inclusion did improve the
predictive performance of default.
Andreeva et al. (2005) applied a Proportional Hazard Cox model to data for a revolving
store card product. When the customers made further purchases, this additional infor¬
mation was taken into account to enhance the models. They also reported the different
behaviour patterns observed between the Good and the Bad segments and within the
Bad segments as well.
On the data of the revolving credit card across three European countries, Andreeva
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(2006) compared survival analysis models (parametric and Proportional Hazard Cox
models) with the widely used Logistic Regression. She observed a similar predictive
performance across countries from those models.
Andreeva et al. (2007) combined a survival probability of default and the survival
probability of a second purchase using data relating to the store card in Germany to
form a survival combination model using OLS regression in a second stage to fit the
net revenue. This profitability oriented approach was shown to accrue more profit than
a logistic regression score optimized to minimize default risk only. However, it also
came at a price of accepting more defaults.
Stepanova and Thomas (1999) made improvements in the application ofCox's Propor¬
tional Hazards model to build credit-scoring models. They used a coarse-classifying
approach for characteristics, explained how residual tools can be used to check model
fitness, expanded the Cox PH model by including time-by-covariate interaction. Stepanova
and Thomas (2001) furthered the modelling with their application of survival analysis
in behaviour scoring. Their results showed the scores from their model are competitive
compared with logistic regression and yet provided more information crucial to calcu¬
late expected profit.
Stepanova and Thomas (2001) gave example equations for calculating expected profit
at the application time and month K, assuming the products sold were personal loans
and the survival probability estimated to month i are Sj.
T+2
Profit (Application Time) = ^ ^(l-f y-2 ~ ^
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where a is the monthly repayment amount or instalment, L is the amount of the loan
and T is the term of the loan and r is the monthly interest rate for interbank lending.
Similarly the expected profit at month K is calculated as
T+2-K T
Profit(Month K) = g
- (BK-(T-K)a)
where r is the monthly interest paid by the consumer and Bk is the actual balance
at month K. This is quite a step forward towards profit scoring, although more com¬
plicated formulae should be considered to account for the estimation of both time to
default and time to pay off early. The two events is quite different, in a competitive
personal loan market, early repayments can be 10 to 20 times more likely to happen
than defaults. On the other hand, the potential loss from default for the lender is much
bigger in amounts than the potential loss of revenue due to early repayments.
When considering models of the more than one type of event of interest, the approach
ofmodelling them in a competing risks context has been tried. Lambrecht et al. (2003)
studied a special UK mortgage data set and built a bivariate competing hazards dura¬
tion model to analyse the time to voluntary possessions or forced processions during
a number of years when economic conditions were changing. Although claiming the
model to be a competing risk model, their main assumption was that the two random
time events are independent and therefore wrote the joint density as the product of
marginal densities in their parametric formulation. By investigating the results, they
identified the variables that are most important to the lenders and borrowers when mak¬
ing their own foreclosure decisions accordingly.
Statistical methods are not the only approaches that can be used to estimate the tim-
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ing of the events, Baesens et al. (2005) have investigated neural network models as
alternatives for survival analysis. Based on their analysis comparing the predictive
performance (on defaults as well as on early repayments) of a neural network and that
of other predictors including a Cox proportional hazards model and a logistic regres¬
sion model, they concluded that the improvement achieved through the neural network
model is marginal.
2.3.5 Profit affected by Basel II
Since 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International
Settlements introduced a capital measurement system (Basel I) that required banks to
hold a fixed percentage of capital for their loans against possible loss. The limitations
ofBasel I led to the drafting ofBasel II. The Basel II Accord mandates that the minimal
capital required for a loan is a function of the LGD (loss give default), PD (probability
of default) and EAD (exposure of default). Oliver and Thomas (2005) discussed what
implications the introduction of regulatory requirements in Basel I and II will bring
and compared the optimal profit-maximizing cut-off scores under the requirements of
Basel I, II and before the Accords. Their model assumed the lender borrowed all the
funds and all equity is the shareholder capital. Cg stands for per unit borrowing cost
and Cq is for the equity capital cost. The expected profit for a single account can be
written as
E[P]=E[R] —E[L\ -E[Cb]-E[Cq] -Cf
where R is for revenue, L for the loss when default. CF is fixed costs.
The expected profit for the portfolio of accounts with scores larger than the cut-off
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score Sc is
E[PP\Sc} = rLpGFc{Sc\G) -fDpBFc(Sc\B)-rBFc(Sc) -rQfD [~K(p(s))dF(S)-CFJsc
where ri and rq are the interest rate charged for lending and capital correspondingly.
Pq and ps are the probability of good and bad. The optimal cut-off is obtained when
_ Pof{s*\G) = (fD + rB)PrQfDK(s*)°c Pb/{s*c\B) (rL -rB) -rQfDK(s*)
Using a numerical example they showed that under Basel I a higher cut-off score is
needed compared with Basel 0. The optimal cut-off score under Basel II may be higher
than under Basel I when the lender is taking high risk applicants by charging very high
rates, otherwise Basel 1 is more restrictive than Basel II.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed previous research relevant to profit scoring. Following
Keeney and Oliver (2005), we presented the preferences of the consumers in a two
dimensional space, the consequence to the lender in terms of expected profit and
how to locate the set of win-win offers. Next we described recent practical and the¬
oretical work modelling acceptance probabilities, maximizing expected profit using
default-risk-based scores and how risk based pricing may be implemented using de¬





This chapter is dedicated to the modelling of the default risk. Section 3.2 reviews pre¬
vious research work in default modelling methods and compares their performance.
In section 3.3 and 3.4 modelling details of logistic regression and support vector ma¬
chines (SVMs) are described. Section 3.5 explains why the area under ROC curves
is used as our performance measure instead of the accuracy ratio. Section 3.6, which
describes how the data is prepared is followed by section 3.7, reporting and comparing
performance of logistic regression and SVMs on the default data. Section 3.8 investi¬
gates the bidirectional relationship between the probability of default and the interest
rate. Finally, section 3.9 summarizes the findings in this chapter.
3.2 Previous research in default risk modelling
To facilitate faster and safer lending practice, lenders build credit scoring models to
assess the risk of default (non-repayments). These models are designed and trained to
44
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discriminate between future applicants based on the observed performance of existing
customers together with their application characteristics and the bureau data shared
between lenders. Predicting a default or no default outcome is a typical binary classi¬
fication problem.
Many statistical and non-statistical classification methods have been proposed and
applied in the credit scoring literature. Those methods include discriminant analy¬
sis, logistic regression, mathematical programming, decision trees, neural networks,
genetic algorithms, genetic programming, support vector machines and nearest neigh¬
bour methods. Combinations of different classifiers have also been tried. Comparative
studies of those classification methods have been carried out in various papers (see
Srinivasan and Kim (1987), Yobas et al. (2000), Baesens (2003), Ong et al. (2005) and
Lia et al. (2006)), with the classification accuracy rate used as the performance indi¬
cator. Table 3.1 compares the performance of different classification methods using
accuracy rate.
Newer and more complex methods, however, bring diminishing improvements, as
Hand (2006) observed. Hand suggested some reasons why little improvement happens
using much more complex models. The first is the flat maximum effect (Winterfeldt
and Edwards (1982) Hand (1997)), where by adding additional variables little can be
gained after equal weights of a linear predictor are carefully optimized. The second
reason is population drift (Kelly et al. (1999)). One of the fundamental assumptions of
credit scoring models is that the customer population distribution with respect to the
risk of default is supposed to be stationary over time. That is without doubt unrealistic
in practice. Customer behaviour will change because of constant changes in the exter-
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nal economic environment. Customers acquired in this advertising campaign will also
be different to those attracted in a next one due to dynamic competition in the market
between the lenders.
Hand also pointed out some common questionable practices during the modelling pro¬
cess by the researchers. One of the problems is the mismatch between the optimization
criteria and the performance assessment methods. A common example is the using of
likelihood to select a model, followed by using the accuracy or misclassification rate to
evaluate the model performance, and finally reporting cost weighted misclassification
rate in practice.
Using the accuracy percentage alone is not a good indication ofpredictive performance
as it fails to reflect the difference in the predictive ability towards different classes.
Area under ROC curve (AuROC) is a more appropriate choice. Detailed discussion
will be given in subsection 3.5.2. For a comparison of the credit scoring models whose
performance is measured in AuROC, please see Baesens et al. (2003) and Bellotti and
Crook (2007c). Besides, the datasets used in the some of the comparative studies may
not reflect the real consumer credit data distribution faced by today's major lenders in
the UK. Take the German Credit Data used in Ong et al. (2005) and Baesens (2003)
for example, thirty percent of them are defined as 'bad' and others are 'good', which
contrasts with typical UK consumer credit data with default rates at around or less than
5 percent.
In this chapter we will compare the performance of logistic regression and support
vector machines in predicting default. Logistic regression is the classifier that is most
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commonly used by lenders and it has yielded consistently good predictive performance
compared with other classifiers (see Table 3.1). Support vector machines are one of
the most promising newer methods. The following two sections will introduce the
modelling detail of logistic regression and support vector machines.
3.3 Logistic regression1
When the dependent variable to predict is binary or dichotomous , logistic regression
may be a more appropriate model than linear regression models. Linear regression
relates the explanatory (or predictor) variables to the dependent(or outcome) variable
by the formula
y — Po + PiM + • • • + P/A«
The dependent variable y could range from —°° to +°° if the values of xn varies from
—oo to +oo. This cannot accommodate the data when the dependent variable is taking
values between 0 and 1 only, although for application scoring this may not matter
since only a ranking is required. However for the calculation of PDs (Probability of
Default) for regulatory capital purposes, predictions outside the [0,1] interval would
be problematic. The logistic transformation solves that problem so that the dependent
variable, p, ranges from 0 to 1 and so can be interpreted as the estimated probability.
k(x)g(x) = In
And the probability p is
1 — 7t(x)
p = %{x) =
— po + Pl-H + • • • + Pnxn
es(x)
1 + es(x)
Maximum Likelihood Estimation methods are normally used to find the estimates of
the parameters that will maximize the likelihood, the probability of observed data. The
'The introduction of logistic regression models follows Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)
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likelihood function for one observed data point (*,-,>>,•), is
n(x)yi [1 -7t(x)]1_-v''
Since the observed data are assumed to be independently collected, their joint proba¬
bility can be written as
L = Yln(xYi[\-n(x)}]-yi
The parameters to be found to maximize L are also going to maximize ln{L) as the log
of L is monotonically related to L. In practice, it is much easier to find the maximum
of ln{L) or the minimum of—ln(L).
Unlike linear discriminant analysis, logistic regression does not require that the co-
variates are normally distributed or that the covariates have an identical covariance
matrix. When dealing with real data in which normality conditions are sometimes not
met, logistic regression can cope well without the restriction of these assumptions.
3.3.1 Variable selection using step-wise selection
Hand (2006) shows that in a linear model, introducing additional variables may result
in diminishing improvement in explanatory power. Adding very large numbers of vari¬
ables may also result in over-fitting of the model. So we have run step-wise variable
selection routines.
There are two directions to select variables, Backward selection and Forward selection.
Backward selection starts from a complete set of variables and then tries to remove
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those insignificant ones step by step. Forward selection is working in the opposite
direction by adding the most significant variables step by step. At each step of a Back¬
ward stepwise selection, an attempt is made to remove any insignificant (when their p
value is smaller than a pre-set threshold pou,) variables from the model before adding
a significant variable (when their p value is larger than a pre-set threshold p,n) to the
model.
3.3.2 Existence of MLE(maximum likelihood estimation)
Albert and Anderson (1984) discussed 3 different situations under which the existence
of a MLE solution of the logistic regression model depends. These 3 different data
configurations are listed below.
• Complete Separation
The data can be completely separated. There exists a vector b that can classify
all cases into the observed classes correctly.
bxj >0 Yj = 1
bxj <0 Yj = 2
In this situation, non-unique infinite estimates are given by the SAS logistic pro¬
cedure.
• Quasicomplete Separation
The data are not completely separable but there is a vector b such that
bxj >0 Yj = 1
<
bxj <0 Yj — 2
In this situation, non-unique infinite estimates are also given by the SAS logistic
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procedure.
• Overlapped
Overlapped data configuration means there is no complete or quasi-complete
separation existing in the sample points. In this situation, unique maximum
likelihood estimates exist.
The problems of quasi-complete or complete separation of data points are typically
encountered when the sample size of data is small. This is later evidenced in the
logistic regression results for a subsample of our data.
3.4 Support vector machines
Support vector machines (SVMs) are becoming one of the most promising learning
methods used for classification and regression. Numerous applications have been sug¬
gested, such as hand written digit recognition, object recognition, text categorization
etc. In many problems SVMs have been found to perform extremely well compared to
other classifiers.
Not surprisingly, SVMs have been tried on credit scoring problems with encourag¬
ing results reported. Baesens (2003) compared the classification performance of Least
Squares SVM against other commonly used techniques including decision trees, lo¬
gistic regression, naive Bayes, linear and quadratic discriminant analysis and k-nearest
neighbours. He concluded that SVMs achieved very good test set classification perfor¬
mances in terms of accuracy rate. However, his analysis was carried out on publicly
available UCI benchmark datasets (Statlog Australian Credit, Bupa Liver Disorders,
The statlog German Credit, The Statlog heart disease, The Johns Hopkins Univer-
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sity Ionosphere, The Pima Indians Diabetes, the Sona, The Tic-Tac-Toe Endgame,
the Wisconsin Breast Cancer and The Adult), none of which resembles a typical low
default-rate dataset a major UK bank now faces. Therefore some questions still remain
unanswered on how SVMs will perform on an extremely imbalanced dataset, which
presents a difficult learning task.
Schebesch and Stecking (2005a) also applied SVMs to classification using loan data
from a bank. However they conducted their analysis and reported findings based on
re-sampled data so that the good-bad ratio was equalized rather than the original 6.7
percent. They have reported the performance of the classifiers using leave-one-out-
error rate, which is around 25%, which is slightly better(but not significant) than logis¬
tic regression. In the results of Schebesch and Stecking (2005b), they have observed
that SVM outperformed logistic regression with unequal sizes of good and bad in the
sample as well as asymmetric costs ofmisclassification.
3.4.1 Formulation2
In a typical classification scenario, we have a set of training data to split into two
classes. The data are in the form of pairs (x/,y,) where i is case i. In a normal binary
classification problem, y,- is a class label of the data vector x, taking value of either —1
or +1. For a linear machine on separable data all the training data should satisfy the
constraints below:
w-Xi + b > +1 if y,- = +1
<
w-Xj + b < — 1 if yi — — 1
2The introduction of SVM formulation follows Burges (1998).
Chapter 3. Default Risk Modelling 53
Where w and b are the weights and constant accordingly. The two inequalities can be
combined to be written as
yi(w-Xj+ b) — 1 > 0 Vz (3.1)
The best classifier is selected when the pair of parallel hyper-planes H\ : w ■ x,- + b —
— 1 and H2 : w • x,- + b = +1 is found to have the largest orthogonal distance, or the
maximum margin (7777), as illustrated in Figure 3.1 where none of the data points fallIMI
in the region between the hyper-planes. Mathematically, finding the maximum margin
2is equivalent to minimising 11 w\ \ subject to the constraint in equation 3.1.
H2 •
Figure 3.1: SVM on two-class linearly separable data
In most cases the data are not linearly separable. We can relax the inequalities by
introducing positive slack variables (Vapnik (1995)) in the inequalities to allow for
training errors .
w-Xj + b >+l-£;- if y, = +l
< w-Xj + b < -1+ if yt = -1
^ > 0 V/
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The objective function to minimize is now
l^+c(iyZ i
where C is a cost parameter controlling how much we can tolerate training errors. A
larger C means a higher penalty assigned to the objective function during optimization.
The Lagrangian L in primal form is:
L _ML+c(£^) - ^<3i(y/(wri + b) - 1 +£,-) -£A& (3-2)
/ / /
where o, and 2,, are the Lagrange multipliers introduced. Using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions,
V n— =w-X^ = 0
^ V n
3» = -2>I = O
~ r - n - \ -n




^/(w-Xf + A) - 1 +^; > 0
$/>0
a,(yi(w -xi +b)- 1 + £,■) = 0
A& = 0
Note that ifwe choose i so that A.,• = C — at > 0, then we can have £,• = 0 because A,-^,- =
0. Also if a,- 7^ 0,y;(w-x,-t-&) — 1 +4/ = 0 because a,(y/(w-x, + Z>) — 1 +^;) = 0. Those
points (xj,yj) that are called support vectors form the decision boundaries that are the
two hyper-planes that separate the two classes. Substituting the equations above back
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into Equation 3.2, the problem ofminimizing L becomes the problem of maximizing
LduqI in dual form:
5 j s s
maxLDuai = X a> ~ 9 X X ai"jyiyj(xi ■xj) (3.3)
i=\ 1 ;=1 i—j
subject to
{0 < a/ < CSf=i = o
where S is the number of support vectors.
When the decision function is better described using a non-linear function, better per¬
formance can be achieved using a non-linear support vector machine, which projects
input data to higher or even infinite dimensional feature space where a linear classifier
can separate mapped data much more easily. Such a method is called the 'kernel trick'.
Note the mapping $ from lower / dimensional space to higher h dimensional space
$ : R1 Rh
Therefore in higher feature space, similar to maximising the margin, we need to solve
an equation similar to equation 3.3
5 j s s
maxLDuai = X ai ~ TX X aiajyiyj($(x') ■ <\>(xj)) (3.4)
,=1 Z ;= I ;=j
subject to similar constraints. Note that components of <|)(jc/) • §(xj) always appear to¬
gether, and is replaced with the kernel function K(xj,Xj) = <|>(x;-) • ^(xj) when Mercer's
Condition is met. The cunning bit here is that <J)(jc) does not need to be computed ex¬
plicitly because only the values of K(x,y) — (|)(x/) • ((>(*/) are needed to be evaluated.
By choosing an appropriate functional form ofK(x,y), computational complexity does
not increase exponentially with the mapping from lower dimensional space to higher
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dimensional space.
A classification result for a test point T can be computed based on the sign of function
/0) = X aiyiK(T^i) + b
;= l
where Sj is the zth point in the set of support vectors and S is the number of support
vectors. Only those support vectors forming the decision hyper-planes are needed to
give predictions. After the training of the SVM is finished, only these support vectors
instead of the whole set of data points need to be retained in the model. That saves a
lot of runtime memory and increases the speed of generating predictions.
3.4.2 Practical concerns
3.4.2.1 Kernel Choices
One of the most important factors that affects the performance of SVMs is the choice
of kernels. Three very commonly used kernels will be used.
• linear kernel: K(x,y) —x-y
• polynomial kernel: K(x,y) = (y -x-y+ r)d
• RBF kernel: K(x,y) = e~^x~y^2/2°2
• Sigmoid kernel: K(x,y) = tanh(y-x-y+ r)
The kernel parameters like d r and c have to be determined using some model chosen
methods. Cross-validation is a common choice to select the best model in predicting
unseen holdout data.
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3.4.2.2 Different Weights on Different Classes to Handle Imbalanced Data
The original formulation in the SVMs aims to maximize the margin (jj^jjr) subject to
constraints. This implicitly assumes that the importance of classes are equal when try¬
ing to separate them. However, this maximizing objective is questionable when dealing
with imbalanced data in which the minority class happens to be more important. SVMs
trained with equalized weight on both classes will be rewarded (quite rightly according
to the formulation) to allocate all cases into the majority class.
To handle an imbalanced data set, instead of minimising the equation treating good
and bad cases at the same cost C which gives
Z i
Osuna et al. (1997) suggested the extension of introducing separate cost parameters
C+ and C_ to form a new objective equation to minimize.




$« > o v;
Here C+ stands for the cost of misclassifying the positive class (minority and more
important) and C_ is for misclassifying the majority negative class. Similar to previous
treatment, Lagrangian multipliers can be introduced in the L as below,
minL = M-+C+( Y, £/)+£-( X 4»)-Za''CV/(w■*,■ +&)-i+Si)-
i\yi=+\ tyi=-1 i '
using KKT conditions, dual form Loual can be written as:
S J s s
LDuai = X "t ~ 9 ZXwjyiyAxi ■ xJ) (3-5)
i'=l i'=l i=j
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subject to
0 <cij<C+ ifyi = +1
< 0 < o, < C_ ifyi = — 1
XL «/>"/ = o
After solving this optimization problem, the prediction can be made in a similar fashion
as before, 5gn{Xf=i aiyiK(T,Si) + b}. Our estimations have been carried out on Libsvm
Chang and Lin (2001) with the setting of ^ = 25. During the optimization,




This section will define Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves and the area
under the ROC curve and compares the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
measures ofpredictive performance.
3.5.1 Definition of the ROC and area under ROC curve
The ROC curve was introduced to measure the ability to detect signals from noises. It
is widely used in medical research to describe the detection ability of classifiers. For
a dichotomous outcome problem, each instance case belongs to a positive or negative
class label. The objective of the classifier is to label the cases into positive or negative
classes. Given the classifier and existing known class labels, there are four possible
outcomes of the prediction.
1. True Positive: Positive instances correctly labelled as positive
2. False Positive: Negative instances incorrectly labelled as positive
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3. False Negative: Positive instances incorrectly labelled as negative
4. True Negative: Negative instances correctly labelled as negative




Positive True Positives False Positives
Negative False Negative True Negatives
Table 3.2: Confusion Matrix
The True Positive Rate, also called sensitivity or recall, can be expressed as
TruePositives
True Positive Rate = — — —
TotalActualPositives
And the False Positive Rate,
FalsePositives
False Positive Rate =
TotalActualNegatives
Specificity is defined as:
False Positive Rate = 1 — Specificity
A discrete two-class classifier outputting some probabilistic results predicts class la¬
bels given a cut-off or threshold value. The instances where the attached probabilities
are higher than the cut-off value are then classified as positive and the rest as negative.
For each cut-off value we can calculate the corresponding True Positive Rate and False
Positive Rate. Then in a two dimensional True Positive vs. False Positive space, con¬
necting all those (TP Rate, FP Rate) points will give us a ROC curve as in Figure 3.2,
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in which sensitivity equals to the true positive rate while false positive rate equals to 1
- specificity.
Area under ROC curve = 0.7873
Figure 3.2: Sample ROC curve
One important value to read from a ROC curve is the area under the ROC curve
(AuROC or AUC) value. Because both the X axis (FP rate or 1-specificity) and Y axis
(TP rate or sensitivity) range from 0 to 1, the Area under a ROC curve is between 0
and 1. Its value is widely used to measure the ability of the model to correctly dis¬
criminate 'good'(positive) cases from 'bad'(negative) cases . The bigger and nearer to
1 the AuROC is, the better the model is considered to be in its classification perfor¬
mance. The AuROC is also related to the Gini Coefficient, which can be calculated as
2 *AuROC — 1.
A random classifier doing nothing but wild guessing should get a straight ROC curve
directly connecting points (0,0) and (1,1). Therefore its AuROC is 0.5. Any correctly
discriminating classifier should do better than that. If not, reversing all the predictions
from negatives to positives and positives to negatives should increase the AuROC.
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Calculation of the AuROC can be done by counting the true positives and false pos¬
itives under each cut-off setting and then summarizing them. A much more efficient
way of calculating the AuROC value is to firstly sort the prediction results together
with the actual class labels by the predicted probabilities(or scores). Recognizing that
previously counted true positives and false positives can be re-used to calculate true
positives and false positives under lower cut-offs. The computational complexity is
therefore reduced to just one linear scan.
3.5.2 Area under ROC curve compared with Accuracy Ratio as a
performance measure
The Accuracy Rate is widely used to measure the predictive performance ofclassifiers.
The Accuracy rate is calculated as
Correctly Predicted Instances
Accuracy rate = Total Instances
The problem with Accuracy Rate is that per se it cannot correctly reflect the differences
in the prediction ability on difference classes.
Many binary classification problems involve very skewed class distributions where
as low as 1 in 1000 cases are positives that need to be detected. Contrary to the relative
size in the distribution, those minority class members are more likely to receive spe¬
cial attention in the investigation. This is normally because when those minority class
members are misclassified the costs incurred will be much higher than those from
the majority class. A classifier making all of its mistakes on one important class can
achieve the same Accuracy Rate as another classifier making mistakes on both classes
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or on the class that is less important.
If the cost ofmis-classification can be determined by the researchers before modelling,
a 2 by 2 cost matrix can be created (assuming the problem is a binary classification ) as
shown in Table 3.3. Each cell of the costmatrix represents the cost ofmis-classification
for that corresponding cell in the confusion matrix. For example, based on the cost ma¬
trix, a cost sensitive classifier can be calculated either re-weighting the training data
according to the cost matrix or predict the class by minimizing expected misclassifica-
tion cost instead ofAccuracy Rate.
1 20
2 1
Table 3.3: Example of a Cost Matrix
The AuROC does not account for different costs of misclassification. The benefit of
AuROC is that it gives an indication of predictive performance over all cut-off values.
Its weakness is that for practical purposes we may be interested in only a narrow range
of cut-offs, to be precise, the slope of the tangent line to the ROC curve at the cut-off
point. Such optimal cut-offs can be found using ROC curve when loss and gain have
been quantified, as shown in the chapter 7.6 of Thomas et al. (2002). Blochlinger and
Leippold (2006) continued this discussion of optimal pricing strategies using the ROC
curves and related those to the profitabilities. They simulated the competition between
(an assumed) 3 lenders' loan market where the lenders took different rating models
(with predictive abilities quantified by the AuROC) and various pricing strategies. The
results are not surprising, the better the scoring model the more economic benefit.
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3.6.1 Definition of default
Given the performance data we have access to, and depending on the type and length
of time period we are researching ( the whole life of an account, the first 12 months
or the most recent 12 months ), we can classify the status of an account into one of 3
categories
1. Good. The observation never missed more than one or two payments during the
time period we set.
2. Paying back early. The customer paid back early and settled the loan before the
end of the observation period of the data .
3. Default. The customer missed 2 or more than 2 payments during the observation
time period.
When modelling the default probability using binary logistic regression, the depen¬
dent variable takes only 2 possible values, 0 for no default or 1 for default. Therefore
the paying back early cases are assumed to be good and marked as 0. The default
is marked as 1 on those who have missed 2 or more than 2 payments in the first 12
months of their account histories.
3.6.2 Bands separation
The data we are working on were collected by a financial institution selling fixed term
loan products. Based on the credit scores, a customer is allocated to one of 7 different
bands numbered from 0, 10 20, ... 60. The number of cases in each band varies. The
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Interest Rates Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] N
BANDO 17.60092 0.430556 16.75702 18.44481 251
BAND 10 21.35344 0.086132 21.18462 21.52226 2240
BAND20 17.54549 0.055612 17.43649 17.65449 2915
BAND30 12.94531 0.033621 12.87942 13.01121 5078
BAND40 10.06131 0.031029 10.00049 10.12213 4604
BAND50 7.396764 0.021013 7.355579 7.437948 6915
BAND60 7.215612 0.010638 7.194761 7.236463 31347
Total 9.236919 0.0190147 9.19965 9.274188 53350
Table 3.4: Average interest rates across bands
smallest band 0, has only 253 cases while the most frequently populated band 60, con¬
tains 21840 cases.
Customers in each band were offered different interest rates to test their acceptance
propensities. Across the bands, the average interest rate applied to each band reflects
the level of risk the bank attached to the cases in that band. The lower the band, the
higher the average interest rate will be charged. Within each band, the exact interest
rate each applicant was charged was the average band rate plus or minus a random
adjustment.
Table 3.4 reports the mean interest rate with standard deviations across different bands.
Generally, the higher the band number, the lower the average interest rates that was
charged with a smaller standard deviation observed. BANDO is a very small band
within which the institution has offered a relatively wide range of interest rates. This is
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evidenced by a much higher standard error of 0.43 within the band compared to those
of other bands (0.01 to 0.08).
This analysis estimated a logistic regression model using all the data in aggregate and
logistic regressions for each band separately.
3.6.3 Data transformation
Continuous variables were categorized into 7 equal sized bins by choosing 6 splitting
points so that the number of cases falling between every two splitting points are the
same (or as similar as possible). By doing so each bin has a similar and large enough
number of cases. The traditional method of "coarse classifying", grouping cases based
on the similarity of odds, is not adopted. This is because we have to predict at least
two binary dependent variables, default and acceptance, both of which can provide
conflicting odds (please see next chapter for acceptance modelling).
For categorical variables, some very rare levels cannot be divided evenly into separate
training and holdout sample sets. Ifby chance all such cases fall into the holdout sam¬
ple set, the model trained on the training set will have difficulties in predicting cases
with such 'novel' values. As a remedy, their values are assigned to the nearest levels.
These rare cases should have little impact on the predictive ability of the trained model.
Two methods are available for the coding of categorical variables. The first one is
the so called Weights of Evidence. These can be calculated based on the log odds
information so that categorical variables with a lot of levels can be easily transformed
into just 1 dimensional numerical values, saving a lot of extra dimensionalities that
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would otherwise be required. This method is efficient and much faster for parameter
estimation when we have only one targeting dependent variable to model.
However, since we have to model the probability of acceptance and default and also
time to default in the next stage we chose dummy variables encoding in the later analy¬
sis (the only exception is the interest rate, retaining its original numerical values rang¬
ing from 5% to 32%). For a categorical variable with k multiple levels, k — 1 dummy
variables are created to replace the original variable. Each dummy variable takes a
binary value of 1 or 0, corresponding to the presence of each level in the original
categorical variable. The level left not coded is represented when all other dummy
variables take the value 0.
3.6.4 Training and holdout sample separation
A model trained and tested with the same set of data cannot be used convincingly.
This is because the model may be over fitted with the training data and so performs ex¬
tremely well in classifying every case in the training data correctly but performs much
less well in an independent holdout data set, which is representative of the population
of all applicants (Thomas et al. (2002)).
By comparing the difference in classification performance between training set and
randomly selected holdout set we can examine whether the current model is over-
fitting. Our data are separated into a randomly selected 70% training set and 30%
holdout set.
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3.7.1 Logistic regression results
Logistic regression models were parameterised for each individual band to predict the
default probabilities within that band. The BANDO data are so small that the SAS
logistic procedure reports finding quasicomplete data separation. The MLE estimates
reported for BANDO are therefore questionable. To get convergence in the maximum
likelihood estimation, the sample size must be increased. We combined BANDO and
BAND 20 to form a larger set and ran logistic regression on it as well. The reason for
choosing BANDO and BAND20 is because the two bands have similar average interest
rates, as shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.5 reports the performance of the classifier across bands using the AuROC.
From BANDO to BAND60, the size of holdout samples is increasing. BandO is so
small that the likelihood estimation routine cannot converge. The AuROC of the model
based on all bands data put together is much higher than those reported from other in¬
dividual bands. This can be explained by the fact that the average interest rates offered
to different bands are varied and combining bands together increases the variance of
interest rates, one of the most predictive independent variables. In some bands, some
holdout samples are omitted because they have some dummy variables not appearing
in the training set due to the random training-holdout-split procedure.
On the training data with all bands combined together, stepwise routines were used to
select the variables for the logistic regression. For the meaning of the names of the
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BAND Converged? AuROC Holdout Sample Size
0 N 0.8571 26
10 Y 0.7623 85
20 Y 0.6803 163
30 Y 0.6934 445
40 Y 0.6129 591
50 Y 0.6514 1430
60 Y 0.7063 6649
0&20 Y 0.6199 193
ALL Y 0.7907 9397
Table 3.5: The predictive performance measured in AuROC across bands.
variables selected, please see Table 3.6. Appendix A: Tables A.l and A.2 list the max¬
imum likelihood estimates of all parameters. The coefficient of the interest rate APR
is 12.2737, which means a percent unit increase in APR will lead the odds of default
increasing by a factor of exp( 12.2737/100) = 1.1306 when other variables are fixed
at the same value. For example, the coefficient of Tnsurance=N' is —0.5967, which
means if the customer does not take the insurance, the odds that he/she is to default
will decrease by a factor of 1 — exp(—0.5967) = 0.4493.
The MLE parameter estimates for each of individual band from 10 to 60 can be found
in Appendix A: Tables A.3 A.4 A.5 A.6 A.l A.8 A.10. Bands 0, 10 and 20 have few
observations so the validity of the model estimated is questionable. In the models es¬
timated for those bands, the Rate variable was even excluded after stepwise selection.
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risk bands and allocated higher interest rate so their default probabilities are relatively
unaffected by the rate imposed on them.
3.7.2 Unweighted SVM results
This section reports the performance of SVMs on holdout data using different kernels
and kernel parameters. The cost parameter C on both positive and negative classes is
kept the same(un-weighted).
3.7.2.1 Data Sampling, Scaling and Variable Selection
Due to the limitation of computation resources required for massive model space
searches for SVMs, 5000 cases were randomly drawn from the data and model searches
were conducted on this subset of the data. This sample size is large enough to draw
generalizable conclusions without being too slow to run on SVMs.
Some trial analysis showed that scaling numerical variables into values ranging from
0 to 1 improved the classifier's performance. The only variable not coded as dummy
variable in the data, the interest rates, ranging from 5% to 32%. After scaling the
values into ranges [0,1], the best AuROC value reached a maximum value of 0.7234,
compared to the previous AuROC value of 0.70 from unsealed data. This can be ex¬
plained by the fact that SVM is more sensitive to numerical values. Too large a value
will unfortunately dominate the classifier and lead to sub optimal performance.
Although large dimensionality is not a problem for SVMs to handle, too many un-
predictive independent variables may not be desirable and result in over fitting. Logis¬
tic regression procedures address this issue by variable selection mechanisms such as
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step-wise selection. For comparison of the performance based on the same set of data
and variables, the same set of variables selected by step-wise selection in the logistic
regression are used in the SVM classification.
Most of our variables are categorical and coded as dummy variables. That means
for a three level variable, (0,0,1), (0,1,0) and (1,0,0) are used to represent each level
within the variable. This is necessary as SVMs are good at handling numerical data
problems. Many fields in which SVMs claimed the crown for the best predictor are
those dealing with lots of numerically measured data, such as hand written characters
or image recognition (see Chapelle et al. (1999)).
3.7.2.2 Linear kernel results
The Linear kernel /f(x,y) =x-y perfonned rather poorly. The Fig 3.3 reports a ROC
curve for a SVM using a Linear kernel with cost parameter c = 1. The Area under the
ROC curve is only around 0.6.








0.1 0.2 0.3 8.4 8.5 0.6 0.7
False Positive Rate
Figure 3.3: AuROC of SVM using Linear kernel
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3.7.2.3 Polynomial kernel results
The results reported below are based on the Polynomial kernel K(x,y) = (y-x-y+ r)3.
(r has been assumed to be a constant 0.) The Area under the ROC curve reaches 0.69,
better than a Linear kernel but worse than a RBF kernel. The cost parameter ranges
from 0.1 to 5. The gamma parameter ranges from 0.01 to 1. It seems the Polynomial
kernel SVM built on this data is more sensitive to the choice of gamma parameter,
where the best AuROC value 0.69 is achieved around y = 0.01.










Gamma parameter g Cost parameter C
Figure 3.4: SVM using Polynomial kernel.
3.7.2.4 RBF kernel results
The RBF kernel: K(x,y) = performs much better than the Linear kernel.
A grid-fashioned search results in model parameter space of cost vs. gamma is shown
in Figure 3.5. The cost parameter ranges from 0.1 to 5. The gamma parameter ranges
from 0.01 to 1. It seems the RBF kernel SVM bult on this data is more sensitive to the
choice of gamma parameter, where the best AuROC is achieved around y= 0.16.
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The Classification Performance over RBF-kernel parameter-space
Gamma parameter Cost parameter C
Figure 3.5: SVM using RBF kernel.
The best area under the ROC curve value of 0.7234 can be found when the cost is
0.05 and gamma is 0.16, as shown in Fig 3.6. Similar performance can be found with
other cost parameters when the gamma parameter is around 0.16. This indicates the
importance of the gamma parameter to the RBF kernel SVM classifier.
ROC curve of trainingsubset.scalfr-t2-cB.e5-ge.16 <RUC * 0.7234)
0.4 B.6
False Positive Rate
Figure 3.6: AuROC of SVM using RBF kernel
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3.7.2.5 Sigmoid kernel results
The results for the Sigmoid kernel K(x,y) = tanh(y-x-y+ r) (where r has been set as
a constant 0) are shown below. The Sigmoid kernel achieved performance in terms of
Area under the ROC curve (0.7172) similar to that of RBF kernel. The cost parameter
ranges from 0.1 to 1.1. The gamma parameter ranges from 0.01 to 0.7. It seems
the Sigmoid kernel SVM bult on this data is also sensitive to the choice of gamma
parameter, where the best AuROC 0.7172 is achieved around y = 0.01.
The Classification Performance over Sigmoid-kemel parameter-space
Gamma parameter g Cost parameter C
Figure 3.7: SVM using Sigmoid kernel.
3.7.3 Weighted SVM results
In our previous analysis, the SVMs based on un-weighted costs were not performing
as competitively as reported in previous research papers. To see if the weighted SVM
methods as described in section 3.4.2.2 can improve the predictive performance, we
conducted the analysis as followed. We ranked cases by the probabilities predicted by
LR and removed those between the 20th and 80th deciles, that is the middle 60% of
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the cases. Later analysis on the weighted SVMs are carried out on this set of data.
The weighted SVM was estimated on this subsample after a logistic regression. Un¬
weighted SVM can achieve Area under ROC value of 0.7677 using an RBF kernel.
The best AuROC value of 0.8037 can be found at when the cost parameter is 0.1 and












Figure 3.8: Area under the ROC of Weighted SVM using RBF kernel.
3.7.4 Summary
The LR model for the whole sample gives an AuROC of 0.7907 whereas the highest
AuROC for unweighted SVM model, can only reach 0.7234, clearly being outper¬
formed. The superiority of a weighted SVM using RBF kernel over an unweighted
SVM using RBF kernel is also demonstrated by the improvement of AuROC from
0.7677 to 0.8037 on a set of subsample.
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3.8 Simultaneous Equations Model
The financial institution providing the data carried out their analysis by first credit
scoring the customers and separating them into different bands according to their risk
of default. Each customer was then offered an interest rate based on the assigned risk
band and some other random adjustments. Apparently the interest rate of the loan can
be explained using the risk of default together with other exogenous demographic and
bureau data variables. On the other hand, it is also possible that the probability of de¬
fault is also affected by the interest rate of the loan simultaneously.
This section studies this simultaneous relationship hypothesis. Firstly we used a Bayesian
Network classifier to search for the most predictive Bayesian networks hoping the
structure of the network might reveal some conditional dependences. Next we fit¬
ted the data using a Simultaneous Equations Model and we examined the parameters
estimated. We used a simultaneous equations model because we required unbiased
estimates of the parameters of the default equation.
3.8.1 Investigation of the relationships between default, rate and
score using Bayesian network structure search
Firstly, a logistic regression model was fitted where the dependent variable was the
probability of default while the interest rate variable was excluded as a covariate. Sec¬
ondly, using the predicted probabilities of Default as the score, together with the inter¬
est rate variable and the observed default indicator, a Bayesian network was searched
and its parameters estimated.
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Figure 3.9: The relationships between 3 variables in a graph found after a global search
Figure 3.10: The relationships between 3 variables in a graph found after a local search
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 present the results of the search. The two different graphs are
found using the same search mechanism TAN (Tree augmented network) but Figure
3.9 was searched globally while Figure 3.10 searched locally. TAN (Tree augmented
network) was proposed in Friedman et al. (1997). A TAN is similar to a Naive Bayes
network in which the class variable C is the root of the network and has no parent.
Unlike a Naive Bayes network, the attributes of a TAN not only have the class variable
as their parent, but also allow augmenting edges between the attributes.
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A TAN is built by firstly constructing a complete undirected graph in which the ver¬
tices are the attributes and the weight of the edge is calculated from the conditional
mutual information. Then use the procedures proposed by Chow and Liu (1968) to
find a maximum weighted spanning tree. The resulting undirected tree can then be
transformed to a directed one by choosing a root variable and setting the direction of
all edges to be outward from it. The final step is to add the class variable C to the tree
by adding an edge from C to each attribute.
Due to the nature of the Bayesian Network structure search algorithm, it always as¬
sumes the node of the default indicator is the root and parent of other explanatory
variables (because it is the default probability to be finally predicted). Both structures
achieved an Area under the ROC curve of 0.803. However, the two networks as shown
in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 differ in the way the dependence relationship between
rate and score as presented. In Figure 3.9 there is a link pointing from LOANAPR to
Score while in Figure 3.10 the direction of the dependency link is just the opposite.
Both networks provide a good fit to the data and both conditional dependent rela¬
tionships cannot be ruled out. For this reason we estimated a Simultaneous Equation
Model based on the assumption that both Probability ofDefault (ScoreProb) and APR
(RAW_LoanAPRl) are simultaneously affecting each other.
3.8.2 Simultaneous equations model
The CDSIMEQ package written in Stata by Keshk (2003) was applied to fit our data
using a Simultaneous Equations Model. This package is well suited in the situation
where one continuous (the rate) variable and one dichotomous (the default behaviour)
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variable are believed to simultaneously determine each other. The structure of the
model is:
y\ is treated as an observed continuous endogenous variable and y>2 is a dichotomous
endogenous variable and observed as
wherey\ is a latent continuous variable. X\ and Xi are matrices ofexogenous variables
in equation (3.6) and equation (3.7) accordingly. The exogenous variables selected
into X\ are chosen using forward stepwise linear regression and the exogenous vari¬
ables selected into Xj are chosen using forward stepwise probit regression. Both sets
of variables contain at least one variable that resides in only one equation but not the
other. Therefore the rank condition for identification is satisfied.
Because endogenous variables appear in the right hand side of the equation , the
standard ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are inconsistent and biased. To ad¬
dress this problem, one of two methods are normally used. The first is to use indirect
least squares (ILS) by solving the structural equations through reduced-form equa¬
tions. The estimates of reduced-form equations by OLS are consistent and lead to
consistent structural parameter estimates. The second method, the method we use, is
using two-stage least squares procedures.
y l — Y1T2 + Pi^i + £i
yi — Y2T1 + $2X2 + £2
(3.6)
(3.7)
y2 = l if y*2>0
yi = 0 if >>2 <= 0
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3.8.3 Two-stage least squares method
The two-stage Least Squares method works through two stages. The first stage is to
create instrumental variables for the endogenous variables. The second stage replaces
the endogenous variables in the structural equations with those instrumental variables.
In the first stage, the endogenous variables are regressed with all of the exogenous
variables in the structural equations (3.6) and (3.7), noted as X, the matrix of all ex¬
ogenous variables.
y\=Y\xX+ u\ (3.8)
y*2* = n2X+ u*2 (3.9)
where y\ and y*2* are instrumental variables. X are exogenous variables and not corre¬
lated with error terms u\ and u\, both ofwhich are assumed to be normally distributed.
So consistent estimates can be obtained using OLS for equation (3.8) and probit for
equation (3.9). Those estimated parameters are used to predict the instrumental vari¬
ables as below
yi = llxX (3.10)
y2** = n2X (3.11)
In the second stage, the original endogenous variables with their predicted values from
equations (3.10) and (3.11) are substituted as:
y\ = Y1T2** + 01*1 +£, (3.12)
T2*=Y2T1+02*2+62 (3.13)
The final step is to correct standard errors generated in the second stage estimation,
which are based onyV* and/i not on the original variables. Maddala (1983), page
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244-245, has given the corrected covariance matrix for the sets of estimates (yi,pi)
and (72, P2) and they were used here.
3.8.4 Estimates of the simultaneous equations model and predic¬
tion results
3.8.4.1 Parameter estimates
The final estimates are
where the Pi and P2 are the vector of coefficients of those exogenous variables X\ and
X2. For detail please see Appendix A: Tables A.l 1 and A. 12.
Table A.l 1 reports the parameter estimates for the first equation above. The instru¬
mental variable for Default is denoted as LDefault. The coefficient of I_Default is a
positive 0.1013, which indicates that higher probability of Default may contribute to
higher interest rates. Its numerical value is small compared with some other coeffi¬
cients attached to variables such as 'APR Adjustment'(1.0362). That is plausible as
the APR adjustment variable is the random rate adjustment within the band. The APR
adjustment plus band average rate will give the exact APR.
Table A. 12 reports the parameter estimates for the second equation above. The in¬
strumental variable is denoted as I^\PR. The coefficient of I^APR is also a positive
number 0.0272. That may be interpreted as when everything else being equal, charg¬
ing interest with 1 unit higher rate will lead to 0.0272 standard deviation increase in
APR = 0.1013 *Default + Pi *X\
Default — 0.0272 * APR + P2 *Xi
(3.14)
(3.15)
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the predicted probability of Default.
It is worth noting that the coefficient on APR is 0.0272 with p value of 0.151. The
coefficient on Default also has a big p value of 0.132. Both are not significant. The nu¬
merical values of the equation coefficients may be interpreted as showing the propen¬
sity to default is affecting the interest rate much more than the way the default is
influenced by the interest rate.
Another way to interpret this could be that other assumed exogenous variables are
explaining most of the variance and therefore dwarfed the coefficients of the endoge¬
nous variable in the RHS of the equation. APR adjustment might be such a factor.
After removing this variable from equations, the estimates turn out to be
This set of estimates can be interpreted as everything else held equal, 1 unit increase
in APR will lead to nearly 0.11 increase in the predicted probability of Default. 1
percentage higher probability of Default means 2.07 unit increase in the APR if every¬
thing else is the same. The details can be found in Appendix A: Tables A. 13 and table
A. 14. This set of estimates now has a coefficient value with p values near 0, although
the Area under ROC is decreased to 0.7622.
3.8.4.2 Modifications of the CDSIMEQ package
The Stata package CDSIMEQ written by Keshk (2003) handled estimation and covari-
ance correction well. However its post estimation routine has difficulties in dealing
APR = 2.0669 *Default + j3, *X\ (3.16)
Default = 0.1097 *APR + $2*X2 (3.17)
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with out-of-sample estimation. This is because when we are to use the estimated Pro-
bit model to predict default for future samples, we need the values of the instrumental
variable y\ in equation (3.13). CDS1MEQ overlooks this situation and only works
when doing post-estimation on the data set on which the model was fitted.
To discover an unbiased estimate of the predictive ability of models we carried out
10 fold cross-validation. The original package of CDSIMEQ is not capable of that.
For this reason, our own version of 2SLS estimation was written. In our own pack¬
age, the data values that are used for the prediction of instrumental variable values are
predicted based on the estimated parameters in the first stage, as below.
y\ = U\X
The predicted instrumental variable y\ is then plugged into the formula below to gen¬
erate the prediction for y2
yi = Yzyi + P2T2
3.8.4.3 Prediction results
The ROC curve based on the predictions on the training set is shown in Figure 3.11.
The area under the ROC value is 0.7873. Using our modified 2SLS routine to run 10
fold cross validation, the area under the ROC achieved is slightly decreased to 0.7837
(when predicted using Instrumental variable values predicted in the first stage). The
AuROC is increased a little bit to 0.7862 when using observed interest rate instead
of using predicted instrumental variable values. As a comparsion, a 10 fold cross
validated Probit achieves a similar Area under the ROC value of 0.7854 and a 10 fold
cross validated Logistic regression model achieves an Area under the ROC value of
0.7819.
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Area under ROC curve = 0.7873
Figure 3.11: Area under ROC given by CDSIMEQ
3.9 Conclusion
This section presented predictive performance results using logistic regression, SVM
and Simultaneous Equations Probit Model. Building models based on the data, the
logistic regression predictor (achieving an AuROC of 0.79) is the most competitive
compared with SVMs (using various kernels achieving the best AuROC of 0.72) and
Simultaneous Equations Probit Models (achieving AuROC around 0.78).
It has to be noted that the difference between model performance results can be ac¬
counted for by the difference in my relative familiarity or expertise with those models.
Different preprocessing methods used in different models might also lead to biased
comparison results. Potentially either of this happening could endanger the validity
of the model comparison conclusion, as observed by Hand (2006). Despite this, best
efforts have been made to remove bias as much as possible during the model building.
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The conclusion presented here is the best I can draw given my existing knowledge.
Therefore it is not useless unless future investigations prove the other way.
Considering simplicity and computational resources requirement, logistic regression is
no doubt the best choice for predicting defaults. However, when the inter-relationships
between Rate and Default is ofmore interest to the lenders that are offering rate-varied
products, the simultaneous equations can provide more insights of the dynamics be¬
tween those factors.
The poor performance of SVMs can be accounted for with two reasons. First, the
data is converted into 0-1 dummy variables, while SVMs normally excel when dealing
with continuous variables. The second, extremely skewed class distribution makes it





This chapter is dedicated to the modelling of consumer acceptance behaviour. Section
4.2 describes previous research on modelling consumer acceptance behaviour. The
next sections will describe the model design, the data and present the data preparation
procedures. Section 4.5 reports the results of fitting logistic regression Models. Sec¬
tion 4.7 will report our investigations into the modelling of acceptance elasticity with
respect to interest rates. In section 4.8 the possibility of improving the default prob¬
ability estimation by applying bivariate Probit Sample Selection Models is examined.
Section 4.9 plots the indifference curves following Keeney and Oliver (2005). In the
final appendix section the tables of estimated MLE results given by the models are
listed.
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4.2 Previous research in acceptance modelling
Thomas et al. (2006) and Jung et al. (2003) have suggested that significant changes are
happening in the evermore competitive consumer lending market. The first one is the
need for tailoring varied-features financial products to improve the likelihood of a con¬
sumer accepting an offer of the product made to him. The second is the requirement for
building interactive application processes in the newer communication and marketing
channels like the Internet or telephone so that during the application process the lender
can adjust their offers to make acceptance more likely.
Both changes necessitate the ability of the lender to infer the probability of a particular
consumer accepting a specific offer during the interactive application process. Some
recently published papers have presented how this issue may be addressed. Rossi et al.
(1996) investigated various forms of purchase history data of Chicago households.
They employed multinomial Probit models to predict the price sensitivities and house¬
hold preferences in terms of 'target couponing'. They used their model to explain the
heterogeneity across households using a hierarchical Bayesian model. The inference
was conducted in a Bayesian way and posteriors were acquired using Gibbs Samplers
through Markov chain simulation. By offering a customized coupon strategy to attract
different customers, they estimated that a seller could have a potentially substantial
gain in revenue than if a! blanket coupon strategy in which all coupons have the same
value is offered.
Montgomery (2001) discussed many applications of quantitative marketing techniques
on the Internet when consumers are 'addressable' thanks to advances in information
technology. In one of the examples given, a multinomial logit model was fitted to the
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data featuring factors that affect consumers' purchase choices. Those factors included
item price, shipping price, tax, delivery charges as well as the brand names of sellers.
The parameter estimates of the coefficients on those factors implied the feature impor¬
tance. The price sensitivities were then quantified.
Jung et al. (2003) investigated and compared three different methods (logistic regres¬
sion (LR), linear programming (LP) and an accelerated life (AL) model) to model the
likelihood of consumers accepting student bank accounts when being given different
offers. Those offers have six features, including 5 choices of overdraft limit, 4 choices
of credit card options, fee for foreign currency, discounts on insurance, interest paid on
account surplus and 10 choices of free gifts. Their data set, named the Fantasy Student
Current Account (FSCA), was gathered from a dedicated website, which was widely
publicized to first year students at the University of Southampton with prize winning
draws as enticement.
Seow and Thomas (2005) not only investigated the effects of specific features on ac¬
ceptance behaviour, but also tested the influence the number ofquestions could have on
the consumer acceptance behaviour. They modelled the probabilities of an applicant
taking different offers using decision trees and based their analysis on the same data set
as used by Jung et al. (2003). A two layered decision tree structure is used whereby the
enforced upper layer uses applicant characteristics only and the lower layer uses only
offer characteristics. This structure offers the convenience for the lender to build an
adaptive application process by asking customers about applicant characteristics first
and afterwords providing the offer that is the mostly likely to be taken by this customer.
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Different tree settings were tested and analysed in their paper. Those trees included
an applicant characteristics only tree, offer characteristics only tree, trees with both
types of characteristics and even with more flexibility allowed in the tree structure (so
called alternate best tree) to generate a better fit to the data. They also explored the
situation when imposing limits on the number of questions asked as a restriction on
the tree building process. Pruning this tree can reduce the number of questions asked
and hence potentially increase the probability of acceptance by the customers.
Because of the particular nature of the sample and the possibility of the 'testing ef¬
fect' of data collected, the results obtained in Jung et al. (2003) and Seow and Thomas
(2005) may not be generalizable. Thomas et al. (2006) mentioned that once the like¬
lihood of acceptance is estimated for a customer, the lender can make the offer based
on the optimality of profitability. However, they did not give comments as to how the
optimality of profitability can be achieved. Besides, there is no research looking into
how the consumer behaviour of accepting the offer may affect their risk of default or
vice versa.
The contribution of this chapter is to model the probability of acceptance using data
relating to the actual acceptance or rejection of the offers made to the applicants for
a fixed term loan product. Since the data recorded the acceptance decisions of those
applicants, the results are not subject to a "testing effect".
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4.3 Model design
As shown in Figure 4.1, the whole potential customer population can be partitioned
into those people who did not apply (NA) for the credit product, those who did apply
but got rejected (AR), those who applied, received an offer but refused to take it (CRO),
those who applied, received and took offers and being good customers (G) or bad
customers (B). The whole population can be expressed as
Whole = G (J B (J CRO \JAR\JNA
while the intersections between sets G,B,CROy4RJVA are all empty sets.
Gp\B = Bf]CRO = CROf)AR =ARf)NA=NA[)G = (l)
We now consider customers who applied, passed their credit check, and received an
offer. That is the set G\JB\JCRO. We observe performance information for those who
have applied, passed the credit check and then took the offer: Accept = GIJ^-
We assume a case makes a choice between defaulting and not defaulting, and between
accepting a credit offer and rejecting it. In each case we assume the consumer makes
the choice which maximises his utility. In each case we model the utility of default
(acceptance) as an unobserved continuous variable D* (A*) such that
D*= {Default)* =piAj+ei (4.1)
A* = {Accept)* = P2A2 + £2 (4.2)
We do not observe the utilities underlying the chosen action: default or none default,
acceptance or rejection. But we do observe the binary situation ofdefault {P{Default =
1)) or non-default {P{Default) = 0) , acceptance (P{Accept) = l)or non-acceptance
{P{Accept) = 0). The observational regime is therefore:





Figure 4.1: Our data samples sets
P(Default) = 1 if (Default)* > 0
P(Default) = 0 if (Default)* <= 0
P(Accept) — 1 if (Accept)* > 0
P(Accept) = 0 if (Accept)* <= 0
Notice that we can observe P(Default) only ifP(Acceptance) — 1. 1
Our research strategy is firstly to model the probability of acceptance directly using
logistic regression, assuming any correlation between 8j and £] in equation 4.1 and 4.2
is zero. Second, in section 4.8 we will drop this assumption and estimate the bivariate
1A further expansion of the model could be utilizing the data in set AR and using a doubled selection
model to fit the whole data.
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Probit sample selection models, allowing for the possibility that the errors in the two
equations are correlated.
4.4 Data preparation
Before presenting the results, it is necessary to report how the acceptance behaviour
is defined, why there is band separation, the transformation of the encoding of data
variables and why the data have to split into training and holdout sets.
After the customer completed an application form, requested an amount of the loan,
chose whether or not to request insurance with the loan, and passed credit check, he/she
may be given an offer with a specific interest rate to accept or reject. This offer will
consist of a loan of a given loan amount, usually the amount requested, sometimes
adjusted by the lender (this does not happen often, however). The lender will allocate
the customer into a certain band reflecting the risk ofdefault. Most of the interest rates
offered within a given band are the same but small variations exist within the band in
some cases because of the lender's adjustments.
The customers who accepted the offer and took the loan are marked with 1 in a bi¬
nary 'paid' indicator. Only the customer who accepted the loan will have performance
data recorded and subsequently can be classified as 'good' or 'bad' customers depend¬
ing on the definition of default. Each applicant who received an offer was given an
interest rate from one of the seven bands as described in section 3.6.2.
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We chose to use Dummy Variables 2 instead of Weights of Evidence 3 for consistency
with the data used for modelling Default as well as Acceptance.
The dataset has over 53,000 cases of applicants applying for a fixed term loan product.
The length of the term ranges from 24 months up to 84 months. To test the predic¬
tive performance of our models, we trained the model using the training set consisting
of 70% randomly selected cases from all the samples and tested it on a holdout set
consisting of the remaining 30% of the total sample.
4.5 Logistic regression results
We fitted the logistic regression model on all the data put together
each individual band. The performances of the models' predictive
pared using area under ROC values on the holdout sample data set.
4.5.1 Performance across bands
From Table 4.1 , we can see the performance measured by area under ROC values is
increasing with the size of holdout samples across different bands. The area under
ROC of the model based on all bands put together is much higher than that of other in¬
dividual bands. This may be accounted for by the doubled sample size. Or this can be
explained because the average interest rates offered to different bands are varied, coin-
2For a categorical variable with k multiple levels, k— 1 dummy variables are created to replace the
original variable. Each dummy variable takes a binary value 1 or 0, corresponding to the presence of
each level in the original categorical variable. The level left not coded is represented when all other
dummy variables take the value 0.
3Please refer to the explanations in previous chapter
as well as data in
abilities are com-
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bining bands together increase the variance of interest rates, one of the most predictive
independent variables.
BAND Converged? AuROC Holdout Sample Size
0 N 0.9167 67
10 Y 0.6956 683
20 Y 0.6730 894
30 Y 0.6797 1585
40 Y 0.6680 1447
50 Y 0.6854 2146
60 Y 0.7187 9362
0&20 Y 0.7168 965
ALL Y 0.7832 16193
Table 4.1: Comparison of the predictive performance for different risk bands
The sample size for BAND 0 is so small that SAS logistic procedure reports finding
quasi complete data separation. The MLE estimates reported for BAND 0 are therefore
questionable. To get convergence in the maximum likelihood estimation, the sample
size must be increased. We combined BAND 0 and BAND 20 to form a larger set
(because the two sets have similar acceptance percentages) and reported results.
4.5.2 Features selected from stepwise selection
Compared with the 12 features selected using stepwise selection in modelling Default,
more (37 in total) features were selected in modelling Acceptance. Similar to the fea¬
tures selected when modelling Default, the first 2 features selected are the Interest Rate
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variable (Rl) and Insurance-take-up indicator (CP1). The features of new customer in¬
dicator (newbus), loan amount requested, as well as the length of the loan (TERM)
entered the model at an early stage and stayed there. That is sensible as those variables
are very likely to influence customers acceptance behaviour.
4.5.3 ROC curve and MLE results
Figure 4.2 shows the ROC curve on the holdout sample using the logistic regression
model fitted on the data with all bands combined together. The area under ROC value
is 0.7832. The table of estimated MLE results given by logistic regression can be
found in Table B.l in the appendix section. Please note that many dummy variables do
not appear to be significant in the MLE results, even those variables were previously
selected from a stepwise selection routine. This happens because of the way the SAS
package conducts the stepwise selection on categorical variables by adding or remov¬
ing each categorical variable as a whole. Therefore even some dummy variables that
were created out of a categorical variable are not significant in the model, they still en¬
ter the final model because some other levels within the categorical variable are highly
significant that they cannot be removed. (The stepwise routine from Stata package,
on the other hand, can evaluate the dummy variables individually for each level of the
category, and therefore yields slightly different models. )
4.6 SVMs results
In previous chapter we have modelled SVMs on default and found their predictive per¬
formances not as good as logistic regression. The acceptance data is different from the
default data. A big difference is the class distribution. In the acceptance data over sixty
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ROC with holdout data of combined
AUROC = 0.7832192791 on totol 16193 holdout somples
Figure 4.2: The ROC curve for the Acceptance model all bands combined
percent are the positive outcome (offer accepted) while in the default data only around
four percent of cases are observed to default.
One of the most important factors that affects the performance of SVMs is the choice
of kernels. Two very commonly used kernels listed below will be used and shown to
be very competitive compared to the logistic regression: the polynomial kernel and
the RBF kernel. Their kernel parameters have to be detennined using some model
selection methods. Cross-validation is a common choice to select the best model in
predicting unseen holdout data. As our data is very large, the SVMs can be very slow
to train. A two-fold cross validation has been used in the grid searches of the models
that will yield the highest AuROC values.
To make the model comparison between logistic regression on the same ground with¬
out being affected by the choices of the feature selection routines, the SVM used for
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Acceptance modelling will be using the same set of variables selected from the step¬
wise selection routine in the logistic regression.
4.6.1 RBF kernel
The RBF kernel uses the kernel function like K(x,y) = e~V*lb-.fll2 \ grid-fashioned
search results in model parameter space of cost C vs. gamma y is shown in Figure 4.3.
The cost parameter ranges from 0.1 to 5. The gamma parameter ranges from 0.01 to
1. The third axis is the area under ROC achieved through a two fold cross validation
on the holdout set. It seems the RBF kernel SVM built on this data is more sensitive
to the choice of gamma parameter, where the best AuROC so far is 0.7905, achieved
at around gamma y = 0.04 and cost C = 1.1.





Figure 4.3: Grid search of the best predictive model parameters for SVM RBF kernel
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4.6.2 Polynomial kernel
The polynomial kernel uses the kernel function K(x,y) = (y-x-y)d. When the dimen¬
sion parameter d is assumed to be one, the SVM is generally a linear kernel SVM. A
reasonable large enough dimension parameter d = 3 4 was chosen and analysed with
results shown in Figure 4.4. The best AuROC value is 0.7937, where cost C = 0.3 and
gamma y = 0.0100. Compared with the Figure 4.3, where a lot more parameter com¬
binations have been searched, the range of the grid search for this polynomial kernel is
much smaller. This is because the polynomial kernel with a higher dimension param¬
eter is very slow to run on a larger data set. Restriction of the computation resources
limited the range of the parameters search.
The Classification Performance over Polynomial-Kernel
0.8
0.795-v
0.79v, ' ' ' •' ••








Cost parameter C Gamma parameter y
Figure 4.4: Grid search of the best predictive model parameters for SVM Polynomial
kernel with dimension parameter d = 3
4Other dimension parameters can also be tested but the limitations of the computation resources
prevented us from doing so.
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4.7 Modelling acceptance elasticity of interest rate
Elasticity could be defined as the proportional change in one variable divided by the
proportional change in another variable.
A general formula for the elasticity (the "x-elasticity of y") is:
percent change in y
Ex,y —
dlny dy x
dlnx dx ypercent change in x
Previous logistic regression results 5 on the acceptance modelling have shown that
the variable having the most influence over customers' decisions to take or reject the
offer is the interest rate charged. To analyse the price elasticity of the propensity of
customers to take loan product offers, we calculate ^y
The functional form of acceptance probability is assumed to be logit as below, x is a
vector for the independent variables and (3 is the vector of parameters.
logU(p(Accept)) = = * = P*
p(Accept) = l+ew
The partial derivative on one of the independent variable xj (with pj as the correspond¬
ing parameterjis
dP(Accept) ew dw ew
dxj ~~ (1 +ew)2'dxj ~ (1 +ew)2
So the price(interest rate as xj) elasticity of the Acceptance Probability is
_dP(Accept) i _ p,*/'
i,P{Accepl) - * precept) = T+e»
5Please see previous section 4.5.3 and the estimated coefficients in Table B.l
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4.7.1 Elasticities for bands
As previously given, the elasticity can be written as a function of price when other in¬
dependent variables are assumed to be constant values. Mean values of those variables
are used as the constant values when calculating the elasticities. Following previous
data transformation, all those variables except the interest rate charged were converted
to dummy variables. For each dummy variable, the relative frequency of each dummy
variable is used as the mean value.
As the interest rates offered range from 4.99% to 32.99%, the price elasticities of
probability of acceptance are calculated by fitting the interest rate value into the previ¬
ous elasticity equation. The table below lists the average elasticities within each band
and all bands combined together. The charts of price elasticities of acceptance in each
individual band can be found in Table 4.2 and in Figures 4.5, 4.6 , 4.7 , 4.8 , 4.9 ,4.10
and 4.11. The price elasticities of acceptance for others variables can be found in Table
4.3.
Notice from Table 4.2:
• The first column indicates on which data set the elasticities are calculated. The
results for band 0 are questionable because of its very small sized sample leading
to quasi complete separation in the data during maximum likelihood estimation.
Band 0 and Band 20 are combined to get reliable estimates.
• The second column presents the average values of acceptance elasticities of in¬
terest rate.
• The third column and fourth column shows at which the point the elasticity is
the biggest.
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average interest rate maximum
Data elasticity with max abs(elasticity) abs(elasticity)
*bandO -1.054006 -9% -3.140571
band10 -0.546448 - 13% -0.714744
band20 -0.541663 - 12% - 0.74064
band30 - 0.59789 - 13% - 0.804827
band40 -0.65196 - 14% - 0.834453
band50 -1.000923 - 17% - 1.231596
band60 -1.547289 - 29% -2.15465
bandO And 20 -0.683178 - 12% 1.005482
combined -1.369484 - 14% 1.997809
Table 4.2: The price elasticities across different bands
Elasticity at the Mean Values Mean Values of Variable
APR -1.34056 9.23288
Insurance -6.57422 0.371393
Loan Amount -3.63484 9612.67
Term 9.382553 52.249
Internet -23.9071 0.407225
New Business -6.6639 0.848887
Table 4.3: The elasticities of other variables on all bands combined
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• We observed that average elasticity grows steadily from band 20 up to band
60, that makes sense by realizing the fact that higher band generally has been
regarded as lower risk and been charged lower price. They shall find them¬
selves having more financial alternatives and therefore more likely to be put off
at higher rates.
• Interestingly, the points where maximum absolute elasticity is observed are also
shifting from lower band to higher band, as shown in Figures 4.5 to 4.10. This
may happen because of the logistic function form we have chosen. Recall that
the elasticity function takes the form of
£/=i!±L
Differentiate El with respect to interest rate i
BE I p,- „ .
TT = TT-TJ - P' *l:di ~ l+ew K (1 +ew)2




So solving the equation below we can get the point.
ePw(i*P,--l) = l
Notice that i and p, are always appearing together in equation and both e$x and i*
P, — 1 are monotonically changing with i * p,, so a unique answer to the equation
above shall exist. Assume we have found the i * p, satisfying the equation. A
smaller P, means the interest rate i has to be larger. Looking at the coefficient in
our logistic regression estimates corresponding to the interest rate confirms that.
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Elasticity of P(Acceptance) Vs. Interest Rate for bandIO dataset
Bote
Figure 4.5: Band 10 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 13%





Figure 4.6: Band 20 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 12%
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Elasticity of P(Acceptance) Vs. Interest Rate for band30 dataset
Rate
Figure 4.7: Band 30 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 13%
Elasticity of P(Acceptance) Vs. Interest Ftate for band40 dataset
Figure 4.8: Band 40 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 14%
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Figure 4.9: Band 50 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 17%
Elasticity of P(Acceptance) Vs. Interest Rate for band60 dataset
Figure 4.10: Band 60 has shown the most elasticity at interest rate of 29%
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Elasticity of P(Acceptance) Vs. Interest Rate for combined dataset
Rote
Figure 4.11: Combining all bands together has seen the most elasticity at interest rate
around 14%
4.8 Bivariate Probit sample selection model
In this section the possibility of improving default probability estimation by apply¬
ing bivariate Probit sample selection models is examined. We estimated with various
model settings and found that only when using a lean model with less variables would
the estimated correlations between the error terms in the bivariate Probit sample selec¬
tion model become significant. However, the predictive ability is still slightly worse
than the usual Probit model applied using area under ROC curve values as the perfor¬
mance indicator.
4.8.1 Background and previous research
When doing Credit Scoring, the data collected for analysis are normally pre-screened
subject to previous scoring practices that have eliminated a substantial portion of ap-
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plicants who were regarded as most likely to default or not profitable enough to keep
as customers. In the sets of data collected for analysis, only the performance informa¬
tion of those who have been accepted is available, leaving the performance of those
rejected unobservable (and those refusing to take the offer are also missing in the
records). Based on these non-randomly selected sample data only, a traditional pre¬
dictor trying to predict probability to default p(D\x) (where D denotes default and x
is the vector of a set of explanatory variables) is in fact modelling p(D\A,x) (where A
denotes accepts), and is assuming that p{D\A,x) equals to p(D\x) .
When the assumption above is under question, using only the observed-accepts to rep¬
resent the whole set (including accepts and rejects), results given by the maximum
likelihood estimation will lead to bias, known as 'sample selection bias'. Heckman
(1979) studied this selection bias in the model structured as below:
Y\ = Pi*i+£i
Yi = P2X2 + £2
where Y\ and 72 are continuous random variables. x\ and xi are vectors of independent
variables. £1 and £2 are the errors. Y\ is only observed when 72 >= 0
The dependent variables in Heckman's model are continuous. When outcomes are
observed as binary results, a bivariate Probit model is more appropriate. Meng and
Schmidt (1985) discussed the bivariate Probit models under various levels of observ¬
ability of the dependent variables. Their model can be written as
7j* = p,x, + £1
Y* = p2X2+£2
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where Yf and are continuous random variables that are not observable directly. The
binary outcomes that are observable are Y\ and Y2
Y\ = 1 if Y* > 0
Yx = 0 if Y* <= 0
Yi = 1 if y* > 0
Y2 = 0 if y*I2 <= 0
The errors 81 and 82 are assumed to be normally distributed 7V(0,0,51,52^), where
51 and S2 are the variances of 8j and 82 respectively. Meng and Schmidt discussed
different cases where the observability differs. In their case three (the 'censored Probit
or partial partial observability'), Y\ is observed if and only if >2 = 1 (Y2 is observed for
all cases). This case is similar to our credit scoring problem and therefore of special
interest to us.
Greene (1992) and Boyes et al. (1989) both used a bivariate Probit model with sample
selection to predict the probability of default and estimated card expenditure so that a
profit oriented scoring approach is possible based on these estimates. Greene (1998)
presented three statistical models to predict the default, expenditure and the number of
derogatory reports in credit history and showed that results were quite different when
sample selection factors were included in the models. However, their results did not
provide indications of the models' predictive performance on the cross-validation sets.
Banasik et al. (2003) compared the prediction results in terms ofthe classification accu¬
racy and area under ROC values from the bivariate Probit model with sample selection
and those from original models based on accepted applicants only. They observed that
small improvements with bivariate Probit model can sometimes be achieved, depend-
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ing on the choice of risk bands and cut-off values selected.
Hand and Henley (1993) reviewed the methods of reject inference and claimed that
reliable reject inference based on rejected applicants is not possible without additional
assumptions being made. Banasik and Crook (2005) conducted analysis on a rare data
set where almost all applicants were granted credit. They found that both the scope and
effectiveness of reject inference is unaffected by the model leanness while still some
benefits are possible with high rejecting rate.
4.8.2 Estimation results
The data used here is encoded as continuous variables using weights of evidence based
on odds of acceptance. The weights of evidence is used because it yields far fewer
dimensions than dummy variables and is quite helpful for a faster and easier conver¬
gence in the maximum likelihood estimation in the Heckprob routine in Stata.
Stepwise Probit models are fitted using two different selection criteria, one is p=0.002
and the other is p=0.05. When p value is 0.002, less variables were selected and there¬
fore we gained a leaner model. Probit models were estimated on the training data then
the predictive performance was evaluated using area under ROC based on the holdout
data .
Our results shown in Table 4.4 and 4.5 6 showed that the correlation parameter (be¬
tween £] and £2) in the bivariate Probit model is only significant when using a lean
model. The significance value of the correlation coefficient is 0.015, when p < 0.002
6The dictionary of variables can be found in Table 3.6.
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is the selection criteria. The result of the likelihood-ratio test (if the two equations in
the model are independent) in the lean model is %2 = 6.94 Prob > %2 = 0.0084. We
can reject the null hypothesis that the two equations are independent. This indicates
that ignoring the selection process will give biased estimates in a lean model. The
larger model (variables selected using p < 0.05) did not show a similar pattern. The
result of the likelihood-ratio test (if the two equations in the model are independent) in
the larger model is %2 = 0.00 Prob > %2 = 0.9608. The null hypothesis that the two
equations are independent cannot be rejected.
Predictive performance on an independent holdout data set shows that the bivariate
Probit model and Probit models are almost equally predictive in terms of area under
ROC values. Nevertheless, the more complex model (variables selected with p < 0.05)
is significantly more predictive (AuROC=0.7979) than the lean model (p < 0.002) (Au-
ROC=0.7925).
Table 4.4: Bivariate Probit model with variables stepwise selected with significance
value of 0.002
Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
default
loanaprl 0.2191171 0.0414665 5.28 0.000 0.137844 0.300390
cpi 0.5184754 0.0474135 10.94 0.000 0.425547 0.611404
wrst46al 0.5377122 0.0792789 6.78 0.000 0.382328 0.693096
timebank 0.3059594 0.0504106 6.07 0.000 0.207157 0.404762
ssrc4to6 0.3118096 0.0688254 4.53 0.000 0.176914 0.446705
socworst 0.2098031 0.0657783 3.19 0.001 0.080880 0.338726
loanbal2 -0.7548026 0.1653233 -4.57 0.000 -1.078830 -0.430775
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loanbal6 -1.5859630 0.3956968 -4.01 0.000 -2.361515 -0.810412
spsetld 0.3207764 0.0877495 3.66 0.000 0.148791 0.492762
term 0.8631102 0.2440975 3.54 0.000 0.384688 1.341533
netincm -1.1657040 0.3475501 -3.35 0.001 -1.846890 -0.484519
_cons -1.8472910 0.0527410 -35.03 0.000 -1.950661 -1.743920
paid
cpi -0.6039442 0.0175323 -34.45 0.000 -0.638307 -0.569582
loanaprl -0.5469236 0.0099439 -55.00 0.000 -0.566413 -0.527434
newbus -0.0607446 0.0576190 -1.05 0.292 -0.173676 0.052187
loan_amt -1.4419610 0.0661858 -21.79 0.000 -1.571683 -1.312239
tosettll -0.4955130 0.0513494 -9.65 0.000 -0.596156 -0.394870
snball6m -0.4451250 0.0372410 -11.95 0.000 -0.518116 -0.372134
loanbaB -0.5439364 0.1099655 -4.95 0.000 -0.759465 -0.328408
timaddl -0.2130155 0.0275202 -7.74 0.000 -0.266954 -0.159077
gdscde2 -0.5306470 0.0522068 -10.16 0.000 -0.632971 -0.428324
internet -1.3356410 0.1164642 -11.47 0.000 -1.563907 -1.107375
socsett -0.5165921 0.0605816 -8.53 0.000 -0.635330 -0.397854
swrstcur -0.2122401 0.0422736 -5.02 0.000 -0.295095 -0.129385
brand -0.7150864 0.1072868 -6.67 0.000 -0.925365 -0.504808
age -0.1093330 0.0247086 -4.42 0.000 -0.157761 -0.060905
loanbal2 -0.6094566 0.0918317 -6.64 0.000 .0.789444 -0.429470
mortbal -1.6385940 0.2980171 -5.50 0.000 -2.222696 -1.054491
tosettl4 -0.7459363 0.2545549 -2.93 0.003 -1.244855 -0.247018
socworst -0.2300384 0.0486660 -4.73 0.000 -0.325422 -0.134655
noopen6 -0.1552179 0.0379108 -4.09 0.000 -0.229522 -0.080914
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gdscde3 -0.4151366 0.0817705 -5.08 0.000 -0.575404 -0.254869
timebank -0.1029272 0.0240946 -4.27 0.000 -0.150152 -0.055703
no_store -0.9392338 0.2438892 -3.85 0.000 -1.417248 -0.461220
ccjgt500 -0.8238198 0.2257602 -3.65 0.000 -1.266302 -0.381338
wrst46al 0.2929748 0.0590219 4.96 0.000 0.177294 0.408656
spl6mact -0.3240852 0.0480901 -6.74 0.000 -0.418340 -0.229830
loanbal4 -0.5339032 0.1310558 -4.07 0.000 -0.790768 -0.277039
spl6ml2 0.2024613 0.0564088 3.59 0.000 0.091902 0.313021
alcifdet -0.3752600 0.0978557 -3.83 0.000 -0.567054 -0.183466
tosettl3 -0.6354947 0.1807832 -3.52 0.000 -0.989823 -0.281166
mor_rent -0.7817131 0.2424378 -3.22 0.001 -1.256883 -0.306544
_cons 0.2124088 0.0071413 29.74 0.000 0.198412 0.226406
/athrho 0.2961050 0.1222285 2.42 0.015 0.056542 0.535668
rho 0.2877441 0.1121084 0.056481 0.489702
Table 4.5: Bivariate Probit model with variables stepwise selected with significance
value of 0.05
Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
default
loanaprl 0.2983323 0.04767 6.26 0.000 0.204900 0.391764
cpi 0.6101280 0.050713 12.03 0.000 0.510733 0.709523
wrst46al 0.3580448 0.10866 3.30 0.001 0.145075 0.571014
timebank 0.2676062 0.055129 4.85 0.000 0.159555 0.375657
ssrc4to6 0.3148383 0.071293 4.42 0.000 0.175108 0.454569
socworst 0.2548701 0.070986 3.59 0.000 0.115740 0.394000
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loanbal2 -0.7924271 0.196375 -4.04 0.000 -1.177314 -0.407540
loanbal6 -1.4821650 0.417788 -3.55 0.000 -2.301015 -0.663314
spsetld 0.3099023 0.090616 3.42 0.001 0.132298 0.487506
term 0.8055490 0.257671 3.13 0.002 0.300523 1.310575
netincm -1.3158470 0.358635 -3.67 0.000 -2.018758 -0.612936
alcifdet 0.6051299 0.197823 3.06 0.002 0.217405 0.992855
age 0.1704406 0.054249 3.14 0.002 0.064115 0.276767
worst12 0.3693976 0.122369 3.02 0.003 0.129559 0.609237
spl6ml2 0.2764318 0.105255 2.63 0.009 0.070137 0.482727
loan_amt 0.4010860 0.168954 2.37 0.018 0.069943 0.732229
tosettl2 0.7046708 0.321418 2.19 0.028 0.074704 1.334638
socsett 0.2552237 0.124509 2.05 0.040 0.011190 0.499258
ccjgt500 -1.1017680 0.5135 -2.15 0.032 -2.108209 -0.095328
_cons -1.6901550 0.0872138 -19.38 0.000 -1.861091 -1.519219
paid
cpi -0.6089806 0.017601 -34.60 0.000 -0.643477 -0.574484
loanaprl -0.5539081 0.010092 -54.89 0.000 -0.573688 -0.534129
newbus -0.0784717 0.0581947 -1.35 0.178 -0.192531 0.035588
loan_amt -1.4586650 0.067862 -21.49 0.000 -1.591672 -1.325657
tosettl 1 -0.5169559 0.051777 -9.98 0.000 -0.618437 -0.415475
snball6m -0.4497474 0.0373964 -12.03 0.000 -0.523043 -0.376452
loanbal3 -0.5403831 0.110517 -4.89 0.000 -0.756992 -0.323775
timaddl -0.2093114 0.027634 -7.57 0.000 -0.263474 -0.155149
gdscde2 -0.5245726 0.05241 -10.01 0.000 -0.627294 -0.421852
internet -1.3568380 0.117011 -11.60 0.000 -1.586175 -1.127501
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socsett -0.5419442 0.062302 -8.70 0.000 -0.664053 -0.419835
swrstcur -0.2136315 0.042534 -5.02 0.000 -0.296996 -0.130267
brand -0.7075670 0.107861 -6.56 0.000 -0.918970 -0.496164
age -0.1156389 0.024993 -4.63 0.000 -0.164623 -0.066655
loanbal2 -0.6052619 0.092307 -6.56 0.000 -0.786181 -0.424343
mortbal -1.6143770 0.299528 -5.39 0.000 -2.201441 -1.027312
tosettl4 -0.8178460 0.259038 -3.16 0.002 -1.325551 -0.310141
socworst -0.2082265 0.049441 -4.21 0.000 -0.305129 -0.111324
noopen6 -0.1491900 0.038207 -3.90 0.000 -0.224074 -0.074306
gdscde3 -0.4184251 0.081961 -5.11 0.000 -0.579066 -0.257784
timebank -0.1015448 0.024147 -4.21 0.000 -0.148871 -0.054219
no_store -0.9209791 0.243301 -3.79 0.000 -1.397840 -0.444118
ccjgt500 -0.8412360 0.226 -3.72 0.000 -1.284187 -0.398285
wrst46al 0.2761811 0.0593490 4.65 0.000 0.159859 0.392503
spl6mact -0.3143237 0.048462 -6.49 0.000 -0.409307 -0.219341
loanbal4 -0.4291300 0.13753 -3.12 0.002 -0.698683 -0.159577
spl6ml2 0.2067295 0.056553 3.66 0.000 0.095887 0.317572
alcifdet -0.3083031 0.099652 -3.09 0.002 -0.503617 -0.112989
tosettl3 -0.7089536 0.183059 -3.87 0.000 -1.067743 -0.350164
mor_rent -0.7998439 0.243753 -3.28 0.001 -1.277591 -0.322097
loanbal6 -0.7482971 0.256081 -2.92 0.003 -1.250206 -0.246388
no_visa -1.3502590 0.511138 -2.64 0.008 -2.352071 -0.348446
snwl2tv -0.5664918 0.220665 -2.57 0.010 -0.998988 -0.133996
no.deps 0.4072923 0.17275 2.36 0.018 0.068709 0.745876
term 0.2367741 0.108833 2.18 0.030 0.023465 0.450083
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spsetld 0.0907106 0.042396 2.14 0.032 0.007616 0.173805
smo89 -0.3150311 0.150135 -2.10 0.036 -0.609291 -0.020772
_cons 0.2125689 0.007145 29.75 0.000 0.198565 0.226573
/athrho 0.0061964 0.126291 0.05 0.961 -0.241330 0.253723
rho 0.0061964 0.126287 -0.236752 0.248415
4.8.2.1 Comparisons of the predictive performance across different models
The results of the models are compared in Table 4.6. Probit002 was predicted using
a Probit model with variables selected with p < 0.002. Heckprobit002 was predicted
using a bivariate Probit model with variables selected with p < 0.002. Probit05 was
predicted using Probit model with variables selected with p < 0.05. Heckprob05 was
predicted using a bivariate Probit model with variables selected with p < 0.05
We conclude from Table 4.6 7 that model Probit05 is slightly more predictive than
model Probit002 when the performance is measured by area under ROC curves. (Ho:
area(Probit002) = area(Probit05), %2(1) = 4.39, Prob> = 0.0362) Comparing the re¬
sults from bivariate Probit models and Probit models put together, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that they are equally predictive. (Ho: area(Probit002) = area(Heckprob002)
= area(Probit05) = area(Heckprob05), %2(3) = 5.66, Prob > %2 = 0.1296). From the
Figure 4.12, plotting both ROC curves, we can hardly tell which model, the Probit002
model or Heckprob002 model, is more dominant.
7The standard errors for the area under ROC curves are calculated based on the nonparametric
approach by DeLong et al. (1988). The asymptotic confidence intervals are calculated by assuming the
distribution for the area under the ROC curve is normal.
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Models Obs ROC Area Std. Err.
-Asymptotic Normal-
[95% Conf. Interval]
Probit002 9471 0.7925 0.0115 0.77004 0.81502
Heckprob002 9471 0.7915 0.0114 0.76922 0.81386
Probit05 9471 0.7979 0.0114 0.77561 0.82026
Heckprob05 9471 0.7979 0.0114 0.77561 0.82025
Table 4.6: The predictive performance of lean model and a complex model
* probitxb ROC area: 0.7925 —-* heckxb ROC area: 0.7915
Reference
Figure 4.12: Compare ROC curves of Probit and Heckprob models
In conclusion, we do not find the default models to suffer from sample selection bias
due the cases being included only if they accepted a loan offer. Therefore the accep¬
tance inference may not be necessary for our data. On a reasonably large model, the
sample selection bias is not significant. Comparisons of the predictive performance
did not find significant improvement achieved through the Bivariate Sample Selection
model than a normal Probit model. Note however that this test is subject to the weak-
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ness that we assumed £1 and £2 are normally distributed.
4.9 Indifference curves
As our data were collected from real customers, we can plot the mean indifference
curves similar to those described by Keeney and Oliver (2005), in which indifference
curves for individuals are described whereas our indifference curves are for the popula¬
tion 8 This section describes how the indifference curves are plotted on a 2 dimensional
space(Rate vs Loan Amount). Also notice that in our dataset the customer chose the
loan amount (albeit with some minor adjustment at some occasions by the lender)
whereas in Keeney and Oliver (2005) the lender chose the credit line (limit). This
however would not affect the validity of the construction of the indifference curves.
4.9.1 Indifference curves based on Logit model
The indifference curves for the customer can be plotted directly from the estimation
results of a Logit model. Assuming the probability of acceptance p can be fitted using
the functional form as:
log = (30 + p/, * log(L) + $apr * log (APR) + pz * Z (4.3)
where Z is the vector ofpredictive variables other than the Loan Amount variable L and
the Interest Rate variable APR. The set of variables in Z was selected using a stepwise
8Please note that the indifference curves drawn from each individual can be totally different from
the curves drawn based on the population. Making inference based on population means and ignoring
individual differences can lead to so called 'ecological fallacy' when the assumption of within group
homogeneity does not hold. However, due to the nature of the way the data was collected, we cannot
test each individual repeatedly to construct indifference curves for each individual. Mean indifference
curves were used.
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selection routine on the training set. For the values of the estimated coefficients J3o Pz,
Pzpp Pz please see Appendix B: Table B.4. For each given probability of acceptance
p, the indifference curve in the two dimensional L and APR space can be written as
1 = lPL*API&APR*C
where C = <?P° * e$z*z * The Z is a vector in which the mean values of the variables
Z have been used.
Indifference Curve
APR
Figure 4.13: Indifference curves
All the points found on the same indifference curve in Figure 4.13 represent the equal¬
ity in the attractiveness of the offers to the applicant. That means, given all other
variables at their mean values, the average customer will accept the offer at the same
probability if the combinations of loan amount and interest are on the same indiffer¬
ence curve. Different indifference curves indicate a different probability of acceptance.
The curve which is closer to the origin point (0,0) has a higher probability of accep¬
tance (The indifference curve with p = 0.6 shown in Figure 4.13, for example, has
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the highest probability of acceptance in the four indifference curves displayed). This
shows that both lower loan amounts and lower interest rates increase the likelihood of
the offer acceptance.
One of Keeney and Oliver's assumptions is that the interest rate has a negative im¬
pact on the probability of acceptance, which is consistent with our finding. For a given
loan amount, the applicant will prefer being charged a lower interest rate. However,
another assumption in the Keeney and Oliver model is that for any given interest rate
the probability of acceptance will be lower for a lower credit line than a higher one.
We have observed the opposite: that an acceptance of an offer is more likely if the
applicant requested lower loan amount.
This result is interesting and merits some further discussion. To argue that on aver¬
age applicants prefer to borrow less than more and are willing to pay a higher interest
rate to be "able" to borrow less is inappropriate because each has the choice as to how
much he wishes to borrow and can choose to borrow less if he wishes to. An appropri¬
ate explanation is perhaps more subtle. An individual may wish to buy a product now
and has a choice as to how much to borrow. The more he borrows the lower his assets
and the greater the chance he will be unable to finance emergency calls on his wealth.
Borrowers must compare the marginal disbenefit from borrowing with the marginal
benefit from consuming the good. In economic theory the more an individual borrows
today the less he expects to consume tomorrow because of the repayments he must
make tomorrow. Given a set of preferences between consumption today and consump¬
tion tomorrow there will be an optimum amount of borrowing which he desires (see
Attanasio (1999)).
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If an applicant increases the amount he wishes to borrow, a lower interest rate may
be necessary to maintain the same probability of acceptance because the larger loan
would, if the rate were constant, imply larger payments whereas these payments may
be correspondingly lower if the rate is lower. In short, it would seem that applicants
are making the choice to accept based on the cash outlays required to service the loan
rather than the amount per se. In addition a larger loan may reduce utility by the
borrower due to increased risk they will be unable to repay. To reduce this risk and
maintain the same probability of acceptance a lower rate may be necessary.
4.9.2 Indifference curves using a different approach
As a check on the robustness onto our calculations concerning the shape of the indif¬
ference curve, we tested with a different functional form of the indifference curves.
We assumed the form of the equation that describes the probability of acceptance as
below
P = a*APR(-*) *Z(~z)
where P is the probability of acceptance, L is the loan amount, APR is the interest rate
charged and Z is a vector of principal components of other covariates retained. Taking
log of both sides:
ln{P) = ln(a) + (-(3)ln(L) + (~i)ln{APR) + (-*) * ln(Z)
To estimate the parameters a (3 y %, different options are available to treat variable
P properly. The first is to assume P as another constant, which is very likely to be
a wrong way. The second is importing the predicted values from a previous Probit
model and use the predicted values as P, as will be implemented here. A third way
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is using Maximum Likelihood Estimation to estimate the parameters of the equation
above. This has not been implemented.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to reduced the number of dimensions
and to gain covariates that are orthogonal to each other. In this case we wished or¬
thogonal covariates to reduce the chance of collinearity with APR and loan amount.
The PCA is done by retaining the eigenvectors with the highest eigenvalues. All the
eigenvalues are sorted and shown in Figure 4.14. In total 18 eigenvectors associated
with eigenvalues higher than 1 were retained.
Scree plot of eigenvalues after pea
0 20 40 BO
Number
Figure 4.14: Eigenvalues after PCA
A Probit model was firstly called to generate the predicted probability values to be
plugged into the variable P in equation below
ln(P) = bo + biln(L) + bAPRln(APR) + bzln{Z)
Then APR can be expressed as
bt. bZ bn-ln(P)
APR =L ~bAPR * Z ~bAPR * e ~bAPR
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where P is the probability of acceptance (predicted by Probit model), L is the loan
amount and Z is the vector of principal components, bp, bAPR,bz are the parameters






Figure 4.15: Indifference curves using a different approach
curves on a Loan Amount vs APR space are plotted in Figure 4.15 using the estimates
of ln(APR) and ln{AMT) with Z and P variables treated as constant. The mean values
of Z have been used in all indifference curves while each indifference curve is gener¬
ated from a different P value. Similar to the indifference curves presented in previous
subsection, the indifference curves in Figure 4.15 are in similar shapes. Same conclu¬
sion can be drawn that both lower interest rates and lower loan amounts increase the
attractiveness of the offers.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter reported the results of the modelling of consumer acceptance behaviour.
Logistic regression was used to model the probability of acceptance on each band as
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well as for all bands combined together. Based on the estimates of the logistic re¬
gression, the acceptance elasticities with respect to interest rate were calculated. Af¬
ter modelling the P(Accept) directly, efforts were made to improve the prediction of
default behaviour with the help of acceptance data using a bivariate Probit sample
selection model. However, the predictive performance on the holdout sample is not
improved using the bivariate Probit sample selection model. Finally, the indifference




This chapter presents the results from survival analyses of default and paying back
early. Section 5.2 describes the background of survival analysis followed by the struc¬
ture of different survival models. Section 5.3 gives the details of the data used in the
survival analysis. The following two sections are each devoted to the individual mod¬
elling of one of the two different types of customer behaviour, default and paying back
early. Section 5.6 shows the results of modelling these two types of behaviour in a
competing risks framework instead of separately. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
section 5.7.
5.2 Introduction to survival analysis
Survival analysis deals with the modelling of time to event data. The event could be
death in a biological study or a breakdown in an engineering problem. In an analysis
of Credit Scoring, an event of interest could be the action of a customer to stop pay-
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ing the monthly payment at a given month for some reason, either because of default
or just switching to other lenders. One important advantage of survival analysis over
static binary dependent variable models is that in survival analysis timing information
has been utilized and modelled. This timing information can be very useful when the
estimation ofprofit is needed, which we shall see in the next chapter.
When an event under study has occurred, we can call it a 'failure'. The probability
that the failure occurs at a time T that is later than some arbitrary time t is called the
survival function S(t).
S(t)=Pr(t<T)
where t is the continuous duration time variable starting from t = 0. From the survival
function S{t) we can define the failure function F(t) = 1 — S(t). The density function




The conditional failure rate, or hazard function, defined as the event rate at time t
conditional on that the subject having survived at least until time t, can be written as
(5.i>
8t->0 51 S(t) dt S(t)
The survival function S(t) can also be derived from the hazard function as
S(t) = e[-S'ohWd"}
5.2.1 Nonparametric model
Without making assumptions about the shapes of the hazard functions with respect to
time, nonparametric models can be estimated to explore survival patterns. A Kaplan
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and Meier (1958) estimate of a survival function can be expressed as
m = n (—)
j\'j« J
where /]... tj are rank ordered survival times such that /] <t2< ■■ < tj. nj is the number
at risk of the events of interest before time tj. dj is the number of observed events of
interest at time tj.
5.2.2 Parametric regression survival models
By assuming the form of parametric distributions of the hazard function, parameters
can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Different distributions for the hazard func¬
tion can be assumed, such as exponential, Weibull, gompertz, lognormal, loglogistic
or gamma. For example, a Weibull proportional hazard model can have the hazard
function as
h{t,X) = hQ{t)f(x)
where f(x) = exp$*x and the baseline hazard function is ho(t) — p * tp~\ p and (1 are
the parameters to be estimated. When p = 1, ho(t) = 1, the hazard rate is constant
and the Weibull model becomes an exponential model where h(t,X) = exp$*x. Figure
5.1 shows the baseline hazard function ho(t) = p * tp~\ (the Weibull function) with
varying shape parameter p.








Figure 5.1: Example of hazard functions for Weibull models
5.2.3 Cox proportional hazards model
Forcing the hazard function to take a particular shape may be a disadvantage if it does
not accurately represent the data. Placing no restrictions on the shape of the baseline
hazard function ho(t), Cox (1972) argued that h(t,x) = /?o(0 */(x) and suggested that
/(x) ought to be modelled as e$x. The hazard function can be written as
h(t,X) =h0(t)*e^*x
whereX = (x\,X2 ,---Xk) is the time independent vector ofK explanatory variables and
the |3 is the vector of shape parameters to be estimated. Here the ho(t) is called the
baseline hazard. The hazard ratio between x, and xj is irrelevant to the baseline hazard
ho(t) as it can be cancelled as shown below
Kcxj)
= ho(t)*e?>Xi = e^xi~Xj)
h(t,Xl) ho(t) * e^-'
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Assuming j is the index of the ordered D distinct observed failure times from t\ to
to (for every i, tj < tl+ \, and there are no ties) and Rj is defined as the risk set at
time tj, which equals the collection of the observations that are at risk of failure at
time tj, the likelihood can be written as the product of the conditional probabilities Pj,
L = Y[% , Pj. The Pj is the conditional probability that for a particular failure at time
tj the failure is observed
xi
Pj=lieRj^x'
where x, is a vector of data with K variables for case i observed within risk set R,.
The estimate of (3 can be found by maximizing the natural logarithm of the partial
likelihood function
, ri "
When there are tied failures to handle, Efron (1977) provided a closer approximation
to the exact marginal likelihood which is computationally intensive. Breslow (1974)
proposed a much faster approximation as below.
D efoj
7=1
where dj is the number of observations in the risk set Rj. Efron's approximation is
a closer approximation than Breslow's method but at the price of higher computation
demands.
In the data used for credit scoring the status of each account is usually recorded in
a monthly fashion. A natural treatment would be to treat the time T as discrete and
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Stepanova and Thomas (2002) found that compared to the PH-Cox model with con¬
tinuous time assumed, this discrete logistic model has a better fit to the data (in terms
of log-likelihood) but "almost no difference in the parameter estimates and no differ¬
ence in the number of correctly classified accounts between the methods". In most of
their estimations, they assumed continuous time and used the Breslow approximation
to handle the ties since this is computationally the fastest method. In the analysis we
carried out we also assumed continuous time and used Breslow's approximation.
5.2.3.1 Extensions of Cox models
Departing from the assumption of homogeneity with respect to the baseline functions ,
we can assume that the same proportional hazard assumption holds for each individual
strata with the individual baseline hazard function hog for strata g. The hazard function
then becomes
hg(t,X) = hog(t)e^x
where g — 1,2, ....G stands for the strata. This model is called the Stratified Cox model.
Although the baseline hazard functions are individually estimated for each strata, the
parameter vector p, is still constrained to be the same across the groups. This main¬
tains the compactness of the model.
Another way of extending the Cox Models is called the Time Dependent Cox model.
In the previous proportional hazard models all the covariates have been assumed to be
unchanged from time zero to the end. Under situations where some covariates change
over time, the time independent assumption can be relaxed. The hazard function can
be written as
h{t,X(t)) = h0(t)e^x+bx{l)
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where X(t) represents the vectorX at time /. As this extension introduces more com¬
plexity into the model, the potential gain from this approach might be overshadowed
by the risk of possible overfitting. This can be seen in the later estimation results.
5.3 Data description
We are going to model time to default and time to paying back early. The time period
in which a borrower is said to have defaulted is the first month in which he/she became
two payments overdue. A binary indicator is used to mark the presence of a default
event observed at a given time. This variable equals 1 when default occurs and 0 when
the payments are made on schedule or is closed early. For paying back early we model
the month in which the balance was paid off.
In the dataset prepared for the survival analysis, for each customer with recorded pay¬
ment performance there are two new variables to be constructed.
1. The length of the duration time of observing the account state of keeping pay¬
ments up to date with consequent exposure to default or payback early possibil¬
ities.
2. Censoring status, whereby an account is censored if the outcome of interest is
not observed, such as borrower making scheduled payments throughout the ob¬
servation period, paying back early when default is the outcome of interest or
having defaulted when paying back early is the outcome of interest. An account
is not censored otherwise.
Other variables used in the data set include those variables used in the estimation of
the probabilities of default and of acceptance.
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In the data investigated, although the fixed terms of the loans range from 24 to 84
months, the longest observation period is 26 months. Therefore most of cases are cen¬
sored as their terms are longer than 26 months. Figure 5.2 illustrates this censoring
situation.
# The longest observed period is 26 months
24 36 48 60
Length of the Loan in Months
72 84
Figure 5.2: Observed loan terms
5.3.1 Description of the data using the Kaplan-Meier model
Since the Kaplan-Meier model makes no parametric assumptions, in the data explo¬
ration stage it can help us to investigate the overall hazard and survival functions with¬
out assuming distributional shapes in advance. The K-M survivor functions for default
and paying back early are compared in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4 compares the hazard
functions of default and paying back early.
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Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival functions, default and paying back early
Both figures indicate much higher hazard rates for paying back early than for default.
While the shape of the default hazard function looks flat in Figure 5.4 because its rel¬
atively much smaller magnitude, in Figure 5.5 we can find the default hazard function
at first quickly rises from 0.002 to 0.003 then at a slower pace increases and decrease
until month 16, starting from when a sharp increase and decrease happens. The hazard
function for the paying back early quickly increases from 0.003 to over 0.020 after 8
months. After 19 months, the paying back early hazard drops quickly from around
0.028 to 0.020 in three months before going up again. In the following sub sections we
will compare the hazard functions ofdefault and paying back early for different groups
to explore the differences in more detail.
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Hazard Functions
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| Default Pay Back Early I
Figure 5.4: Kaplan-Meier hazard functions, default and paying back early
Hazard Function for Default
Figure 5.5: Kaplan-Meier hazard function for default
5.3.2 Differences between customers from two different brands
In the data investigated, there was still quite a big difference between the customers
from two different brands. Brand! has 8,823 customers while Brand2 has 22,549 cus-
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tomers. Their hazard functions shown in Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 1 reveal a large
difference between the customers' behaviour of these two brands especially in terms
of paying back early. Two possible explanations are available. The first is the length
of the existing observation periods. For Brand 1 customers, the maximum length of
the observed period is 18 months while the maximum length of the observed period
is 26 months for Brand2 customers. The second is the proportion of newly opened
accounts. Of Brandl accounts, 99.24% were new business while of Brand2 accounts,
74.22% were newly opened. One might expect that newly attracted customers would
have a higher tendency to switch, but the paying back early hazard for Brandl is actu¬
ally lower than that for Brand2. Please note that the sudden rise of paying back early
hazard for Brandl customers after month 15 is due to the very few observations after
that month.




Default Pay Back Early
Figure 5.6: The KM hazard functions of the Brandl customers for paying back early
and default
'Figures 5.7 and 5.9 are supplemented because the much smaller magnitude of the default hazard
functions render them look flat in comparison when plotted together with paying back early hazard
functions.
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Default Hazard on Brand 1 customers
analysis time
Figure 5.7: The KM hazard functions of the Brandl customers for default






Default Pay Back Early
Figure 5.8: The KM hazard functions of the Brand2 customers for paying back early
and default
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Default Hazard on Brand2 customers
analysis time
Figure 5.9: The KM hazard functions of the Brand2 customers for default
5.3.3 Difference between hazard functions with different loan terms
There are 6 categories of loan terms in the data set as shown in Table 5.1. Term 24








Table 5.1: Size of different loan term groups
The hazard functions for different terms have different shapes. As shown in Figure
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5.10, for customers taking the loan with the same term, the hazard functions for paying
back early and default are not exactly same. Because of the much smaller magnitude
of default hazard functions compared to that of paying back early hazard functions the
default hazard functions look flat over the time but they are not so. They have been
plotted separately in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Compare the Hazard functions for loans with different terms.
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Figure 5.11: Compare the default hazard functions for loans with different terms.
5.4 Results of default modelling
This section explores the modelling of the time to default using parametric and semi-
parametric models. To avoid dimensionality problems, the data is encoded using
weights of evidence instead of dummy variables. Seventy percent of the data were
randomly selected as a training set, on which the tests and estimations in the following
sub sections were carried out. In total we have 21968 cases in the training set, 1,162
default, 6,063 paying back early and 14,743 Good cases. The cases for paying back
early and Good were both treated together as Non-default.
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5.4.1 Selection of explanatory variables
By testing the equality of the survival functions across the levels with the discrete ex¬
planatory variables, the log rank test or the Wilcoxon test can be carried out. If it is
significant, then the null hypothesis that the survival functions are the same across the
groups, can be rejected and this variable can be included into the model. However,
when our variables have been recoded as continuous using weights of evidence, these
tests were not carried out. Besides, the Stata manual for the survival analysis (release 9,
page 300) suggests that "although it should be preferable to use log rank test, perform¬
ing the log rank test or Cox (likelihood ratio) test makes little substantive difference
with most datasets."
Forward stepwise selection was carried out by starting from fitting an empty model
and one by one adding the most significant excluded term and then re-estimating the
function. The test of significance is a Wald Test. The Wald Test is based on the esti¬
mated variance matrix of the estimators. The likelihood ratio test can also be used to
test the significance of parameters and is preferred by many over the Wald test because
fewer assumptions are made and the interpretation is easier. Our results showed that
identical sets of variables have been selected by the Wald Test and the Likelihood ratio
test. In the following sections we estimated hazard functions for default using alterna¬
tive assumed distributions for the hazard functions: the Weibull and the Exponential.
We then estimated PH Cox models.
5.4.2 Parametric regression using the Weibull distribution
Parametric regression estimation using the Weibull distribution was carried out and the
results are reported in Table 5.2 and the variable dictionary can be found in Table 3.6.
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The hazard and estimated survivor functions can be
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found in Figures 5.12 and 5.13.
Hazard on Default data, Weibull, at sample means
analysis time
Figure 5.12: Hazard function, Weibull distribution, default data
Survival on Default data, Weibull, at sample means
Figure 5.13: Survivor function, Weibull distribution, default data
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Table 5.2: Weibull model estimates for default
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
loanaprl -0.5348692 0.0353265 -15.14 0.000 -0.6041078 -0.4656306
cpi -0.7395155 0.0388443 -19.04 0.000 -0.8156489 -0.6633822
term -0.9456799 0.1094957 -8.64 0.000 -1.1602880 -0.7310723
timebank -0.4994509 0.0839768 -5.95 0.000 -0.6640425 -0.3348594
spl6ml2 -0.4935099 0.0654505 -7.54 0.000 -0.6217905 -0.3652294
ssrc4to6 -0.4304889 0.0701085 -6.14 0.000 -0.5678990 -0.2930789
loanbal4 -0.5236339 0.1091294 -4.80 0.000 -0.7375237 -0.3097442
spsetld -0.5336005 0.0878954 -6.07 0.000 -0.7058724 -0.3613286
spl6m4 -0.4979006 0.1167386 -4.27 0.000 -0.7267040 -0.2690973
age -0.4233402 0.1063859 -3.98 0.000 -0.6318528 -0.2148276
loanball -0.6680406 0.1384581 -4.82 0.000 -0.9394134 -0.3966678
timaddl -0.6679946 0.1801264 -3.71 0.000 -1.0210360 -0.3149533
inc_surp -0.3277320 0.0970146 -3.38 0.001 -0.5178772 -0.1375867
searches -0.4812325 0.2127586 -2.26 0.024 -0.8982318 -0.0642332
spvaldel -0.4153225 0.1198893 -3.46 0.001 -0.6503012 -0.1803438
newbus 17.6266100 6.1234020 2.88 0.004 5.6249660 29.6282600
loanbal2 -0.4131220 0.1667517 -2.48 0.013 -0.7399493 -0.0862946
ccjgt500 -0.5696079 0.2531701 -2.25 0.024 -1.0658120 -0.0734037
brand 0.9648506 0.4020723 2.40 0.016 0.1768033 1.7528980
no_amex -0.8484294 0.3949714 -2.15 0.032 -1.6225590 -0.0742997
mortbal -0.5967126 0.2742134 -2.18 0.030 -1.1341610 -0.0592643
loanbal6 -0.2857244 0.1337473 -2.14 0.033 -0.5478644 -0.0235844
snbal!6m -0.6260833 0.3564790 -1.76 0.079 -1.3247690 0.0726026
_cons -6.4694950 0.1017219 -63.60 0.000 -6.6688660 -6.2701240
/ln_p 0.2541715 0.0264933 9.59 0.000 0.2022455 0.3060975
P 1.2893930 0.0341603 1.2241490 1.3581150
1/p 0.7755588 0.0205471 0.7363148 0.8168943
Chapter 5. Survival Analysis 142
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8082
Figure 5.14: Area under ROC, Weibull distribution, default data
5.4.3 Parametric regression using the Exponential distribution
Parametric regression estimation using the Exponential distribution was carried out.
The survival and hazard functions can be found in Figures 5.15 and 5.16.
Survival on Default data, Exponential, at sample means
analysis time
Figure 5.15: Survivor function, Exponential distribution, default data
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The estimates are reported in Table 5.3. The area under the ROC curve is plotted
in Figure 5.17. Although using a simpler model structure than a Weibull model, the
AuROC on the holdout set is 0.8345, better than that of the Weibull model's 0.8082.




Figure 5.16: Hazard function, Exponential distribution, default data
Figure 5.17: Area under ROC, Exponential distribution, default data
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Table 5.3: Parametric regression results using Exponential Distribution on default
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
loanaprl -0.5178199 0.0356924 -14.51 0.000 -0.5877758 .0.4478641
cpi -0.7250035 0.0388431 -18.66 0.000 -0.8011347 -0.6488724
term -0.9472073 0.1093950 -8.66 0.000 -1.1616170 -0.7327971
timebank -0.4792742 0.0841515 -5.70 0.000 -0.6442081 -0.3143403
spl6ml2 -0.4961234 0.0656931 -7.55 0.000 -0.6248795 -0.3673673
ssrc4to6 -0.4310955 0.0706320 -6.10 0.000 -0.5695317 -0.2926592
loanbaW -0.5270958 0.1091070 -4.83 0.000 -0.7409415 -0.3132501
spsetld -0.5602218 0.0891598 -6.28 0.000 -0.7349719 -0.3854718
spl6m4 -0.5125098 0.1219666 -4.20 0.000 -0.7515599 -0.2734597
age -0.4046630 0.1064918 -3.80 0.000 -0.6133830 -0.1959430
loanball -0.6682834 0.1382475 -4.83 0.000 -0.9392435 -0.3973233
timadd 1 -0.6401188 0.1809254 -3.54 0.000 -0.9947260 -0.2855116
ine_surp -0.3193763 0.0969892 -3.29 0.001 -0.5094716 -0.1292810
searches -0.4943235 0.2128714 -2.32 0.020 -0.9115437 -0.0771032
spvaldel -0.5027495 0.1294584 -3.88 0.000 -0.7564833 -0.2490157
newbus 19.1777700 5.9255270 3.24 0.001 7.5639540 30.7915900
loanbal2 -0.4180606 0.1668939 -2.50 0.012 -0.7451666 -0.0909547
ccjgt500 -0.5249048 0.2533820 -2.07 0.038 -1.0215240 -0.0282853
no_amex -0.7933713 0.3964881 -2.00 0.045 -1.5704740 -0.0162689
loanbal6 -0.2929449 0.1337332 -2.19 0.028 -0.5550571 -0.0308326
mortbal -0.5509227 0.2726835 -2.02 0.043 -1.0853730 -0.0164728
snball6m -0.6134397 0.3571774 -1.72 0.086 -1.3134940 0.0866152
smo89 1.1302930 0.5553435 2.04 0.042 0.0418393 2.2187460
alcifdet -0.5125166 0.2514563 -2.04 0.042 -1.0053620 -0.0196714
_cons -5.6685750 0.0349650 -162.12 0.000 -5.7371050 -5.6000450
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5.4.4 Cox proportional hazard model
The Cox proportional hazard model estimates are reported in Table 5.4. Figure 5.18
shows the baseline survivor function, where So(t(j)) = IT;=o (^ ~hj)- hj is the baseline
hazard contribution. Figure 5.19 plots the ROC curve on the holdout set.
Baseline S(t),Cox model
Figure 5.18: Baseline function S(t), Cox model, default data
1 - Specificity
Figure 5.19: Area under ROC, Cox PH model, default data
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Table 5.4: PH Cox model estimates on default
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
loanaprl -0.535006 0.035208 -15.20 0.000 -0.604013 -0.466000
cpi -0.728857 0.038837 -18.77 0.000 -0.804975 -0.652739
term -0.942529 0.109279 -8.62 0.000 -1.156712 -0.728346
timebank -0.483651 0.084039 -5.76 0.000 -0.648365 -0.318936
spl6ml2 -0.487245 0.065402 -7.45 0.000 -0.615430 -0.359060
ssrc4to6 -0.419171 0.070046 -5.98 0.000 -0.556458 -0.281883
loanba!4 -0.519626 0.109106 -4.76 0.000 -0.733471 -0.305782
spsetld -0.540380 0.087629 -6.17 0.000 -0.712129 -0.368631
spl6m4 -0.466104 0.116628 -4.00 0.000 -0.694689 -0.237518
age -0.400648 0.106515 -3.76 0.000 -0.609413 -0.191882
loanball -0.662516 0.138324 -4.79 0.000 -0.933626 -0.391406
timaddl -0.653350 0.180490 -3.62 0.000 -1.007103 -0.299596
inc_surp -0.317062 0.096913 -3.27 0.001 -0.507008 -0.127116
searches -0.481334 0.212881 -2.26 0.024 -0.898573 -0.064095
spvaldel -0.423302 0.119776 -3.53 0.000 -0.658058 -0.188546
newbus 19.333330 5.928404 3.26 0.001 7.713872 30.952790
loanbal2 -0.417280 0.166892 -2.50 0.012 -0.744382 -0.090178
ccjgt500 -0.555103 0.253246 -2.19 0.028 -1.051456 -0.058749
loanbal6 -0.289933 0.133673 -2.17 0.030 -0.551926 -0.027940
no_amex -0.806257 0.396196 -2.03 0.042 -1.582786 -0.029727
mortbal -0.551189 0.272541 -2.02 0.043 -1.085359 -0.017018
snba!16m -0.628288 0.357366 -1.76 0.079 -1.328713 0.072136
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5.4.4.1 Predictive performance using area under ROC
The cumulative hazard probability in the first 12 months or 24 months can be used to
represent the default behaviour. This cumulative hazard probability equals 1 minus the
probability of survival until 12 months or 24 months. This survival function S(t,x),
the probability of survival until time t for a subject with explanatory variable vector x
under the proportional hazards assumption, can be expressed as
S[t,x) = = e-eV**tih0(u)du =So^
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard function that is only related to the duration time
variable t. Now,
Prob{default within time t) = 1 — S(t,x) = 1 — e~e^c*Sof,o{«)du
For a fixed given value of time /, the probability of default within time 0 to t is mono-
tonically changing with the exponentiated linear prediction e&x, so called the relative
hazard. When measuring the predictive performance using Area under ROC curves on
the binary outcome classifiers, it is only the relative size of the predicted numerical
values that matters. This relative hazard (or the hazard ratio) value can then be used
instead of the actual probability of default in calculating the Area under the ROC val¬
ues on the training and holdout data.
The area under the ROC curve on the holdout sample is 0.8345. For comparison,
using the Logistic Regression model, the area under the ROC curve on the holdout set
is 0.8339. The previous Exponential model achieved an AuROC of0.8345 on the hold¬
out set. Considering the randomness, the difference in the predictive power between
those models, in terms of the area under ROC curve, is mostly negligible. The Weibull
model, however, is the poorest performing model with AuROC of only 0.8082.
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5.4.5 Test of proportional hazard assumption
The proportional hazard assumption is extremely important for the Cox models and
other parametric regression models that are consistent with the proportional hazard
assumption, for example, the Exponential model estimated earlier.
5.4.5.1 Graphical assessment of PH assumption
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1998) (chapter 6.3) describes methods to test the proportional
hazard assumptions. One of the methods that can be used to test the violations of the
proportional hazard assumption on discrete variables in simpler models is the graphical
assessment method. For each level of of the nominal variable, a curve can be plotted.
This can be log-log plots ( —ln(—ln(survival probability)) vs ln(analysis time). Par¬
allel curves indicate the non-violations of the proportional hazard assumption.
Or as pointed out by Garrett (1997), two curves can be plotted by displaying pre¬
dicted survival probability from the Cox model along with the observed probability
from Kaplan-Meier models. The closer the observed values are to the predicted, the
less likely the assumption is to be violated. One problem with the graphical assessment
method is that eyeballing is difficult and subjective. Another limitation is its applica¬
bility only to simpler models with nominal covariates. Besides, too many levels within
those nominal covariates gives one graph with many curves that are difficult to tell
apart.
5.4.5.2 Testing the PH Assumption using scaled Schoenfeld residuals
Grambsch and Themeau (1994) proposed that the test of a zero slope in a generalized
linear regression of a scaled Schoenfeld residuals of time is equivalent to a test of the
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existence of the constant log hazard ratio over time. The results for the global scaled
Schoenfeld residuals test, as displayed in Table 5.5, show that the null hypothesis that
there is a zero slope, has to be rejected (Prob>chi2 = 0.0000).
Table 5.5: Test of proportional hazards assumption
rho chi2 df Prob > chi2
loanaprl 0.04959 3.02 1 0.0821
cpi -0.01456 0.26 1 0.6114
term -0.08801 9.45 1 0.0021
timebank -0.04636 2.57 1 0.1088
spl6ml2 0.01102 0.14 1 0.7040
ssrc4to6 -0.04981 3.07 1 0.0797
loanbal4 -0.05680 3.58 1 0.0585
spsetld 0.07621 6.65 1 0.0099
spl6m4 -0.04137 2.21 1 0.1371
age -0.00056 0.00 1 0.9844
loanball 0.00492 0.03 1 0.8653
timaddl -0.04016 1.83 1 0.1758
inc_surp -0.09487 10.64 1 0.0011
searches 0.03680 1.55 1 0.2127
spvaldel 0.01139 0.16 1 0.6905
newbus -0.05848 3.85 1 0.0499
loanbal2 -0.04155 1.91 1 0.1674
ccjgt500 -0.02504 0.74 1 0.3883
loanbal6 0.00140 0.00 1 0.9623
no_amex -0.03270 0.97 1 0.3235
mortbal 0.02903 0.99 1 0.3209
snball6m -0.02022 0.39 1 0.5320
global test 74.15 22 0.0000
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That means there are violations in the assumption of proportional hazards. When
assessed individually, the covariates that clearly violate the proportional hazards as¬
sumption are term, spsetld, inc_surp, newbus (the p value threshold is set as 0.05 ) .
However, graphically it is still not easy to check the violation. Comparison of Figures
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Figure 5.21: Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals for AGE, non violating PH Assumption, de¬
fault data
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5.4.5.3 Using time dependent covariates to test the PH assumption
Another method of testing the proportional hazard assumption was described by Hos-
mer and Lemeshow (1998) following Schoenfeld (1982) and Grambsch and Therneau
(1994) by creating time dependent covariates which are the interactions between those
covariates to be tested and the log of survival time. If those newly generated time
dependent covariates enter the Cox model with significant parameters then the PH as¬
sumption is violated. Because of the limits of the software package used (Stata Stcox),
which refuses to run when too many time dependent covariates are entered into the
model, those newly created time dependent covariates were split into three groups,
each group enters a Cox model with other time-independent covariates. The results in
Appendix C: Tables C.l, C.2, and C.3 show the estimates for those three models.
Similar to findings using scaled Schoenfeld residuals, four variables (term, spsetld,
inc_surp and newbus) were found to be significant. Another four covariates (loanbal4,
spl6m4, loanbal2 and no_amex ) were also found to be violating the PH assumption
according to this test.
5.4.5.4 Performance of the Cox model with time dependent covariates
Previous tests on the proportional hazards assumptions indicated violations of the as¬
sumption and pointed out four covariates that may be time dependent. The four vari¬
ables are term, spsetld, inc_surp and newbus. A Cox model with time dependent co¬
variates is therefore constructed on the training data. The time dependent covariates
were constructed as X*t, where t is the duration time and X is the set of four time
dependent covariates that have been shown to be violating the PH assumption in both
of previous tests.
Chapter 5. Survival Analysis 152
The expectation is that the Cox model with time dependent covariates should improve
the predictive performance on the holdout data. Surprisingly, this is not what was ob¬
served. The area under the ROC curve on the holdout set is 0.8289, lower than the area
under the ROC curve from the original Cox model of 0.8345. Figure 5.22 plots the
ROC curves on the holdout set and the estimates are listed in Appendix C: Table C.4.
Therefore we retain these variables in the hazard function.
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8289
Figure 5.22: Area under ROC, Cox model with time dependent covariates, default data
5.4.6 Conclusion
In the previous analysis we have estimated the parameters for different survival analy¬
sis models of default. The predictive performance comparisons in terms of area under
the ROC curve on the holdout set show that the Exponential model and the PH Cox
model are as competitive as a Logistic Regression model in predicting default. More
complex models such as the Cox model with time dependent covariates added, do not
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predict as well as expected. They might be suffering from the problem of over fitting.
5.5 Results of paying back early modelling
Previous results in section 5.3.1 have shown that the hazard functions for behaviours
of default and paying back early are totally different. Stepanova and Thomas (2002)
compared the modelling approaches of the paying back early behaviour using PH Cox
models and Logistic Regression. They used two alternative definitions of paying back
early in the modelling comparison. The first type is for the loan to be paid off early
within the first 12 months. The second is for the loan to be paid off between month 12
and month 24 should the loan not have been paid off in the first 12 months. They found
a stronger effect of the term arrangement (especially the remaining time-to-maturity of
the loan) on the probability of paying back early than on the probability of default.
In our analysis, we will not predict the probability of paying back early from month
12 to month 24 since we are more interested in estimating profitability at the time of
application. This profitability estimation requires the paying back early probabilities
estimation at the time of application.
For the same reason, the behaviour of paying back early is defined as the observa¬
tion that the loan has paid back within the whole duration of the loan. Because we
have a limited observation period (only the first 26 months), our definition of paying
back early is the observation of the outcome of the customer to pay back early within
the first 26 months. Most of the variables used (except the two continuous variables,
the loan amount L and loan APR ) in the models are coded using the weights of evi-
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dence, which are calculated using the odds ofpaying back early.
Both parametric and semi parametric survival models will be fitted to the data. Two
proportional hazards parametric survival models, Weibull and exponential models, will
be used. Two accelerated failure time models, the Lognormal and Loglogistic models,
will be tried as well. These two models are introduced because of the difference ob¬
served in the shape of the hazard functions compared to the hazard functions of the
default models.
5.5.1 Parametric proportional hazards modelling results
The hazard functions for the Weibull and exponential models can be found in Figures
5.23 and 5.24. Because of the way the hazard functions are parameterized, their hazard
functions structures are constrained. For the exponential model, the hazard function
has to be held constant, which apparently differs from the real functional form of the
hazard function as we have observed in the Kaplan-Meier model. It is therefore not
surprising to find that the Lognormal and Loglogistic models (to be shown in the next
sub section) have better fits for the hazard functions than Weibul and exponential mod¬
els. The estimates for the two models can be found in Appendix C: Tables C.5 and
C.6.
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Figure 5.24: Hazard function, Exponential model, paying back early data
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5.5.2 PH Cox model results
The hazard function for the PH Cox Models is shown in Figure 5.25. Because the
model structure of PH Cox model is semi-parametric, the estimated hazard function
is the closest to the observed hazard functions estimated by the Kaplan-Meier model.
The hazard goes up initially and the speed of increase decreases until reaching around
19 months. After then the hazard of paying back early drops quickly. The estimates
for the PH Cox model can be found in the Table C.7 within the appendix section.
Cox proportional hazards regression
Figure 5.25: Hazard function, PH Cox model, paying back early data
5.5.3 Parametric accelerated failure time models
The hazard functions estimated from Lognormal and Loglogistic models (shown in
Figures 5.26 and 5.27 respectively) more closely capture the shape of the observed
real hazard functions than the Weibull and exponential models do. The hazard function
rises at first then the speed of increase decreases slowly. However, both models have
not captured the decrease in the hazard function after around 20 months as the semi-
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Figure 5.26: Hazard function, Lognormal model, paying back early data
Loglogistic regression
analysis time
Figure 5.27: Hazard function, Loglogistic model, paying back early data
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5.5.4 Model comparison
One way of comparing the goodness of fit of the survival models is by using Cox-Snell
Residuals Cox and Snell (1968). For each observation j, the Cox-Snell residual rj is
rj = Ho(tj)exp(fixj)
where (3 are the estimates of the survival model. Hoitj) is the cumulative baseline haz¬
ard function up to tj. This set of Cox-Snell residuals can be treated as observations
from an exponential distribution with parameter X equal to one if the p and Ho(t) are
the true estimates of the model parameters.
The fit of the model may be examined by comparing these Cox-Snell residuals to the
empirical estimates of the cumulative hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier estimates of
the survival function S, can be transformed into the empirical estimates of a cumulative
hazard function where Ho = —ln(S). If the model has a good fit, the plot of Kaplan-
Meier estimates against Cox-Snell residuals should be very close to a straight line with
a slope of one.
The Figures 5.28, 5.29, 5.30 , 5.31 and 5.32 suggest that Weibull and exponential
models have a poorer fit to the data compared to the Lognormal, Loglogistic and PH
Cox model. The better model fit for the Lognormal and Loglogistic models can be
explained by their suitable shapes of the hazard function forms, which see the hazard
rates increase and then go down as observed in the paying back early behaviour. PH
Cox model can also achieve a reasonable fit thanks to its semi-parametric estimation
of the baseline hazard functions.
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Weibull
Figure 5.28: Using Cox-Snell residuals to check the fit ofWeibull model
Exponential
_l 1 1 r
0 2 3
Cox-Snell Residual
Figure 5.29: Using Cox-Snell residuals to check the fit of Exponential model
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Lognormal
Figure 5.30: Using Cox-Snell residuals to check the fit of Lognormal model
Loglogistic
Figure 5.31 Using Cox-Snell residuals to check the fit of Loglogistic model
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Figure 5.32: Using Cox-Snell residuals to check the fit of PH Cox model
Better fit of the model to the training data does not necessarily translate to a better pre¬
dictor on the out-of-sample data. The predictive performances of those parametric and
semi-parametric survival analysis models, measured by their abilities to differentiate
the binary outcome ofpaying back early or not for the holdout set, are compared in Ta¬








Table 5.6: Comparison of the model predictive performance on holdout set
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As shown in Table 5.6, using AuROC as the performance measure, overall the predic¬
tive abilities of those models are very similar in terms of the ability of differentiating
the non-paying back early from the paying back early customers within the 26 months
observation period. The lowest AuROC value, 0.6597, was reported by a Lognormal
model and the highest AuROC value, 0.6736, was reported by a Logistic Regression.
The exponential model, despite its poor model fit indicated by the Cox-Snell residuals,
achieves the second best AuROC.
5.5.5 Conclusion
Compared to the predictive performance of the default models, the paying back early
models achieve much lower AuROC values. This is because of the lack of predic¬
tive variables explaining the paying back early behaviours. The dynamic competitive
ranking data of the lenders' typical rates for each month and the rates charged by com¬
peting lenders , for example, might improve the predictions if they were available to
be included in the models.
Due to the different shapes of the hazard functions observed, the parametric propor¬
tional hazard survival models like Weibull and exponential models are not found to
fit the hazard functions well, despite still doing reasonable well in the binary outcome
predictions. The parametric Accelerated Failure Time models like the Lognormal and
Loglogisitic models, are found to fit the data better in terms of the Cox-Snell residuals.
The proportional hazards Cox model, is also found to have good model fit (thanks to
the semi-parametric model structure) and comparable predictive performance.
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5.6 Results of competing risks modelling
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In our data three different outcomes may happen, paying back early, continue to pay
on time during the observation period (right censored) or default. The risks of paying
back early and default are non-repeated failures by definition. Once the customer has
paid back early or defaulted, for the analysis the account was considered closed and
study time finished 2. Each subject was either right censored or encountered one of
the two events. As seen in Figure 5.3 and 5.4, the Kaplan-Meier survival and hazard
functions for payback early and default are totally different.
Lunn and McNeil (1995) discussed different methods available for the estimation of
parameters in modelling competing risks, either estimating the parameters for those
events individually or jointly. The latter was preferred rather than the "separate estima¬
tion" approach, the drawback ofwhich, they argued, is "it does not treat different types
of failures jointly, complicating the comparison of parameter estimates corresponding
to different failure types". They described two methods that model competing risks
with parameters estimated jointly. One practical advantage of their models is that the
two models do not require dedicated software packages. Instead, the models work
by augmenting the data through duplication. For a model with two competing risks,
the data will be doubled by duplicating rows. One row for one risk. One new binary
covariate is introduced to indicate the risk type. The interactions with this new "risk
type" covariate and other covariates x,■ are also created to enter into the model.
The first of the two methods (called "Method A") proposed by Lunn and McNeil
2Many borrowers who defaulted on our definition (2 payments overdue), were actually allowed by
the lender who supplied the data, to continue making payments.
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assumed that the baseline hazard functions for each hazard function hoj(t) for each
possible risk event differ by a constant ratio, eb°. When the assumption of a constant
ratio between baseline hazard functions does not hold, Lunn and McNeil suggested an
alternative method (called "Method B") that fits a stratified Cox PH model in which
the data for each failure type forms a strata, assuming different baseline hazard func¬
tions and sharing the same set of parameters. Cleves (1999) suggested a simpler model
(called "Method StataFAQ") for the analysis ofmultiple survival data. It is simpler be¬
cause interaction covariates are dropped. The model is similar to Lunn and McNeil's
"Method B" model in using the strata to model different baseline hazard functions for
each type of risk. The tables of estimates are listed in Tables C.8, C.10 and C.9, which
can be found in Appendix C.
The predictive performances for each event measured on the holdout set, in terms of
area under ROC curves are reported in Table 5.7. All three models are trained using
dummy variables since weights of evidence are outcome specific. The predictive vari¬
ables are firstly stepwise selected from a PH Cox default model and a paying back early
model, separately. The two sets of selected variables are then merged into the set of
predictive variables used across the current three competing risk models. The weighted
AuROC values are calculated as the sum of half of the AuROC values of defaults and
half of those for payback early. Generally the paying back early was not predicted well
compared to default in terms of AuROC values, as has been previously noted. The
method StataFAQ is the worst performing model, with both default and paying back
early having the lowest AuROC of the three models. Method A and Method B, on the
other hand, are barely distinguishable.
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AuROC default paying back early weighted
Method A 0.8273 0.6691 0.7482
Method B 0.8287 0.6679 0.7483
Method StataFAQ 0.7543 0.6530 0.7037
Table 5.7: Comparison of the model performance
In conclusion, in the three competing risks models we have tested, the two models pro¬
posed by Lunn and McNeil provide reasonable predictive performance. Compared to
the individually estimated approaches, PH Cox for example, the competing risks mod¬
els are competitive in predicting paying back early. On the other hand, in the prediction
of defaults, their predictive performance are lagging behind. Overall the benefits from
using these competing risks models over individually estimated approaches are not
significant.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, different modelling approaches of default and paying back early have
been tested. Overall, the semi-parametric proportional hazard Cox model is found
to perform well in predicting both types of behaviours. In the parametric survival
models, the exponential model is found to perform competitively in the prediction of
both default and paying back early. However, the two types of proportional hazard
parametric models, exponential and Weibull models, are found to fit the data less well
than other models for the paying back early data, which has a bump shape in the hazard
function. Finally, both types of the failure events have been modelled in a Competing
Risk framework, which did not seem to bring much benefit in terms of the predictive
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This chapter calculates the unconditional expected profit for the lender at the time an
application for credit is received and before making an offer to the customer. This
chapter has the following structure.
• Section 6.2 gives the estimating equations for the profits of a fixed term loan
product. Detailed results are discussed along with graphical presentations.
• Section 6.3 demonstrates the optimal decision policies the lender can employ to
maximize profit or market share subject to the marketing strategies.
• Section 6.4 provides sensitivity tests on different segments. Specifically, we will
analyse the difference between Internet and None Internet segments and compare
the economic benefit of this segmentation.
The existing literature lacks an empirical methodology which a lender may use to
choose the interest rate on a fixed term loan when its objective is to maximise uncon-
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ditional expected profits at the time ofapplication subject to a minimum market share.
This chapter provides such a methodology and applies it to a dataset of actual choices
made by applicants and a lender so that optimal decision policies can be applied sub¬
ject to the constraints.
The results show the extent of the trade-off between market share and unconditional
expected profits. Our results also demonstrate the possibility of segmenting the mar¬
ket and choosing the optimal interest rate for each loan amount requested can lead to
markedly different policy decisions than by simply adapting a particular rate for all ap¬
plicants. We also discuss how the specification of the models can affect the functions
estimated and decision policies involved.
6.2 Estimating equations
The unconditional expected profit at the time of application (t = c) of a fixed term
loan, but conditional on a vector of an applicant's characteristics, x, can be written as
Et=c(n\x) = Et=c(Ti\a\x)Et=c(p(o)\x) +Et=c(n\d\x){\ - E,=c(p(a)\x)) (6.1)
where a(a) = the potential borrower accepts (rejects) the offer and n = the present
value of the profits at t = c. The second term is assumed to be zero. If the customer
rejects the offer, the lender makes a profit of zero. The first term is the product of the
expected profit conditional on acceptance (see section 6.2.1 below) and the acceptance
probability (see section 6.2.2). We also assume that Et=c(ji\a\x) and Et=c{p(a) I*) are
independent. Although £)=c(7t|a) is correlated with p(a) since both are functions that
share a same set of predictive variables, it does not necessarily imply that they are cor¬
related with each other when conditional on this same set of applicant characteristics
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x. It should also be noted that in later subsections, for the ease ofnotation, we use p{a)
in place for Et-C{p{a)\x).
6.2.1 Conditional expected profit
In the previous chapter on survival analysis we compared two different approaches
to estimate survival probabilities of default and paying back early, independently, and
simultaneously in competing risks models. The benefit gained from using compet¬
ing risks models instead of independent estimation models was not significant when
measuring the predictive performance ofmodels by AuROC values on the holdout set.
Therefore the basic assumption we have made in the beginning of this chapter is that
the probability of default Pf and the probability of paying back early Pf are indepen¬
dent.
The conditional expected profit is the sum of four sources of expected revenue, each
discounted at the opportunity cost of the funds, less the value of the loan. One ratio¬
nale behind the discounting is that eventually we want to calculate the unconditional
expected profit at the very time of the application before the offer is made by the lender
to the applicant. The other reason is that, from the data supplied we cannot infer the
exact figure for the cost of the lender supplying the loan. Using this discounting we
assume the cost to the lender to supply the loan by borrowing the funds is a fixed in¬
terbank rate. 1
The four sources of expected revenue are presented in detail as follows.
'This assumption of a fixed interbank rate can be wrong in a volatile market when the liquidity is
under pressure.
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1. The expected scheduled monthly payments when the borrower is still making
these because he/she has not defaulted and not repaid early:
y sb5? Mh ^(1+0'
where
Sb = probability that the borrower has not chosen to pay back early all of the loan
on or before period t\
Sf = probability that the borrower has not defaulted on or before period t\
i = the interbank monthly interest rate, assumed to be 5% compound over 1 year;
The opportunity cost of the fund cannot be omitted as we assume that, to service
the loan, the lender need to borrow all or most of all (subject to regularities
restrictions such as Basel I or II) the fund at an interbank rate.)
M= scheduled (fixed amount) monthly payment;
T = terminal period of the loan;
2. The expected balance to be repaid early provided the borrower has not defaulted
before the early repayment date:
Y +2*7')2A (Vi-A) (1 + f),
where
Bt = the expected balance to repay when the borrower wishes to settle early at
the end ofmonth t.
The fee for early repayment is assumed to be two months interest, at monthly
interest rate j, on the rest of the balance.
3. The expected recovery amount if the borrower defaults in month t but has not
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paid back early before t:
7 «,-!X(l-LGD)S*(Sf_,-Sf)-
t= 1
where LGD = Loss Given Default.
4. The expected receipts from insurance premia:
I*p(I) */>(£/)
where
/ = insurance income if the insurance is taken and no claim is made;
p(I) = probability that the insurance is taken;
p{U) = probability that no insurance claim is made.
The balance to pay when the customer wishes to settle early at the end ofmonth t,




L = the loan amount requested
j = the monthly rate. Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is equal to 100((1 + y')12 — 1).
So j _ e{log{\+APR/m))/\2 _ j
The monthly payment, M, is
M Lti, (1+-/71 (l+i)T-I
where T is the term in the number ofmonths.
The conditional insurance income, I, is calculated as an added margin as a percentage
Chapter 6. Profitability Modelling 172
of the sum of expected monthly payments
Tit'"
where IM = insurance margin.
We have assumed or estimated the following parameters listed below. When decid¬
ing what exact values to be chosen for parameters roughly assumed, we choose the
values in a conservative way in their effects upon the expected profits.
• LGD = 0.75 This is an averaged Loss Given Default estimates assumed to be
constant.
• IM = 0.1 The insurance margin indicates what percentage extra the lender will
add to the monthly payments. The exact percentage the lender will charge is
different, within range from 10% to 20%, depending on the decision policies
constraints involved. A lower end value of 10% is chosen as it is conservative
towards profit estimation.
• p(U) = 0.8 This is a conservative estimate by assuming only 20% of customers
will claim. In fact, according to the 2006 report from The Office of Fair Trading
about the UK Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) market titled 'The PPI Claim
Ratio, percentage ofpremiums paid by consumers', the claim ratio was estimated
to be as low as 15-20%. 2
• p(I) = 0.3 The insurance take-up rate is the average value across all the sample
instead ofmodelled.
2The web address for the market study report of the UK market of payment protection insurance
(PPI) at 2006 can be found at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2006/148-06
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• i = 0.004074 This monthly interest rate is equivalent to an annual rate of 5%.
The averaged interbank rates on the market during the time period in which this
fixed term loan product resides is below 5%. As the interbank rate constitutes
the most important part of costs for the lender to fund the loan, an slightly con¬
servative value of 5% is chosen to compensate possible increase of the rate and
the administrative overheads in the fixed costs.
• T = 24 The time span of24 months is chosen because the equations involved will
be the simplest functional form to calculate in the Matlab Symbolic Toolbox.
Although 24 months is the choice of the loan tenn that we want to calculate the ex¬
pected profits for, the samples on which the estimation routines were carried out in¬
clude the samples with loan terms from 24 months up to 60 months. Using this larger
pool of samples (totally 27160 cases including both training and holdout sets) avoids
the possible bias introduced because of the very small sample size for the 24 months
loan (totally 2149 cases including both training and holdout sets).
The survival probabilities for the Default and PayEarly were calculated using estimates
from the Cox Proportional Hazard models 3.
S^(t,L,APR) = $APR*APR+$L*L+&dog(L)*,og(APR)+$b0)
S?(t,L,APR) — ^(j)^p(KpR*APR+$l*L+$\*los{P)*l°g{APR)+K)
where So(t) are the baseline survival functions which do not change with the predictive
variables such as APR and Loan Amount L.
3This formulation includes an interaction between the loan amount L and APR. The tables of es¬
timates for the Default and PayEarly hazard functions can be found in the appendix in Table D.13 and
D.16
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[3q and Pq are estimated constants within the survival probability functions for
paying back early and default, plus the added sum of the other variables' mean values
multiplied by their corresponding coefficients estimated from Cox models. That is, if
we calculate for the applicant with the mean values of the covariates:
Po = Pm) +X $bxX
P? = p7o +XP2^
For convenience we will refer to such an applicant as the 'mean' applicant or 'typical'
applicant. The results for the remainder of this section and section 6.4 relate to the
'mean' applicant.
6.2.1.1 Results of conditional expected profit
The expected profits conditional on an offer having been accepted by customers, Et=c(ii\a
have been calculated by summing up the four sources of revenues detailed in the pre¬
vious subsection. Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 plot the results in a profit-loan amount-
interest rate 3D space .
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Figure 6.1: Expected profit conditional on the acceptance
In Figure 6.1, the AT axis is Loan Amount, the Y axis is the interest rate APR charged
and the Z axis is the expected profits conditional on the loan having been accepted by a
customer. Figure 6.2 is the projection of Figure 6.1 into a 2 dimensional Loan Amount
vs. Rate space. This is done by connecting points of different offers (Loan Amount
and Rate) but with the same expected profits to give iso-expected-profit contours. The
colours of the contours indicate the height of the conditional expected profits. Hot
colours (red or yellow) stand for relatively higher profits while the cold colour (blue)
stands for lower conditional expected profits.
Loan Amount (£10000)
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Contour of Expected Profit Conditional on Acceptance
Figure 6.2: The contour of conditional expected profit shown in Figure 6.1 . a
"The colour of the contour indicates the height of the conditional expected profit. Hot colours (red
or yellow) stand for relatively higher profit while cold colour (blue) stands for lower expected profit.
The figures show that up until an interest rate of approximately 14% the conditional
expected profits increase along with the loan amount given an interest rate. The larger
the loan amount, the larger the conditional expected profits. They also show that given
a loan amount, a higher interest rate increases conditional expected profit up until a
threshold point of the interest rate. Interest rates above that threshold actually reduce
the conditional expected profit.
For different given loan amounts, this threshold interest rate above which the con¬
ditional expected profit is reduced rather than increased, is slightly different. As can
be seen more clearly in Figure 6.2, the threshold interest rate is lower for larger loan
amounts than for smaller loan amounts. For a £25000 Loan, the threshold interest rate
will be around 14% while that rate will be slightly higher at around 19% for a loan of
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£6000.
6.2.2 Acceptance probability
Logistic Regression was used to estimate the probability of acceptance on the sam¬
ples with loan terms ranging from 24 months up to 60 months 4. The equation that
was estimated had the form of log-— $X. Therefore the estimated probability of
acceptance p(a) can be expressed as:
P(a) = gT (6-2)1 + e"x
Table D.l in the appendix shows the estimated parameters. In the table, rawJoanaprl
and L are the Loan APR and Loan Amount in their original continuous values together
with logLXAPR, the interaction term between the two variables APR and L that we
found to significantly improve the acceptance model when it was included. This vari¬
able is coded as the product of their natural logarithms, log(L)*log(APR). All the other
variables are coded using dummy variables.
Similar to the treatments we have used previously in the PH Cox models , Po is the
constant plus the added sum of other variables' mean values multiplied by their corre¬
spondingly estimated coefficients: Po + P2f.
exp($o + Papr *APR + pL *L + * log(L) * log(APR))
p{a) = ^ — — -
(1 + exp(po + Papr *APR + pL *L + Pi * log(L) * log(APR))
For an applicant with the mean values of the covariates, the 'mean' applicant: po =
4.0175. The estimates for Papr , Pz, and Pi are -0.1098 , 0.1076 and -0.9015 respec¬
tively. Both negative signs on papr and Pi indicate that the applicant will be much
4The reason for this is that there are a limited number of 24 month cases in the data, too small to
provide unbiased estimates. This choice of samples was discussed in section 6.2.1
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less likely to accept an offer if the interest rate APR is high. The positive sign on P/_
combined with the negative sign on Pi indicates that a more complex relationship ex¬
ists between the loan amount and the acceptance probability. For a given interest rate
APR, the acceptance probability is dependent on the relative sizes of two terms Pl*L
and pi * log(L) * log(APR). Plug in the estimates of p/, and Pi
p{a) - 0.1098 * L - 0.9015 * Iog(L) * log{APR)
This means, when the Loan Amount is large, p(a) will be dominated by the first term
since the numerical values of log(L) *log(APR) will be relatively much smaller. This
leads to the conclusion that the acceptance probability will be higher when the loan
amount is larger (though the maximum loan amount is £25K, meaning the largest
L — 25). On the other hand, when the Loan Amount is small, the second term will
be dominant and the combination of the two terms will bear negative sign. Under
such circumstances, the applicant will be more likely to accept an offer when the loan
amount is smaller.




Figure 6.3: Estimated acceptance probability"
"The colour indicates the height of the numerical values of the estimated probability of acceptance.
Hot colours (red or yellow) stand for relatively higher probability while cold colour (blue) stands for
lower probability.
Figure 6.3 plots the results. Notice that the origin is in the far corner, lower interest
rates and loan amounts occur further along the X and Y axis respectively. From the
graph we can see that customers prefer a lower rate given a chosen loan amount and
a lower loan amount given the interest rate, in accordance to the negative signs on the
coefficients $apr and P/,. For example for a given loan amount of £25000, when the
interest rate is increased from 5% to 10%, the probability of acceptance is decreased
from 0.8 to around 0.3. While at an interest rate of 15%, when the loan amount is
increased from £1000 to £5000, the probability of acceptance is decreased from around
0.9 to 0.3. The surface of the plot takes a S shape where the steepest part is located at
smaller loan amounts and high interest rates. This is because the functional form of the
probability of acceptance is a Logit function and the interaction term log(L)*log(APR)
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is included.
6.2.3 Unconditional expected profit
The unconditional expected profit at the time of application (/ = c) of a fixed term
loan was given in equation 6.1 and for convenience is reproduced here as Et=c(tt|x) =
El=c(n\a\x)Et=c(p(a)\x). That is the product of the expected profit conditional on ac¬
ceptance and the probability of acceptance. The expected profit conditional on accep¬
tance Et=c(7t|a|x) has been discussed in section 6.2.1. The probability of acceptance
p(a) has been discussed in section 6.2.2. Combining these two leads to the equation
below
Et=c{n\x) = E,=c(n\a\x)E,=c(p(a)\x)
t d t \4
+ £(1 - LGD)sf(Sf_ I -Sf)+£ S*Sf *p(U)\
exp((3o + (3apr *APR + (3^ *L + pi * log(L) * log(APR))
* s: „ —
1 +exp{$o + $APR*APR + $L*L + $\ *log(L)*log(APR))
The final Matlab Symbolic representation of the function of the unconditional expected
profit, with all the estimated values, can be found in the appendix.
Figure 6.4 plots the results in 3D space, showing that a higher rate and loan amount do
not necessarily bring higher expected profits from all applicants considering the very
low acceptance rate at those points. In fact, a ridge ofmost profitable offers is shown,
especially for those with higher loan amounts. At each given loan amount, the interest
rate that maximizes the profit actually goes down when the amount is increasing.
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Unconditional Expected Profit at the time of application
200 s "
Rate (%) Loan Amount (£10000)
Figure 6.4: The unconditional expected profit of a loan at the time of application. a
Contours of Unconditional Expected Profit at the time of application
Figure 6.5: Contour of unconditional expected profit.
"The colour indicates the height of the expected profit. Hot colours (red or yellow) stand for rela¬
tively higher profit while cold colour (blue) stands for lower expected profit.
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Figure 6.5 can be seen as the projection of Figure 6.4 into a 2 dimensional space of
Loan Amount and Rate, with lines connecting loan amount - rate offers with the same
expected profits to form contours. The same conclusion to that drawn from Figure 6.4
can also be drawn from this figure that a lower or mid-ranged interest rate is the most
profitable for the lender. We can also see that for higher loan amounts the maximum
expected profits are much less sensitive to the loan amounts than to the interest rates.
6.2.4 Iso-profit curves plotted together with iso-preference curves
We can further plot the iso-preference curves derived from the acceptance probabilities
shown in Figure 6.3 and the iso-unconditional expected profit contours from Figure 6.5
on the same Figure, as shown in Figure 6.6. The iso-preference curves are stretching
from top left comer to bottom right comer, marked with the acceptance probabilities
(from 0.1 to 0.9). The iso-preference curves corresponding to a lower rate given a loan
amount are those with higher acceptance probabilities.
If the lender wants to maintain market share by keeping the acceptance rates fixed
while maximising profits, in other words, the lender wants to improve the profit with¬
out decreasing the probability of acceptance, from 0.6 as an example, then better offers
can be made by moving along the iso-preference curve where p(a) = 0.6 from left to
right to the region where the expected unconditional profit is higher. This assumes the
lender can choose both rate the loan amount. The point of unconstrained maximum
expected profit from an applicant can be found at the intersection at the point of the
global maxima ofprofit (the top of the hill). In the next section we discuss the optimal
decision policies under different constraints.
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ISO Profit Contours and ISO Preference Contours with Labels
Loan Amount (£10000)
Figure 6.6: The iso-profit curves plotted together with the iso-preference curves.
6.3 Optimal decision policies
After a customer has applied for a loan and passed the credit check to be accepted by
the lender, it is up to the lender to decide what as the characteristics of any offer it
wishes to make. As shown in the flow chart below, Figure 6.7, the decision policies
are dependent on its marketing strategies. A lender may want to maximize profit only,
or increase market share only, or maximize profit subject to a certain minimum market
share or possibly other combinations.
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The Decision Diagram
Figure 6.7: Decision diagram
Furthermore, the optimal decision policies to be employed by the lender are also de¬
pendent on certain constraints on aspects of the loan the lender can control. If the loan
amount and APR are both variables adjustable by the lender, the optimal offers are no
doubt to be found on the line of optimal offers suggested in Keeney and Oliver (2005).
When the expected profit is the only maximizing criteria (no market share concerns),
the point at the top of the hill of the profits is the ideal choice. For example in Figure
6.8, the point marked with 'Peak' where Loan Amount is £25000 and Rate is 8.08%
is such a maximum, assuming that £25000 is the largest loan amount that this loan
product allows.
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Contours of Unconditional Expected Profit at the time of application
Loan Amount (£10000)
Figure 6.8: Contour of unconditional expected profit with peak point marked
When the lender wants to optimise the offers (by choices of interest rate) to maximise
profit subject to a given market share (p{a) > k), the optimizing rate can be found as
shown in section 6.3.1.
Table 6.1 lists the combinations of objectives to maximise given certain constraints.
In reality, the amount of the loan is requested by the customer and rarely changed, ex¬
cept in order to allow the customer to pass affordability checks, or to offer a suggestion
to the customer that they may want a bigger loan to cover an additional debt disclosed
during a conversation. Since the loan amount is usually fixed by the applicant, the
optimal policy is a choice of interest rate and is dependent on whether the market share
is set as the constraint. The details are in subsection 6.3.2.
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p(a) unconstrained
— L fixed by borrower




st. r = r*
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maxr£j=c(jt)
st. L = L*
maXL,rEi=c(n)
p(a) > k
—L fixed by borrower









st. p(a) > k
Table 6.1: Matrix of optimal decision policies by lender
6.3.1 Optimal policies if choice is of APR rate s.t. p(a)5
Suppose the lender's objective is to maximize unconditional expected profit from an
applicant by choice of interest rate, subject to a given minimum probability of accep¬
tance p{a) > k — 0.6 and the loan amount chosen by the borrower will be adjusted
accordingly. The optimal interest rate can be found by walking along the acceptance
line p(a) = k = 0.6 until L = 25000 and APR = 6.79% with maximum of profit ex¬
pected at 173.4, as seen in Figures 6.9 and 6.10.
5Please note that the discussion here is based on the results from the model that includes the inter¬
action term between the loan amount L and APR in the predictive variables
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Figure 6.9 shows the iso-profit contours with an iso-preference line with the proba¬
bility of acceptance p(a) = 0.6. Figure 6.10 plots the unconditional expected profit
against the loan amount when moving along the iso-preference line p(a) = 0.6 (The
dotted curve in Figure 6.9 runs from from the top left corner to the right bottom corner
with p(a) = 0.6 tag on). The unconditional expected profit increases then decreases
and then increases again until reaching the point ofmaximum profit, which is found at
the highest loan amount.
Rate vs. Loan Amount when Prob(Acceptance)=0.6 against ISO profit curves
Figure 6.9: The acceptance line p(a) = 0.6 on the iso-profit contours.
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Expected Profit vs. Loan Amount given Prob(Acceptance)=0.6
Figure 6.10: The loan amount that maximise the expected profit when p(a) > 0.6
The general solution to this optimisation problem can be set up as follows:
max E,=c(n) = f(L,APR)
r
s.t. p(a) > k
where k is the minimum market share constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker condition shall
be met and maxima can be found if f and p(a) — k are concave. By observing the
diagrams, it seems that / is not concave unless the decision region is split into two
regions as there are two hills. If sufficient conditions are met, the optimisation problem
can be written as follows:
max E,=c(n) = f(L,APR)
r
s.t. k — p(a) —g{L,APR)< 0
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Letting the Lagrangian functionF — f{L.APR) — X*g{L,APR) by introducing a mul¬




dF ALL y ds - n





Although all the functions here are differentiable, the functional form of the Et=c{ri) =
f{L.APR) is so complex (see Appendix ) that differentiation procedures in the Matlab
Symbolic Toolbox cannot be completed. This maybe due to memory overflow. There¬
fore, diagrams and small-stepped enumeration have been used to find the interest rate
that maximizes the profit from an applicant.
6.3.2 Optimal policies if choice is of APR given loan amount
In the following cases the loan amount is chosen by the applicant and is fixed for the
lender and is known by the lender before the lender chooses the interest rate.
6.3.2.1 If the market share p(a) is not considered6
If the market share is ofno concern to the lender, we can just move across the iso-profit
contours along a vertical line corresponding to the fixed loan amount and calculate the
optimal rate. These rates are shown in Figure 6.11 for three different loan amounts.
6Please note that the discussion here is based on the results from the model includes the interaction
term between loan amount L and APR in the predictive variables
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Each of these lines represents a cross section through the iso-profit contours with dif¬
ferent given loan amounts. Figure 6.11 shows that generally, for a given larger loan
amount the interest rate that will maximize the profit is in fact lower.
Unconditional Expected Profit vs. APR at given Loan Amount L
Figure 6.11: The optimal rate APR given Loan Amount L if p(a) is not considered.
6.3.2.2 If the market share p(a) is the constraint7
This situation is much more complex and needs discussion. Notice that if the loan
amount is fixed by the borrower, the lender can choose whether to gain market share
or profit subject to this constraint, but generally not both. Consider Figure 6.12 as an
example, also assume the Loan Amount given is £10000:
1. If the minimum market share is p(a) = 0.6 then point A gives the optimal rate.
Point A is at the intersection between the dotted iso-preference curve p(a) = 0.6
7please note that the discussion here is based on the results from the model includes the interaction
term between loan amount L and APR in the predictive variables
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and the vertical line of fixed loan amount L = 10000.
2. Ifmaximising profit is regarded by the lender as more important than the market
share then point B, where the highest profit given the loan amount is found, is
the optimal choice. Point B is also at the intersection between the dotted iso-
preference curve p(a) = 0.38 and the vertical line of fixed loan amount L = 10K.
Notice that point A gives lower profit than B while gaining a highermarket share.
3. Only if the minimum market share target implies a p(a) that is lower than the
p(a) at the point B that will maximise the profit at the given loan amount, then
the optimal choice is the point B, where both constraints on the market share and
profit maximising target can be satisfied.
Optimised Rate for Given Loan Amount = 10000
Figure 6.12: The optimal rate APR given Loan Amount L if p(a) is the constraint.
Chapter 6. Profitability Modelling
6.4 Segmentation
192
The results so far assume that one model for acceptance probability and one for each
of the survival probabilities applies to all the applicants. To explore the sensitivity of
this assumption, we separated the sample of applicants into different segments and ob¬
served the differences across the segments.
We wish to discover whether, if we choose an individual profit maximizing interest
rate for the mean applicant from each segment separately, the unconditional expected
profits are larger than the profits expected from the previous model without segmenta¬
tion. Similarly, will the expected market share be larger after the segmentation?
6.4.1 Sensitivity test of the segmentation based on application chan¬
nel
The equation used to calculate the unconditional expected profit from an applicant has
to assume that the length of the loan term is 24 months. This is due to the limit imposed
by the ability of the Matlab Symbolic Toolbox to handle large symbolic calculations.
However, only a relatively few cases have been observed in our data with 24 month
loan term. To achieve robust results with segmentation, it was decided to include more
sample data with loan terms up to 60 months. In all the calculations and estimations
hereafter, the variable of loan term was entered into the models. The coefficients ac¬
cordingly have been used in the calculations to get the estimated probabilities given
loan term equal to 24 months. The unconditional expected profits calculated are also
based on a 24 month loan.
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Based on this set of sample data with loan terms up to 60 months, applicants have
been segmented into two sub samples depending on whether they applied through the
Internet or they applied in some other way. Around 40 percent of customers applied
through the Internet (18883 cases) and the rest did not (27199 cases).
Different methods are available to select the variables for the estimation of the ac¬
ceptance model, the default model and the paying back early model when we consider
segmented samples. Another factor to consider is the inclusion of interaction term be¬
tween Loan Amount and Rate. Four methods have been considered and are discussed
below.
Method 1 chose the sets of variables to enter the three probability functions after run¬
ning stepwise procedures on the combined data set. Using the variables selected (with
the Loan Amount variable forced in if necessary), the parameters for those three prob¬
abilities were then estimated separately for each segment as well as for the combined
data. We call the resulting model, Model 1. In Model 1 the interaction term between
Loan Amount and Rate was found to be statistically significant in predicting the prob¬
ability of acceptance and survival probability of default but not so in predicting the
survival function of early repayment.
Method 2 chose the sets of variables for each probability function individually us¬
ing a separate stepwise procedure for each segment (with the Loan Amount variable
forced in if necessary). The parameters were estimated using these sets of variables
separately. The interaction term was excluded from the variable selection. We call the
result Model 2.
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Method 3 chose the sets of variables for each probability function individually us¬
ing a separate stepwise procedure for each segment (with the Loan Amount variable
forced in if necessary). The parameters were estimated using these sets of variables
separately. The interaction term was included from the variable selection. We call the
result Model 3.
Method 4 chose the sets of variables to enter the three probability functions after run¬
ning stepwise procedures on the combined data set. Using the variables selected (with
the Loan Amount variable forced in if necessary), the parameters for those three prob¬
abilities were then estimated separately for each segment as well as for the combined
data. The interaction term was excluded from the variable selection. We call the re¬
sulting model, Model 4.
The estimation results for all three functions for both and each segments in Model
1, 2, 3 and 4 can be found in the appendix section. Panel a in Table 6.2 summarizes
the difference between these 4 models concerning the inclusion of the interaction term
and the choice of whether or not to conduct stepwise selection for each segment sep¬
arately. Panel b in Table 6.2 compares the predictive performance between Model 1,
2, 3 and 4 across the Acceptance, Survival of Default and the Early Repayment mod¬
els. The predictive performance is measured by the area under the ROC curve on the
independently selected holdout data.
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Panel a:
Interaction term included Yes No
Stepwise for each Yes Model 3 Model 2
segment separately No Model 1 Model 4
Panel b:
Yes No
Model 3 Model 2
NonSegment Acceptance 0.7874 NonSegment Acceptance 0.7707
Internet Acceptance 0.8001 Internet Acceptance 0.7848
Nonlntemet Acceptance 0.7799 Nonlntemet Acceptance 0.7687
NonSegment Default 0.8331 NonSegment Default 0.8295
Yes Internet Default 0.8194 Internet Default 0.8154
Nonlntemet Default 0.8294 Nonlntemet Default 0.8334
NonSegment Payback early 0.6666 NonSegment Payback early 0.6666
Internet Payback early 0.6379 Internet Payback early 0.6373
Nonlntemet Payback early 0.6584 Nonlntemet Payback early 0.6586
Model 1 Model 4
NonSegment Acceptance 0.7874 NonSegment Acceptance 0.7707
Internet Acceptance 0.8018 Internet Acceptance 0.7886
Nonlntemet Acceptance 0.7802 Nonlntemet Acceptance 0.7694
NonSegment Default 0.8331 NonSegment Default 0.8295
No Internet Default 0.8136 Internet Default 0.8073
Nonlntemet Default 0.8332 Nonlntemet Default 0.8294
NonSegment Payback early 0.6666 NonSegment Payback early 0.6666
Internet Payback early 0.6546 Internet Payback early 0.6543
Nonlntemet Payback early 0.6613 Nonlntemet Payback early 0.6614
Table 6.2: Compare the AuROC values on the holdout set on different models
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Model 1 and 3 include the interaction term between Loan Amount and Rate (which is
significant in both the acceptance and default modelling) and Model 2 and 4 do not.
This is the major reason why Model 1 and 3 are consistently more predictive on accep¬
tance and default modelling than Model 2 and 4 across each individual segment and
segments combined. For example, the AuROC of acceptance modelling in Model 3 is
0.7874 while that AuROC value in Model 2 is 0.7707.
On the other hand, the benefit of individual stepwise selection on each segment is
not so evident by comparing the results from Model 1 against Model 3 and the results
from Model 4 against Model 2. It was expected that Model 3 should achieve higher
AuROC values on the segmented data than Model 1 since individual stepwise selec¬
tion procedures have been used. However, this was not observed. The AuROC values
from individually stepwise selected models are not larger or even lower than the Au¬
ROC values from models that use variables selected from the combined set. Take the
acceptance modelling results for example, The AuROC is 0.8001 in Model 3 while
the AuROC is 0.8018 in Model 1 for the Internet segment. The AuROC is 0.7799 in
Model 3 while the AuROC is 0.7803 in Model 1 for the Nonlnternet segment.
Recognizing the high significance of the interaction term and overall higher AuROC
values, the details of the Model 1 results will be presented and discussed in section
6.4.1.1. The implications for the economic benefits in terms ofunconditional expected
profits and market shares will be given later in section 6.4.2 where both models (Model
1 and Model 3) will be compared.
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6.4.1.1 Comparison of the iso-preference and iso-profits contours for Model 1
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the acceptance probabilities accordingly for the Internet
and Non-Internet segments for Model 1 respectively 8. Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the
unconditional expected profit for the Internet and Non-Internet segments for Model 1
respectively. Figures 6.17 and 6.18 show the iso-profits and iso-preference contours for
the Internet and Non-Internet segments for Model 1 respectively. The iso-perference
curves in Figure 6.17 are mapped from Figure 6.13 and the iso-perference curves on
Figure 6.18 are mapped from Figure 6.14. Those iso-preference curves are marked
with the probabilities of acceptance in the map, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. Comparison
between these two sets of iso-preference curves shows that for any given loan amount,
a higher interest rate can be charged to the Non-Internet segment than to the Internet
segment to achieve the same probability of acceptance. In other words, the Internet
applicants are harder to please and attract.
The slopes ofeach contour, indicating the trade-offofhigher interest rate for lower loan
amount to maintain the probability of acceptance, are not noticeably different between
the segments for any given loan amount. The iso-profits contours, however, differ sub¬
stantially between the two segments. These contours are mapped from Figure 6.15 and
6.16 respectively for the Internet and Non-Internet segments. Comparison between the
iso-profit contours shows that generally for a given requested loan amount, the highest
unconditional expected profit that can be earned per customer is much higher for the
Internet segment than that can be earned from the Non-Internet segment. For example
for a requested loan amount of £20K, with the profit maximizing interest rate charged,
8Please note that all the results here are relating to a 'mean' applicant with covariates (except Loan
Amount, Rate) assigned to their mean values.
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the unconditional expected profits per applicant are around £110 for a Non-Internet
applicant and around £220 if the applicant applied from Internet.
If the lender has a strategy of minimum level of profitability given a loan amount,
we can compare the two segments from a different perspective . We can say that for
a requested loan amount and given unconditional expected profit, the probability of
acceptance (market share for the lender) will be higher for the Internet segment that
for the Non-Internet segments. For example for a loan amount of £5K and uncondi¬
tional expected profit per applicant of £90 the probability of acceptance is 0.67 for the
Internet applicants (see point A in Figure 6.17) and around 0.51 for the Non-Internet
group (see point B in Figure 6.18 ).
To achieve the highest market share ( probability of acceptance ) for a given uncon¬
ditional expected profit level one has to find the tangency points between the corre¬
sponding iso-profit curve and the geometrically lowest iso-preference curve. Both Fig¬
ure 6.17 and 6.18 show the situation for loans up to £25K, above which the frequency
of observation in the data becomes very low. Unfortunately the tangency points for
many levels of profits occur around this maximum loan amount due to the convexity
of both curves 9. Nevertheless differences appear from the figures. For example, to
maximize the probability of acceptance subject to gaining an unconditional expected
profit of £100 would require a requested loan amount of around £1K and interest rate
at 20.69% for the Internet applicants (see point C in Figure 6.17), but a loan amount
around £25K and rate at 7.06% for the Non-Internet applicants (see point D in Fig-
9The convexity of the iso-preference curve is due to the inclusion of the interaction term which was
highly significant in the regression.
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ure 6.18). Of course since the loan amount is requested by the applicant and rarely
changed by the lender, it is not possible for a lender to freely choose which of the








Figure 6.14: Acceptance probabilities for customers applying through Non-Internet
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Figure 6.15: Unconditional expected profits for customers applying through Internet
Figure 6.16: Unconditional expected profits for customers applying through Non-
Internet
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ISO Profit Contours and ISO Preference Contours with Labels
Figure 6.17: Iso-profit and iso-acceptance curves (marked with p(a) from 0.1 to 0.9)for
customers applying through Internet
Figure 6.18: Iso-profit and iso-acceptance curves (marked with p(a) from 0.1 to 0.9) for
customers applying through Non-Internet
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6.4.2 Economic benefit of the segmentation
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 compare the economic benefit of the segmentation for each of the
five different loan amounts, using results from Model 1 and Model 3 accordingly. The
economic benefit is mainly measured by the total unconditional expected profits, al¬
though the expected total number of accepted customers is also included in the com¬
parison since a lender may have objectives that relate to both.
The expected total unconditional profit for each given loan amount for each segment
(or all segments combined) is calculated as the product of the expected unconditional
profit per applicant within that specific segment (or all segments combined) and the
number of customers, which is the number of applicants observed to apply for that
specific given loan amount. Notice that we have assumed all applicant will receive an
offer regardless of the probability of default. Of course we could modify this to esti¬
mate the unconditional expected profits from a subset of applicants who meet certain
criteria such as positive profits or a probability of default.
The expected total number of customers who accept the offer is the total number of
customers that apply for the offer that are expected to accept it. This is calculated as
the probability of acceptance at each given loan amount times the number of appli¬
cants. Please note that the number of applicants at each given loan amount is observed
rather than predicted. The assumption is that the distribution of applicants between
segments at each given loan amount remains as observed.
With one exception, all of the relevant predictive variables (except Loan Amount and
Interest Rate) in the calculation of the conditional expected profit per customer and
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L=3000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 106.26 12.93 0.56 302 32090.31 169.54
Nonlnternet 96.10 15.16 0.53 1148 110318.78 609.93
2 Segments Combined 0.54 142409.09 779.48
NonScgmcntation 99.61 14.27 0.54 1450 144435.08 786.92
Gains from Segmentation -2025.99 -7.44
L=7000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 109.23 9.09 0.46 1096 119718.27 501.31
Nonlnternet 91.27 11.09 0.38 1455 132793.78 556.39
2 Segments Combined 0.41 252512.05 1057.70
NonSegmentation 95.17 10.06 0.40 2551 242786.83 1032.39
Gains from Segmentation 9725.21 25.31
L=10000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 122.51 8.27 0.44 2260 276871.02 996.21
Nonlntcrnet 91.96 10.07 0.34 2879 264757.45 990.66
2 Segments Combined 0.39 541628.46 1986.87
NonSegmentation 100.64 9.13 0.38 5139 517165.83 1934.32
Gains from Segmentation 24462.63 52.55
L=17000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 183.83 7.60 0.47 125 22979.35 58.51
Nonlntcrnet 102.93 9.08 0.32 96 9881.03 30.86
2 Segments Combined 0.40 32860.38 89.38
NonSegmentation 136.15 8.26 0.38 221 30089.06 84.42
Gains from Segmentation 2771.32 4.95
L=25000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 315.10 7.52 0.54 472 148729.09 254.64
Nonlnternet 125.54 8.64 0.34 338 42431.40 116.27
2 Segments Combined 0.46 191160.49 370.92
NonSegmentation 208.76 8.01 0.44 810 169098.68 356.64
Gains from Segmentation 22061.81 14.27
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L=3000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 102.42 13.02 0.56 302 30930.39 170.24
Nonlnternet 95.43 15.05 0.54 1148 109554.44 616.13
2 Segments Combined 0.54 140484.83 786.37
NonSegmentation 99.61 14.27 0.54 1450 144435.08 786.92
Cains from Segmentation -3950.25 -0.55
L=7000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 94.40 9.11 0.46 1096 103467.66 502.19
Nonlnternet 90.82 11.04 0.38 1455 132140.04 558.43
2 Segments Combined 0.42 235607.71 1060.62
NonSegmentation 95.17 10.06 0.40 2551 242786.83 1032.39
Gains from Segmentation -7179.13 28.23
L=10000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 98.46 8.30 0.44 2260 222517.57 993.72
Nonlnternet 91.91 10.03 0.35 2879 264597.66 993.26
2 Segments Combined 0.39 487115.23 1986.98




L=17000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 130.05 7.60 0.47 125 16256.64 58.76
Nonlnternet 104.76 9.05 0.32 96 10056.67 30.98
2 Segments Combined 0.41 26313.31 89.74
NonSegmentation 136.15 8.26 0.38 221 30089.06 84.42
Gains from Segmentation -3775.75 5.32
L=25000 Unconditional Optimal P(A) Number of Total Expected number
Profit Expected Interest applicants Profit of applicants who
per applicant Rate Expected accept offer
Internet 207.97 7.42 0.56 472 98161.56 262.48
Nonlnternet 131.89 8.60 0.35 338 44579.33 117.56
2 Segments Combined 0.47 142740.88 380.04
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probability of acceptance have been assumed to take their mean values. The only
exception is the values used for the Internet variable. To account for the interaction
between the Internet variable and the Loan Amount variable, the mean values of the
Internet variable used for calculating the Po, Pq and Pq in Model 1 and Model 3 on the
non-segment data at each given loan amount have been adjusted to use the mean values
of Internet variable observed at each given loan amount.
Overall the expected unconditional profit per applicant is increasing with loan amount
in Model 1 and Model 3 when the loan amount is larger than £3000, as seen in Table
6.3 and 6.4. Both models show that the unconditional expected profit per applicant for
the Internet segment is higher than that for the Non-Internet segment. The difference in
the unconditional expected profit between the two segments is also generally increas¬
ing with the loan amount in the two models. When the loan amount becomes larger,
the Internet applicants are expected to be more profitable that their Non-Internet peers.
This shift ofprofitability between Internet and Non-Internet segments, becomes greater
and greater when the loan amount increases, and can be observed in both models with
one exception in Model 3. In Table 6.3 for Model 1, at loan amounts of £3K, the
difference is 106.26 — 96.10 = 10.16. For loan amounts of £7K, £10K, £17K, £25K,
the difference are 17.96, 30.55, 80.91, 189.57, indicating the increasing profitability of
the Internet applicants for the lender when the loan amount is larger. In Table 6.4 for
Model 3, for loan amount of £3K, £7K, £10K, £17K, £25K, the difference are 6.99,
3.59, 6.55, 25.30, 76.08. Here one exception is observed when the loan amount in¬
creases from £3K to £7K the difference shrinks from 6.99 to 3.59.
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What is not changing when loan amount gets larger is that the optimal interest rates
that maximize the unconditional expected profits from Internet applicants is always
lower than that for the Non-Internet segment, as can be shown in Tables 6.3. The
difference between those optimal interest rates, though, is getting smaller and smaller
when the loan size gets bigger. For loan amount of £3K, £7K, £10K, £17K, £25K, the
differences between the Internet and Non-Internet optimal rate are -2.23, -2.00, -1.80,
-1.48 and -1.12. This could be possibly explained away by the observation that in non-
segment data, the optimal interest rates are getting smaller for larger loan amounts,
therefore the difference between Internet and Non-Internet rates shall get smaller to
keep the percentage of the difference at roughly a constant level.
The benefit of segmentation can be illustrated using gains in the total expected un¬
conditional profits. For Model 1, as shown in Table 6.3, the gains measured as a per¬
centage of the total profit before segmentation, are -1.40%, 4.01%, 4.73%, 9.21% and
13.05% at loan amounts of £3K, £7K, £10K, £17K and £25K respectively. For Model
3, as shown in Table 6.4, the gains measured as a percentage of the total profit before
segmentation, are -2.74%, -2.96%, -5.81%, -12.55% and -15.59% at loan amounts of
£3K, £7K, £10K, £17K and £25K respectively.
The benefit of segmentation can also be illustrated using the generally increased ex¬
pected number of customers accepting the offer. For Model 1, as shown in Table
6.3, the total number of accepts, for loans of £3K, £7K, £10K, £17K and £25K, are
changed by a percentage 10 of -0.95%, 2.45%, 2.72%, 5.87% and 4.00% accordingly.
For Model 3, as shown in Table 6.4, the total number of accepts, for loans of £3K,
l0Percentage of the number of accepts before the segmentation
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£7K, £10K, £17K and £25K, are changed by a percentage of -0.07%, 2.73%, 2.72%,
6.30% and 6.56% accordingly.
The different results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate the importance of the speci¬
fication of the models that are used to model the hazard functions and the probability
of acceptance functions. Our initial expectation was that if all of these functions are
individually estimated using stepwise selection routines and if interest rates are chosen
to maximize unconditional expected profits at each loan amount separately for each
segment, these segmentation would yield higher profits. In Model 1 we find it does.
But it is possible that it may not do so for several reasons. One reason is that the
estimated functions may fit the data less well at some loan amounts than at others. An¬
other is that when the functions are estimated for each segment separately the smaller
number of observations within the segment compared with larger sample size of the
segments combined may cause the functions to fit less well in the former case than in
the latter case.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides an empirical methodology which a lender can employ to esti¬
mate the unconditional expected profits and expected acceptance probabilities at the
time ofapplication for an individual applicant by combining the estimates from accep¬
tance modelling, Survival probabilities of the defaults and early repayment behaviours.
This chapter also discussed potential optimal decision policies for a lender subject to
different constraints. The results have also shown that it is possible, using proper
model specification and careful interpretation, to segment the market by choosing the
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optimal interest rate for each segment to meet the lender's marketing objectives, being




Based on the theoretical model proposed by Keeney and Oliver, this thesis explores and
models the relationships between offers of credit products, credit scores, consumers'
acceptance decisions and expected profit using data that records the actual choices
made by customers and their monthly account status after being accepted. This con¬
cluding chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will summarize the
research findings by answering the questions raised earlier in the Introduction chapter.
The second section will reiterate the contribution to the knowledge. The third section
will discuss the limitations within our modelling approaches and outline some possible
research directions in the future.
7.1 Summary of findings
In Chapter 1, the following research questions were asked:
• Why do we need to model the profitability ofmaking a loan, unconditional on the
acceptance by the applicants, and how can iso-profit and iso-acceptance contours
be empirically estimated and presented?
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• Is acceptance inference needed?
• How do novel approaches like support vector machines (SVMs) perform (com¬
pared to logistic regression) in predicting default and acceptance ?
• How to model the chance of default and paying back early and how to incorpo¬
rate them into a profit estimation?
The first question involving the acceptance and profitability modelling is the key one
in this thesis. The other questions naturally emerge during the course of the investiga¬
tion into the modelling of acceptance and profitability. The following subsections will
summarise our findings as answers to these questions.
7.1.1 How can we model the profitability of making a loan, uncon¬
ditional on the acceptance by the applicants, and how can
iso-profit and iso-acceptance contours be empirically esti¬
mated and presented?
Keeney and Oliver's theoretical work provided a foundation for ourmodel. Keeney and
Oliver's work empathized two objectives for lenders: profitability and market share
(the probability of the acceptance of offers). Their concept of profitability uncondi¬
tional on the acceptance of offers differs from previous research where the profitabil¬
ity analysis focused on customers who have already accepted offers. Earlier research
omitted the probability that an applicant will accept an offer in the analysis ofpotential
profit to a lender and so such could not estimate expected profit at the time of applica¬
tion.
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To model this profitability, unconditional on the acceptance of offers, both behaviours,
acceptance and profitability, need to be modelled. In Chapter 2, we reviewed the pre¬
vious literature on acceptance modelling and profitability modelling.
We estimate the expected profits unconditional on acceptance in Chapter 6 by com¬
bining previous results in the acceptance and survival analyses of default and paying
back early. The results for a single applicant are presented in a three dimensional space
of Profit vs Rate vs Loan Amount. The iso-profit contours are drawn by connecting
all the points representing the same amount of expected profit in a two dimensional
space of Loan Amount vs Rate. Similarly, the iso-preference contours are drawn by
connecting all the offers with the same level of acceptance probabilities in the same
two dimensional space of Loan Amount vs Rate. By examining those iso-profit and
iso-acceptance contours, different profit optimising decision policies can be derived
under various constraints.
A further segmentation analysis has also been conducted by separating the samples
into two different groups, Internet and Non-internet applicants, with parameters esti¬
mated individually. On each segment, different profit-maximizing interest rates were
found and we found some economic benefit when aggregated over all applicants can
be achieved through this segmentation exercise.
7.1.2 Is acceptance inference needed?
The need of acceptance inference has been explored in Chapter 4 via fitting models of
bivariate Probit sample selection. The results indicate that our model does not suffer
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from the sample selection bias 1 unless using a lean model in which a significant sample
selection bias has been observed. The conclusion is that acceptance inference may not
be needed for our data.
7.1.3 How do novel approaches like support vector machines (SVMs)
perform (compared to logistic regression) in predicting de¬
fault and acceptance ?
In the newly introduced credit scoring methodologies, SVMs have received a lot of
interest and been reported to be quite competitive in the literature ( such as Baesens
(2003) and Baesens et al. (2003)). SVMs with various kernels have been used to pre¬
dict the default in Chapter 3 and the acceptance of offers in Chapter 4. In the default
prediction, we found SVMs are not competitive compared to the logistic regression
(the performance measure used is the area under the ROC curve on the holdout set).
In acceptance prediction, the performance of SVMs were observed to be as predictive
as logistic regression (using the area under the ROC curve on the holdout set as per¬
formance measure). One of the reasons behind this may be the difference in the class
distributions ofdefault and acceptance. Another explanation for the better performance
of logistic regression may be its appropriate size ofmodel complexity compared to that
of SVMs to avoid the danger of over fitting. As a conclusion, we have not found that
SVMs out-perform logistic regression based on our data.
'Assuming that the residuals of the two equations are normally distributed.
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7.1.4 How to model the chance of default and paying back early
and how to incorporate them into a profit estimation?
Accurate profit estimation requires estimating whether the applicant will default, but
also when the default is expected to happen. An earlier defaulter causes more loss than
a later one as the latter has made more payments and therefore left a smaller balance
as loss to the lender. Binary outcome predictors like static logistic regression models,
lack the capability to predict the timing of an event whereas this is the aim of survival
analysis models. The latter have been shown to be equally predictive in tasks of binary
outcome predictions over specific outcome windows as logistic regression.
Paying back early was observed to be much more frequent in our data than the events
of default and paying back early events are also very important to lenders in terms
of profitability, in spite of being rarely modelled in the literature. A customer with
a higher probability to pay back early brings less profit for the lender and therefore
impacts adversely on the profitability of the whole portfolio.
Chapter 5 presents survival analysis results ofmodelling the default and paying back
early events. Different semi-parametric and parametric models have been compared
and Cox PH models were the best performing models. Chapter 5 also models the
survival probabilities of default and paying back early under the competing risk frame¬
work. Three different competing risk models have been compared. However, no im¬
provement has been observed in the predictive performance.
Together with the coefficients estimated from Acceptance models, the coefficients from
the Cox PH models for default and paying back early events estimated separately, are
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then plugged into the equation to calculate unconditional expected profits for a fixed
term loan. The details have been given in Chapter 6.
7.2 Contributions to knowledge reiterated
This section will reiterate the eight major contributions this thesis has made to knowl¬
edge. First, this thesis is the first empirical academic study to estimate expected profits
at the time of application. Unlike previous studies, which predict the profits of a cus¬
tomer who has already accepted an offer, this thesis estimated the expected profits at
the time of application by combining the results from acceptance modelling, survival
analysis of default and paying back early.
Second, the customers' acceptance behaviours are estimated based on a data set that
contains the actual acceptance choices made by customers ofa realfinancial product.
Instead of using hypothetical data as in previous research, findings based on our data
shall be closer to what will be observed in the practical retail lending industry.
Third, this thesis found that the iso-preference curves drawn from empirically esti¬
mated results indicate a preference towards lower loan amounts rather than higher
amounts. This appears contrary to those assumed in Keeney and Oliver's theoretical
model, where larger credit lines are presumed to be preferred over lower credit lines.
Fourth, this thesis discussed different profit maximizing strategies the lender may
choose under different marketing objectives. What has made this thesis different from
previous researches is that this thesis has used estimates from industry sourced data for
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the profit calculation rather than assumed numerical cost and profit figures.
Fifth, this thesis provided a segmentation analysis based on separately estimating prof¬
its on Internet and Non-Internet groups. This segmentation practice was demonstrated
to lead to markedly different policy decisions compared with the decisions drawn be¬
fore the segmentation.
Sixth, the possible existence of sample selection bias introduced in the process of ac¬
ceptance has been explored using bivariate Probit sample selection models. Previous
literature focused on the study of reject inference and paid less attention to the cor¬
responding scenario of acceptance inference. Our results suggested that acceptance
inference might not be necessary.
Seventh, this thesis revisited the topic of comparing the classification methods, SVMs
vs. logistic regression. Varied predictive performances of SVMs on different predic¬
tion tasks (default and acceptance) have been observed. SVMs were found to perform
poorly against logistic regression in predicting default, in contrast to the good perfor¬
mance reported in the literature (Baesens (2003) and Baesens et al. (2003)). Another
novelty in this thesis is the application of SVMs to predict acceptance. We found that
SVMs produced similar predictive performance as logistic regression did. One possi¬
ble explanation for this varied performance on different data by SVMs is the difference
in the class distributions. The default data is much more unbalanced than the accep¬
tance data, hence more challenging to SVMs, which are more sensitive to the class
distribution.
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Eighth, this thesis compared competing risk survival models against those separately
estimated survival models in the prediction of default and paying back early and ob¬
served little improvement in the predictive performance from competing risk models.
7.3 Limitations and future research
There are still some limitations that exist in our work. First, the cost for the lender to
service the loan in our profitability model has been assumed to consist of only the run¬
ning cost for the lender to borrow at the inter-bank rate. This simplification is adopted
because detailed data relating to fixed costs are unfortunately not available.
Second, this profitability model has not considered impacts on the profits of the eco¬
nomic cycle. Adding macro economic variables into the set of predictors, such as
what the models in Bellotti and Crook (2007a) do, might offer a more robust model
at different stages in the economic cycles. However, in our data the longest duration
of observed performance is 26 months, which is too short to cover a whole economic
cycle.
A number of possible extensions can be suggested for future research. For example,
only one type of segmentation analysis is done, the Internet Non-Internet segmenta¬
tion. It would be interesting to calculate the expected profits for other segments and to
see how much the economic benefits can be increased through segmenting onto other
groups and how different optimal decision strategies can be derived.
Profitability analysis can also be applied to other products. The profitability analy-
Chapter 1. Conclusion 217
sis in this thesis is based only on a fixed term loan product. Extending profitability
analysis to other types of credit products such as mortgage or credit cards could be
very interesting.
Our model has not considered the capital adequacy requirement the lender is bound
to abide by. Under Basel II, the latest capital requirement, the lender has to cover the
unexpected loss by setting aside a minimum amount of capital which is a function of
PD and LGD and other parameters and the type of product. More capital required
means less return on economic capital for the lender. Different optimal decision poli¬
cies might be needed under such capital requirements.
Finally, the confidence intervals of AuROC estimates have not been calculated. Pro¬
viding such estimates could provide facility to check if the difference in predictive
performance is significant. One way to generate such estimates is to sample the data
using sampling method like bootstrapping and report the AuROC results distribution,
from which confidence intervals can be drawn.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -3.6218 < .0001
Rate 12.2737 < .0001
Insurance N -0.5967 < .0001
LOAN^AMT (1.2e+04,1.5e+04] -0.0860 0.3907
LOAN_AMT (1.5e+04,2.3e+04] -0.0840 0.4805
LOAN^AMT (le+04,1.2e+04] -0.1434 0.2623
LOAN_AMT (2.3e+04,2.5e+04] 0.3544 0.0111
LOAN^AMT (5e+03,6.5e+03] 0.0710 0.5207
LOAN^AMT (6.5e+03,8e+03] 0.1578 0.0953
LOAN_AMT (8e+03,le+04] -0.0369 0.6621
TERM 24 -0.4330 0.0012
TERM 36 -0.2416 0.0059
TERM 48 -0.0373 0.6625
TERM 60 0.1981 0.0035
TERM 72 0.0384 0.8303
newbus 0 -0.1485 0.0024
ALCIFDET EMP 0.2847 0.0157
CCJGT500 (22,27] -0.0422 0.6516
CCJGT500 (27,32] 0.2038 0.0140
CCJGT500 (32,37] -0.1849 0.0579
CCJGT500 (37,43] 0.2147 0.0142
CCJGT500 (43,58] -0.0569 0.5286
CCJGT500 EMPTY -0.1334 0.0583
LOANBAL1 (1.29e+04,6.49e+04] -0.1379 0.1690
LOANBALI (1.37e+06,8.72e+06] 0.4300 0.0005
LOANBALI (1.53e+05,3e+05] -0.0875 0.3610
LOANBALI (3e+05,4.89e+05] -0.00468 0.9606
LOANBAL1 (4.89e+05,7.4e+05] -0.00170 0.9852
LOANBAL1 (6.49e+04,1.53e+05] -0.2884 0.0062
LOANBALl (7.4e+05,1.37e+06] 0.1479 0.0925
NETINCM (1.05e+03,1.2e+03] -0.1730 0.0556
NETINCM (1.2e+03,1.38e+03] -0.2400 0.0288
NETINCM (1.38e+03,1.55e+03] -0.0469 0.6287
NETINCM (1.55e+03,1.8e+03] -0.0197 0.8418
NETINCM (1.8e+03,2.2e+03] 0.0591 0.5511
NETINCM (2.2e+03,3.5e+03] 0.2635 0.0082
NETINCM (3.5e+03,9.37e+05] 0.6437 < .0001
NETINCM (900,1.05e+03] -0.1742 0.0823
TOSETTL6 EMPTY -0.1518 0.1438
TOSETTL6 N 0.2665 0.0230
Table A.1: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression across
all bands. To be continued in table A.2
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
AGE (27,31] 0.1423 0.1526
AGE (31,34] 0.0211 0.8409
AGE (34,37] -0.1060 0.3194
AGE (37,41] 0.0292 0.7453
AGE (41,45] -0.1155 0.2420
AGE (45,50] -0.0892 0.3777
AGE (50,57] -0.3926 0.0007
AGE (57,64] 0.0658 0.7216
TIMEBANK (l.le+03,1.41e+03] 0.1652 0.1055
TIMEBANK (1.41e+03,1.61e+03] -0.0107 0.9187
TIMEBANK (1.61e+03,2e+03] 0.0749 0.3966
TIMEBANK (2.4e+03,3e+03] 0.0407 0.7191
TIMEBANK (2e+03,2.4e+03] -0.2843 0.0803
TIMEBANK (3e+03,8.2e+03] -0.8381 0.0014
TIMEBANK (500,900] 0.2211 0.0217
TIMEBANK (900,l.le+03] 0.1914 0.0496
SPSETLD 0 0.5221 < .0001
SPSETLD 1 0.2555 0.0052
SPSETLD 2 0.1540 0.0961
SPSETLD 3 0.0917 0.3592
SPSETLD 4 -0.1486 0.1703
SPSETLD 5 0.0308 0.7831
SPSETLD 6 -0.0905 0.4891
SPSETLD 7 -0.1121 0.4337
SPSETLD 8 -0.3901 0.0354
SPVALDEL -1 1.0130 0.0066
SPVALDEL 0 0.3766 0.2589
SPVALDEL 1 0.8392 0.0191
SSRC4T06 0 -0.4315 < .0001
SSRC4T06 1 -0.2540 0.0024
SSRC4T06 2 0.0499 0.6391
SSRC4T06 3 0.0393 0.8070
SWRSTCUR 0 -0.0126 0.8837
SWRSTCUR EMP 0.4754 0.0002
SWRSTCUR N -0.2818 0.1883
WRST46AL 0 0.1486 0.4468
WRST46AL 1 -0.3887 < .0001
WRST46AL 2 -0.3354 0.0237
WRST46AL 3 0.0669 0.5270
Table A.2: Following table A.1. Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic
Regression across all bands.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 0.7011 0.2529
Insurance N -1.0505 < .0001
SOCNOACT EMPTY 1.9042 0.0019
INC_SURP (1.12e+03,1.38e+03] 0.5048 0.3566
INCLSURP (1.38e+03,1.79e+03] -1.1836 0.0600
INC_SURP (1.79e+03,2.96e+03] 1.4598 0.0115
INC.SURP (2.96e+03,9.37e+04] -0.1744 0.8771
INCLSURP (395,565] -0.0345 0.9338
INCLSURP (565,726] -0.3132 0.4683
INCLSURP (726,910] -0.0784 0.8536
INCLSURP (910,1.12e+03] -1.2085 0.0848
Table A.3: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 223 cases in band 10. 1
Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1.9976 0.9924
Insurance N -0.5738 0.0001
TOSETTL4 EMPTY 0.7048 0.0068
TOSETTL4 N -0.0884 0.7590
AGE (27,31] -0.0309 0.9343
AGE (31,34] -0.6688 0.1647
AGE (34,37] -0.4486 0.4459
AGE (37,41] 1.1564 0.0010
AGE (41,45] 1.4336 0.0002
AGE (45,50] -0.5223 0.3746
AGE (50,57] -0.6051 0.3138
AGE (57,64] -0.3528 0.7346
SPVALDEL -1 -3.1530 0.9881
SPVALDEL 0 -4.1920 0.9841
SPVALDEL 1 -2.8148 0.9893
Table A.4: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 389 cases in band 20.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.7428 < .0001
Rate 8.5002 0.0075
Insurance N -0.5847 < .0001
TERM 24 -0.4375 0.2826
TERM 36 -0.0925 0.7016
TERM 48 0.2013 0.3970
TERM 60 0.2751 0.1645
TERM 72 -0.6943 0.2739
SEARCHES (15,32] -0.1104 0.6524
SEARCHES (32,49] -0.0686 0.7727
SEARCHES (49,65] -0.2743 0.2277
SEARCHES (65,80] 0.1117 0.6139
SEARCHES (80,95] 0.2383 0.2786
SEARCHES (95,100] 0.6558 0.0351
TOSETTL1 EMPTY 0.4997 0.0029
TOSETTL1 N 0.00893 0.9421
Table A.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 997 cases in band 30.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.9717 < .0001
Rate 11.4369 0.0140
Insurance N -0.5551 < .0001
LOAN_AMT (1.2e+04,1.5e+04] 0.3109 0.2365
LOAN^AMT (1.5e+04,2.3e+04] 0.1445 0.6185
LOAN_AMT (le+04,1.2e+04] 0.1555 0.6335
LOAN-AMT (2.3e+04,2.5e+04] 0.0584 0.8996
LOAN_AMT (5e+03,6.5e+03] -1.0087 0.0315
LOANVLMT (6.5e+03,8e+03] 0.8449 0.0002
LOAN_AMT (8e+03,le+04] 0.0517 0.8336
INC2SURP (1.12e+03,1.38e+03] -1.0187 0.0165
INC_SURP (1.38e+03,1.79e+03] -0.9583 0.0259
INC_SURP (1,79e+03,2.96e+03] 0.3283 0.2462
INC_SURP (2.96e+03,9.37e+04] 0.5199 0.2135
INC_SURP (395,565] 0.4628 0.0382
INC_SURP (565,726] 0.2670 0.2775
INC-SURP (726,910] -0.5160 0.1377
INCYSURP (910,1.12e+03] 0.4539 0.0896
SPL6M4 0 -0.5685 0.0641
SPL6M4 1 -0.3942 0.3923
SPL6M4 EMPTY 1.4446 0.1416
SPL6M4 N 0.0932 0.7582
SSRC4T06 0 -0.4648 0.0265
SSRC4T06 1 -0.3155 0.1442
SSRC4TO6 2 0.2700 0.3124
SSRC4T06 3 -0.5614 0.2102
Table A.6: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 1327 cases in band 40.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -3.9773 < .0001
Rate 14.1654 0.0008
Insurance N -0.4936 < .0001
TERM 24 -0.3190 0.3719
TERM 36 -0.6210 0.0109
TERM 48 0.1662 0.4223
TERM 60 0.3625 0.0226
TERM 72 0.2218 0.5527
LOANBAL4 (2.2e+04,3.55e+05] -0.2979 0.1034
LOANBAL4 (3.55e+05,3.83e+06] 0.6149 0.0020
MOR_RENT (156,227] -0.4059 0.1360
MOR_RENT (227,300] 0.0418 0.8442
MOR_RENT (300,360] 0.3197 0.2146
MOR_RENT (360,450] 0.1904 0.4020
MOR_RENT (450,577] -0.4461 0.1547
MOR_RENT (577,900] -0.6067 0.0535
MOR_RENT (900,1.3e+0] 0.7644 0.0137
AGE (27,31] -0.3390 0.2257
AGE (31,34] 0.1946 0.4228
AGE (34,37] 0.0374 0.8876
AGE (37,41] 0.1343 0.5592
AGE (41,45] -0.1658 0.5477
AGE (45,50] -0.0228 0.9327
AGE (50,57] -0.9720 0.0138
AGE (57,64] 0.5020 0.3725
SM089 0 -0.9325 0.1277
SNW12TV 0 -1.0634 0.0365
SWRSTCUR 0 -0.0175 0.9131
SWRSTCUR EMP 0.6050 0.0202
SWRSTCUR N 0.1785 0.5623
Table A.7: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 3209 cases in band 50.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -3.5447 < .0001
Rate 10.7774 0.0004
Insurance N -0.6322 < .0001
LOAN_AMT (1.2e+04,1.5e+04] -0.2795 0.0852
LOANMlMT (1.5e+04,2.3e+04] 0.2446 0.1512
LOAN_AMT (le+04,1.2e+04] -0.5738 0.0122
LOAN^AMT (2.3e+04,2.5e+04] 0.6144 0.0027
LOANMiMT (5e+03,6.5e+03] 0.0469 0.7776
LOAN^AMT (6.5e+03,8e+03] 0.0765 0.6018
LOAN_AMT (8e+03,le+04] 0.0304 0.8090
TERM 24 -0.4929 0.0230
TERM 36 -0.0160 0.8973
TERM 48 -0.1645 0.2216
TERM 60 0.0559 0.6099
TERM 72 0.0376 0.8964
newbus 0 -0.1682 0.0224
ALCIFDET EMP 0.3896 0.0275
CCJGT500 (22,27] 0.0719 0.5944
CCJGT500 (27,32] 0.3022 0.0125
CCJGT500 (32,37] -0.2112 0.1516
CCJGT500 (37,43] 0.1845 0.1587
CCJGT500 (43,58] -0.1693 0.2334
CCJGT500 EMPTY -0.2633 0.0187
NETINCM (1.05e+03,1.2e+03] -0.2688 0.0597
NETINCM (1.2e+03,1.38e+03] -0.1341 0.3941
NETINCM (1.38e+03,1.55e+03] -0.0128 0.9278
NETINCM (1.55e+03,1.8e+03] -0.1377 0.3445
NETINCM (1.8e+03,2.2e+03] -0.1196 0.4385
NETINCM (2.2e+03,3.5e+03] 0.3746 0.0066
NETINCM (3.5e+03,9.37e+05] 0.8909 < .0001
NETINCM (900,1.05e+03] -0.2922 0.0725
SOCSETT EMPTY -0.4652 0.0166
AGE (27,31] 0.3381 0.0227
AGE (31,34] 0.0145 0.9281
AGE (34,37] 0.0199 0.8943
AGE (37,41] 0.00469 0.9703
AGE (41,45] -0.3292 0.0261
AGE (45,50] -0.1417 0.2925
AGE (50,57] -0.4148 0.0036
AGE (57,64] 0.2017 0.3273
Table A.8: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on 15766 cases in band 60. To be continued.
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Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
SPL6MACT 0 -0.1774 0.2479
SPL6MACT 1 0.3217 0.0517
SPL6MACT EMPTY 0.9194 0.0117
SPL6MACT N -0.8553 0.0148
SSRC4TO6 0 -0.5930 < .0001
SSRC4T06 1 -0.3222 0.0511
SSRC4T06 2 -0.0914 0.6666
SSRC4T06 3 0.1686 0.6243
SWRSTCUR 0 -0.1876 0.1089
SWRSTCUR EMP 0.5766 0.0030
SWRSTCUR N 0
Table A.9: Following table A.8. Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic
Regression after stepwised selection based on 15766 cases in band 60.
Variable Dummy Variable MLE estimates Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -0.7224 0.0583
Insurance N -0.4457 0.0008
brand dlfs 0.2855 0.0370
internet 0 0.3357 0.0193
AGE (27,31] -0.1139 0.7402
AGE (31,34] -0.3634 0.3786
AGE (34,37] -0.3644 0.4792
AGE (37,41] 0.9108 0.0036
AGE (41,45] 0.8991 0.0101
AGE (45,50] 0.0297 0.9446
AGE (50,57] -0.5848 0.2725
AGE (57,64] -0.6786 0.5134
SVALCAIS 0 -0.7585 0.0267
WORST 12 0 -0.5096 0.0286
WORST 12 1 -0.1522 0.3961
Table A.10: Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters by Logistic Regression after
stepwised selection based on data of band 0 and 20
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APR Coef. Std. Err. t P>\t\ [95% Conf. Interval]
LDefault 0.101254 0.067156 1.51 0.132 -0.03037 0.232883
raw_apradj 1.036216 0.007658 135.31 0.000 1.021206 1.051226
loan_amt6 03 -0.36626 0.033634 -10.89 0.000 -0.43218 -0.30033
internet 1 -0.51071 0.019706 -25.92 0.000 -0.54934 -0.47209
cpiy 0.349419 0.044769 7.8 0.000 0.261669 0.437168
brandlomb 0.266039 0.020584 12.92 0.000 0.225694 0.306384
term -0.01412 0.000703 -20.09 0.000 -0.0155 -0.01274
loan_amt8 04 -0.29979 0.031185 -9.61 0.000 -0.36092 -0.23867
inc_surp0395 0.342868 0.02919 11.75 0.000 0.285654 0.400081
loan_amt2 04 0.306278 0.053768 5.7 0.000 0.200891 0.411665
netincmlO 03 -0.02061 0.025631 -0.8 0.421 -0.07084 0.02963
newbus 1 -0.24536 0.028024 -8.76 0.000 -0.30029 -0.19043
loan_amt8 03 1.191471 0.032696 36.44 0.000 1.127385 1.255556
socsett02 -0.34227 0.05138 -6.66 0.000 -0.44298 -0.24157
spl6ml2n 0.142824 0.035236 4.05 0.000 0.073759 0.211888
tosettllem y -0.0362 0.02726 -1.33 0.184 -0.08963 0.01723
wrst46al20 -0.19312 0.041188 -4.69 0.000 -0.27385 -0.11239
timaddl 1100 0.11173 0.02811 3.97 0.000 0.056634 0.166827
spl6mact00 -0.01198 0.020982 -0.57 0.568 -0.0531 0.029149
tosettl2y -0.07268 0.02774 -2.62 0.009 -0.12705 -0.01831
inc_surpl7 3 -0.12677 0.027802 -4.56 0.000 -0.18126 -0.07228
inc_s 726910 -0.02879 0.027662 -1.04 0.298 -0.08301 0.025428
spl6ml2u -0.10446 0.033068 -3.16 0.002 -0.16928 -0.03965
timeb 500900 0.065156 0.029057 2.24 0.025 0.008204 0.122108
timebank2e 3 0.017199 0.038602 0.45 0.656 -0.05846 0.092861
ssrc4to610 -0.11954 0.060767 -1.97 0.049 -0.23864 -0.00043
loan_amt5 03 -0.40821 0.036762 -11.1 0.000 -0.48026 -0.33615
loanball4 05 -0.02214 0.026868 -0.82 0.410 -0.0748 0.030523
loan_amtl2 4 -0.11312 0.034235 -3.3 0.001 -0.18022 -0.04601
ssrc4to600 -0.14718 0.060213 -2.44 0.015 -0.2652 -0.02916
ssrc4to620 -0.1125 0.065111 -1.73 0.084 -0.24012 0.015121
mor_rent0156 -0.02571 0.022109 -1.16 0.245 -0.06905 0.017621
swrstcurem y 0.053772 0.055867 0.96 0.336 -0.05573 0.163272
sncais3mem y -0.03702 0.058797 -0.63 0.529 -0.15226 0.078224
noopen601 -0.00557 0.02096 -0.27 0.790 -0.04666 0.035508
_cons 8.405523 0.179857 46.73 0.000 8.052997 8.758048
Table A. 11: Equation for APR in Simultaneous Equations with apr adjustment variable
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Default Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
I^APR 0.027213 0.018953 1.440 0.151 -0.00993 0.06436
raw_apradj 0.063977 0.020553 3.110 0.002 0.023694 0.104261
cpiy 0.560055 0.031586 17.730 0.000 0.498147 0.621962
wrst46al30 0.194317 0.04471 4.350 0.000 0.106687 0.281947
socworstOO -0.21736 0.039904 -5.450 0.000 -0.29557 -0.13915
loan_amt2 04 0.265667 0.06295 4.220 0.000 0.142288 0.389045
spvaldelOO -0.33224 0.06417 -5.180 0.000 -0.45801 -0.20647
age3741 0.00492 0.038709 0.130 0.899 -0.07095 0.080788
wrst46al20 -0.10458 0.070333 -1.490 0.137 -0.24243 0.033272
loanball7 06 0.043432 0.040286 1.080 0.281 -0.03553 0.122391
spsetld -0.0323 0.005034 -6.420 0.000 -0.04217 -0.02244
tosettl6n 0.23468 0.05033 4.660 0.000 0.136034 0.333326
inc_surpl3 3 -0.17994 0.048165 -3.740 0.000 -0.27434 -0.08554
timeb 500900 0.10139 0.039015 2.600 0.009 0.024922 0.177858
ssrc4to6em y 0.375853 0.0948 3.960 0.000 0.190048 0.561658
swrstcurem y 0.236494 0.059098 4.000 0.000 0.120665 0.352324
term 0.004485 0.001008 4.450 0.000 0.00251 0.00646
mor_r 156227 -0.1126 0.042278 -2.660 0.008 -0.19547 -0.02974
_cons -2.06113 0.178601 -11.540 0.000 -2.41118 -1.71108
Table A. 12: Equation for Default in Simultaneous Equations with apr adjustment vari¬
able
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APR Coef. Std. Err. t P>\t\ [95% Conf. Interval]
IJTefault 2.066874 0.169633 12.18 0.000 1.734386 2.399362
loan_amt6 03 -0.39192 0.117188 -3.34 0.001 -0.62162 -0.16223
internet 1 -0.11097 0.068446 -1.62 0.105 -0.24512 0.023189
cpiy -0.33139 0.129165 -2.57 0.010 -0.58456 -0.07822
brandlomb 0.272648 0.070521 3.87 0.000 0.134424 0.410872
term -0.01247 0.002393 -5.21 0.000 -0.01716 -0.00778
loan_amt8 04 -0.19384 0.108511 -1.79 0.074 -0.40652 0.01885
inc_surp0395 0.289899 0.09066 3.2 0.001 0.112201 0.467596
loan_amt2 04 -0.13056 0.16374 -0.8 0.425 -0.4515 0.190379
netincmlO 03 0.10031 0.086499 1.16 0.246 -0.06923 0.269852
newbus 1 -0.79597 0.090501 OOooi 0.000 -0.97335 -0.61858
loan_amt8 03 1.534303 0.112716 13.61 0.000 1.313375 1.75523
socsett02 -0.53127 0.186071 -2.86 0.004 -0.89598 -0.16657
spl6ml2n 0.410265 0.109917 3.73 0.000 0.194823 0.625706
tosettllem y -0.23293 0.091214 -2.55 0.011 -0.41171 -0.05414
wrst46al20 -0.0249 0.153433 -0.16 0.871 -0.32563 0.275838
timaddl 1100 0.456138 0.092864 4.91 0.000 0.274121 0.638155
spl6mact00 -0.20657 0.071755 -2.88 0.004 -0.34721 -0.06593
tosettl2y 0.21492 0.090498 2.37 0.018 0.03754 0.3923
inc_surpl7 3 -0.31014 0.098731 -3.14 0.002 -0.50366 -0.11662
inc_s 726910 0.014688 0.09666 0.15 0.879 -0.17477 0.204145
spl6ml2u -0.02656 0.125598 -0.21 0.833 -0.27274 0.219619
timeb 500900 0.428248 0.092688 4.62 0.000 0.246576 0.609921
timebank2e 3 0.231935 0.15089 1.54 0.124 -0.06382 0.527686
ssrc4to610 -0.9958 0.175959 -5.66 0.000 -1.34068 -0.65091
loan_amt5 03 -0.24802 0.130183 -1.91 0.057 -0.50318 0.007142
loanbal 14 05 0.072639 0.091784 0.79 0.429 -0.10726 0.252539
loan_amtl2 4 0.009586 0.119498 0.08 0.936 -0.22463 0.243806
ssrc4to600 -1.18404 0.177833 -6.66 0.000 -1.5326 -0.83548
ssrc4to620 -0.8841 0.182831 -4.84 0.000 -1.24246 -0.52575
mor_rent0156 -0.08755 0.071996 -1.22 0.224 -0.22867 0.053562
swrstcurem y 0.802323 0.160225 5.01 0.000 0.488276 1.116369
sncais3mem y 0.56678 0.179544 3.16 0.002 0.214865 0.918694
noopen601 0.025002 0.070821 0.35 0.724 -0.11381 0.163813
_cons 14.19966 0.464848 30.55 0.000 13.28854 15.11078
Table A. 13: Equation for APR in Simultaneous Equations without apr adjustment vari¬
able
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Default Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
I^\PR 0.109739 0.012056 9.1 0.000 0.08611 0.133368
cpiy 0.493173 0.031372 15.72 0.000 0.431685 0.554661
wrst46al30 0.194647 0.044112 4.41 0.000 0.108189 0.281105
socworstOO -0.2434 0.038644 -6.3 0.000 -0.31914 -0.16766
loan_amt2 04 0.23279 0.061501 3.79 0.000 0.112249 0.35333
spvaldelOO -0.30918 0.062943 -4.91 0.000 -0.43255 -0.18581
age3741 0.003102 0.037798 0.08 0.935 -0.07098 0.077186
wrst46al20 -0.07969 0.069019 -1.15 0.248 -0.21497 0.055586
loanball7 06 0.050535 0.039337 1.28 0.199 -0.02656 0.127634
spsetld -0.03747 0.005069 -7.39 0.000 -0.04741 -0.02754
tosettl6n 0.245969 0.049513 4.97 0.000 0.148925 0.343012
inc_surpl3 3 -0.15898 0.047131 -3.37 ■ 0.001 -0.25136 -0.06661
timeb 500900 0.101738 0.038764 2.62 0.009 0.025763 0.177714
ssrc4to6em y 0.324367 0.097269 3.33 0.001 0.133725 0.51501
swrstcurem y 0.205048 0.060343 3.4 0.001 0.086778 0.323317
term 0.006744 0.000864 7.8 0.000 0.00505 0.008438
mor_r 156227 -0.12054 0.041102 -2.93 0.003 -0.2011 -0.03998
_cons -2.73474 0.139228 -19.64 0.000 -3.00762 -2.46186
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Table B.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates(continued)
Variable Dummy Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
GDSCDE2 (222,999] 1 0.1634 0.03 29.5759 < .0001
GDSCDE3 0 1 -0.1238 0.0632 3.8295 0.0504
GDSCDE3 111 1 -0.0881 0.1123 0.6146 0.4331
GDSCDE3 200 1 0.1767 0.1454 1.477 0.2242
GDSCDE3 222 1 -0.3798 0.1444 6.9211 0.0085
LOANBAL1 (1,29e+04,6.49e+04] 1 -0.0575 0.0373 2.3734 0.1234
LOANBAL1 (1.37e+06,8.72e+06] 1 0.1974 0.058 11.5776 0.0007
LOANBAL1 (1.53e+05,3e+05] 1 0.037 0.0365 1.0265 0.311
LOANBAL1 (3e+05,4.89e+05] 1 -0.0412 0.0362 1.2949 0.2552
LOANBAL1 (4.89e+05,7.4e+05] 1 0.0187 0.0354 0.2788 0.5975
LOANBAL1 (6.49e+04,1.53e+05] 1 -0.0339 0.0362 0.8753 0.3495
LOANBAL1 (7.4e+05,1.37e+06] 1 0.0613 0.0366 2.8057 0.0939
LOANBAL2 (1,05e+04,6.27e+04] 1 -0.0622 0.0367 2.8648 0.0905
LOANBAL2 (1.05e+06,6.34e+06] 1 0.341 0.0572 35.5606 < .0001
LOANBAL2 (1.69e+05,3.68e+05] 1 -0.0435 0.0363 1.4383 0.2304
LOANBAL2 (3.68e+05,1.05e+06] 1 0.0566 0.038 2.2158 0.1366
LOANBAL2 (6.27e+04,1.69e+05] 1 -0.1402 0.0361 15.1271 0.0001
LOANBAL3 (1,59e+05,6.17e+05] 1 -0.0228 0.0376 0.3679 0.5442
LOANBAL3 (2.57e+04,1.59e+05] 1 0.0131 0.0365 0.1286 0.7199
LOANBAL3 (6J7e+05,7.29e+06] 1 0.2809 0.0574 23.9684 < .0001
LOANBAL4 (2.2e+04,3.55e+05] 1 -0.043 0.0387 1.2335 0.2667
LOANBAL4 (3.55e+05,3.83e+06] 1 0.3096 0.0569 29.5751 < .0001
LOANBAL5 (1,98e+05,8.5e+06] 1 0.1078 0.0436 6.1054 0.0135
LOANBAL6 (8.91 e+04,2. 5e+06] 1 0.1002 0.0415 5.8325 0.0157
MORTBAL (1.05e+05,le+07] 1 0.0774 0.0465 2.7647 0.0964
MORTBAL (4.8e+04,1,05e+05] 1 -0.152 0.0332 20.9423 < .0001
MORJIENT (156,227] 1 -0.0253 0.036 0.4956 0.4814
MOR_RENT (227,300] 1 0.0166 0.0316 0.2743 0.6005
MORJIENT (300,360] 1 -0.0363 0.0379 0.9149 0.3388
MORJIENT (360,450] 1 -0.0396 0.0332 1.4219 0.2331
MORJIENT (450,577] 1 0.0551 0.0361 2.3296 0.1269
MORJIENT (577,900] 1 0.0553 0.0351 2.4755 0.1156
MORJLENT (900,1.3e+0 1 0.1081 0.062 3.0414 0.0812
NETINCM (1.05e+03,1.2e+03] 1 0.0356 0.033 1.1637 0.2807
NETINCM (1.2e+03,1.38e+03] 1 -0.00227 0.0371 0.0037 0.9513
NETINCM (1.38e+03,1.55e+03] 1 -0.0122 0.0339 0.1302 0.7182
NETINCM (1.55e+03,1.8e+03] 1 -0.0465 0.0328 2.0016 0.1571
NETINCM (1.8e+03,2.2e+03] 1 -0.00261 0.0343 0.0058 0.9393
NETINCM (2.2e+03,3.5e+03] 1 -0.0668 0.0366 3.3215 0.0684
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Table B.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates(continued)
Variable Dummy Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
NET1NCM (3.5e+03,9.37e+05] 1 -0.0401 0.0664 0.3647 0.5459
NETINCM (900,1.05e+03] 1 -0.00159 0.0376 0.0018 0.9663
NOOPEN6 (0,1] 1 0.0597 0.0261 5.2263 0.0222
NOOPEN6 (1,2] 1 -0.0816 0.0348 5.4948 0.0191
NOOPEN6 (2,9] 1 -0.1013 0.0537 3.5597 0.0592
SNBALALL (1,3] 1 -0.1565 0.0554 7.9719 0.0048
SNBALALL (104,245] 1 0.0885 0.0403 4.8287 0.028
SNBALALL (13,30] 1 -0.00009 0.04 0 0.9983
SNBALALL (3,13] 1 -0.0454 0.0403 1.2689 0.26
SNBALALL (30,57] 1 0.0321 0.0381 0.7121 0.3987
SNBALALL (57,104] 1 0.0922 0.0376 6.0171 0.0142
SNBALALL EMPTY 1 0.019 0.0757 0.0627 0.8023
SNBALL6M (1,3] 1 0.3842 0.0751 26.1688 < .0001
SNBALL6M (10,24] 1 0.0639 0.0705 0.821 0.3649
SNBALL6M (133,738] 1 -0.4445 0.1165 14.5697 0.0001
SNBALL6M (24,44] 1 -0.2622 0.0704 13.8736 0.0002
SNBALL6M (3,10] 1 0.3925 0.0723 29.4695 < .0001
SNBALL6M (44,72] 1 -0.0867 0.0695 1.5569 0.2121
SNBALL6M (72,133] 1 -0.3528 0.0712 24.5532 < .0001
SOCBAL EMPTY 1 -0.1128 0.0422 7.1575 0.0075
SOCSETT EMPTY 1 0.5024 0.0528 90.408 < .0001
TIMADD1 (1.2e+03,1.71e+03] 1 -0.00408 0.0354 0.0133 0.9083
TIMADD1 (1.71e+03,2.61e+03] 1 0.1317 0.0369 12.7426 0.0004
TIMADD1 (100,200] 1 -0.1731 0.0361 22.9409 < .0001
TIMADD1 (2.61e+03,5.9e+03] 1 0.275 0.0596 21.2978 < .0001
TIMADD1 (200,306] 1 -0.0741 0.0346 4.5809 0.0323
TIMADD1 (306,506] 1 -0.1068 0.0333 10.3107 0.0013
TIMADD1 (506,800] 1 0.0212 0.0337 0.3933 0.5306
TIMADD1 (800,1.2e+03] 1 0.0316 0.0343 0.8508 0.3563
TOSETTL1 EMPTY 1 -0.1002 0.0436 5.2795 0.0216
TOSETTL1 N 1 -0.0758 0.0243 9.7162 0.0018
TOSETTL2 EMPTY 1 -0.0158 0.0404 0.154 0.6948
TOSETTL2 N 1 -0.0889 0.0252 12.4507 0.0004
TOSETTL3 EMPTY 1 0.0209 0.0384 0.2962 0.5863
TOSETTL3 N 1 -0.098 0.0281 12.1829 0.0005
TOSETTL4 EMPTY 1 0.1475 0.0456 10.4613 0.0012
TOSETTL4 N 1 -0.1257 0.0339 13.7455 0.0002
AGE (27,31] 1 -0.0703 0.036 3.8093 0.051
AGE (31,34] 1 -0.0597 0.0368 2.6343 0.1046
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Table B.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates(continued)
Variable Dummy Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
AGE (34,37] 1 -0.00425 0.0363 0.0137 0.9067
AGE (37,41] 1 0.082 0.0331 6.1289 0.0133
AGE (41,45] 1 0.0689 0.035 3.8729 0.0491
AGE (45,50] 1 0.0861 0.0363 5.6392 0.0176
AGE (50,57] 1 0.0437 0.0376 1.3512 0.2451
AGE (57,64] 1 0.0692 0.069 1.005 0.3161
T1MEBANK (l.le+03,1.41e+03] 1 0.0583 0.0363 2.5787 0.1083
TIMEBANK (1.41e+03,1.61e+03] 1 0.0182 0.0343 0.2803 0.5965
TIMEBANK (1.61e+03,2e+03] 1 -0.00793 0.0292 0.0739 0.7857
TIMEBANK (2.4e+03,3e+03] 1 0.013 0.0367 0.1257 0.7229
TIMEBANK (2e+03,2.4e+03] 1 0.0439 0.0492 0.7988 0.3714
TIMEBANK (3e+03,8.2e+03] 1 0.1358 0.0612 4.9196 0.0266
TIMEBANK (500,900] 1 -0.0471 0.0345 1.8585 0.1728
TIMEBANK (900,l.le+03] 1 -0.0821 0.0342 5.7612 0.0164
NCLSTORE 0 1 -0.3339 0.1944 2.952 0.0858
NO_STORE 1 1 -0.1436 0.1986 0.5233 0.4694
NCLSTORE 2 1 -0.1791 0.2242 0.6381 0.4244
NO-STORE 3 1 -0.0123 0.2997 0.0017 0.9673
SNRECACT 1 1 1.3558 0.4147 10.6873 0.0011
SPL6M12 0 1 -0.1768 0.0677 6.8184 0.009
SPL6M12 1 1 0.0199 0.0891 0.0497 0.8236
SPL6M12 EMPTY 1 0.3056 0.2471 1.5294 0.2162
SPL6M12 N 1 0.1596 0.0797 4.012 0.0452
SPL6MACT 0 1 -0.2741 0.1783 2.3647 0.1241
SPL6MACT 1 1 -0.6286 0.1854 11.4968 0.0007
SPL6MACT EMPTY 1 -0.5415 0.2816 3.6988 0.0545
SPL6MACT N 1 1.8661 0.6691 7.7769 0.0053
SPSETLD 0 1 0.1615 0.0379 18.1829 < .0001
SPSETLD 1 1 0.122 0.0341 12.7568 0.0004
SPSETLD 2 1 0.0875 0.0333 6.8885 0.0087
SPSETLD 3 1 -0.0178 0.0341 0.272 0.602
SPSETLD 4 1 0.0227 0.0354 0.4105 0.5217
SPSETLD 5 1 0.0144 0.0388 0.1384 0.7098
SPSETLD 6 1 -0.0573 0.0424 1.8267 0.1765
SPSETLD 7 1 -0.0171 0.0484 0.1249 0.7238
SPSETLD 8 1 -0.126 0.053 5.6409 0.0175
SPVALDEL -1 1 0.0367 0.2379 0.0238 0.8773
SPVALDEL 0 1 -0.2175 0.2381 0.8343 0.361
SPVALDEL 1 1 0.0872 0.2462 0.1255 0.7231
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Default Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
loanaprl 0.3117450 0.0213706 14.59 0.000 0.2698593 0.3536306
cpi 0.5949605 0.0365988 16.26 0.000 0.5232281 0.6666930
wrst46al 0.5469332 0.0802858 6.81 0.000 0.3895758 0.7042906
timebank 0.3395312 0.0491891 6.90 0.000 0.2431223 0.4359402
ssrc4to6 0.3364142 0.0692591 4.86 0.000 0.2006688 0.4721596
socworst 0.3045035 0.0567139 5.37 0.000 0.1933464 0.4156607
loanbal2 -0.6521232 0.1653033 -3.95 0.000 -0.9761117 -0.3281347
loanbal6 -1.5275050 0.4034007 -3.79 0.000 -2.3181550 -0.7368537
spsetld 0.3421178 0.0889288 3.85 0.000 0.1678205 0.5164151
term 0.9258050 0.2473159 3.74 0.000 0.4410748 1.4105350
netincm -1.2971430 0.3497322 -3.71 0.000 -1.9826060 -0.6116808
_cons -1.6875550 0.0169933 -99.31 0.000 -1.7208610 -1.6542490
Table B.2: Probit Default Model with variables stepwise-selected with significance value
of 0.002
Default Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
loanaprl 0.3004062 0.0220364 13.63 0.000 0.2572157 0.3435967
cpi 0.6118196 0.0371333 16.48 0.000 0.5390396 0.6845996
wrst46al 0.3580667 0.1086589 3.30 0.001 0.1450991 0.5710342
timebank 0.2679799 0.0545948 4.91 0.000 0.1609760 0.3749838
ssrc4to6 0.3153274 0.0705834 4.47 0.000 0.1769864 0.4536683
socworst 0.2569090 0.0575867 4.46 0.000 0.1440411 0.3697769
loanbal2 -0.7899687 0.1899592 -4.16 0.000 -1.1622820 -0.4176556
loanbal6 -1.4782630 0.4102631 -3.60 0.000 -2.2823640 -0.6741616
spsetld 0.3097557 0.0905687 3.42 0.001 0.1322443 0.4872671
term 0.8046459 0.2570356 3.13 0.002 0.3008653 1.3084260
netincm -1.3180350 0.3558251 -3.70 0.000 -2.0154390 -0.6206306
alcifdet 0.6065010 0.1958156 3.10 0.002 0.2227094 0.9902925
age 0.1709128 0.0533851 3.20 0.001 0.0662799 0.2755457
worst 12 0.3700065 0.1217338 3.04 0.002 0.1314125 0.6086004
spl6ml2 0.2763015 0.1052215 2.63 0.009 0.0700711 0.4825319
loan_amt 0.4047468 0.1516572 2.67 0.008 0.1075041 0.7019895
tosettl2 0.7079504 0.3143855 2.25 0.024 0.0917661 1.3241350
socsett 0.2572794 0.1172814 2.19 0.028 0.0274120 0.4871468
ccjgt500 -1.0989980 0.5104424 -2.15 0.031 -2.0994470 -0.0985491
_cons -1.6859410 0.0171999 -98.02 0.000 -1.7196530 -1.6522300
Table B.3: Probit Default Model with variables stepwise-selected with significance value
of 0.05
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Table B.4: Indifference Curve Logit





































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Parameters estimated from OLS regression
_Itimaddl_9 -0.168349 0.0398130 -4.23 0.0000 -0.246381 -0.090317
Jgdscde 200 0.524374 0.1676055 3.13 0.0020 0.195873 0.852875
Jspsetld_8 -0.250975 0.0614355 -4.09 0.0000 -0.371386 -0.130564
Jsnbalall_2 0.216802 0.0467015 4.64 0.0000 0.125268 0.308335
Jsnball6m_7 -0.659762 0.0784589 -8.41 0.0000 -0.813538 -0.505985
Jsnball6m_3 -0.725873 0.1294780 -5.61 0.0000 -0.979645 -0.472101
Jsnball6m_4 -0.550400 0.0772546 -7.12 0.0000 -0.701816 -0.398984
Jspsetld_7 -0.208056 0.0543322 -3.83 0.0000 -0.314545 -0.101567
Jspsetld_3 -0.134976 0.0389790 -3.46 0.0010 -0.211373 -0.058579
Jtimadd 1 _5 -0.123718 0.0405609 -3.05 0.0020 -0.203216 -0.044220
Jtimaddl_6 -0.112501 0.0395957 -2.84 0.0040 -0.190107 -0.034895
Jsnbalall_6 0.148504 0.0434600 3.42 0.0010 0.063324 0.233684
Jloanbal 1 _7 0.121340 0.0408825 2.97 0.0030 0.041212 0.201469
Jinc_surp_7 -0.102884 0.0376997 -2.73 0.0060 -0.176774 -0.028994
Jno_deps_4 0.100590 0.0291208 3.45 0.0010 0.043514 0.157666
Jsocworst_2 -0.680604 0.2735984 -2.49 0.0130 -1.216847 -0.144361
Jspsetld_6 -0.133687 0.0488140 -2.74 0.0060 -0.229361 -0.038013
Jsnwl2tv_2 0.147099 0.0584538 2.52 0.0120 0.032532 0.261667
Jsnbalall_5 0.091368 0.0421038 2.17 0.0300 0.008845 0.173890
_lalcifdet_2 0.230821 0.1016956 2.27 0.0230 0.031501 0.430141
Jage_4 0.118337 0.0381368 3.10 0.0020 0.043590 0.193084
Jage_5 0.118641 0.0408234 2.91 0.0040 0.038629 0.198654
Jage_6 0.116703 0.0413757 2.82 0.0050 0.035608 0.197798
Jccjgt500_6 -0.063494 0.0275959 -2.30 0.0210 -0.117581 -0.009407
Jsocworst_4 -0.234336 0.1065833 -2.20 0.0280 -0.443235 -0.025436
_Itosettl4_2 -0.231257 0.0472866 -4.89 0.0000 -0.323937 -0.138577
Jmor_rent_8 -0.079177 0.0323495 -2.45 0.0140 -0.142580 -0.015773
Jmor_rent_4 -0.090851 0.0376629 -2.41 0.0160 -0.164669 -0.017034
_cons -2.661112 0.2150567 -12.37 0.0000 -3.082615 -2.239609
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
Table C.1: Use time dependent covariates to test the PH assumption, group 1
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z|
rh
loanaprl -0.625875 0.099315 -6.30 0.000
cpi -0.623123 0.113440 -5.49 0.000
term -0.023298 0.314821 -0.07 0.941
timebank -0.159357 0.228213 -0.70 0.485
spl6ml2 -0.599066 0.185356 -3.23 0.001
ssrc4to6 -0.084699 0.205879 -0.41 0.681
loanbal4 0.336511 0.302102 1.11 0.265
spsetld -1.171431 0.235313 -4.98 0.000
spl6m4 -0.468656 0.117236 -4.00 0.000
age -0.406709 0.106335 -3.82 0.000
loanball -0.654438 0.138320 -4.73 0.000
timaddl -0.662313 0.180766 -3.66 0.000
inc_surp -0.315840 0.097031 -3.26 0.001
searches -0.483789 0.212854 -2.27 0.023
spvaldel -0.437298 0.120251 -3.64 0.000
newbus 19.954610 5.943964 3.36 0.001
loanbal2 -0.427326 0.167069 -2.56 0.011
ccjgt500 -0.571135 0.253296 -2.25 0.024
loanbal6 -0.284608 0.133869 -2.13 0.034
no_amex -0.834241 0.395129 -2.11 0.035
mortbal -0.546873 0.272527 -2.01 0.045
snball6m -0.629072 0.357020 -1.76 0.078
t
loanaprl 0.048288 0.047978 1.01 0.314
cpi -0.052760 0.053240 -0.99 0.322
term -0.459681 0.148602 -3.09 0.002
timebank -0.163812 0.106824 -1.53 0.125
spl6ml2 0.054944 0.088407 0.62 0.534
ssrc4to6 -0.168402 0.096270 -1.75 0.080
loanbal4 -0.413371 0.135136 -3.06 0.002
spsetld 0.331755 0.115104 2.88 0.004
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Table C.2: Use time dependent covariates to test the PH assumption, group 2
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\
rh
loanaprl -0.534217 0.035139 -15.20 0.000
cpi -0.727654 0.038817 -18.75 0.000
term -0.933334 0.109403 -8.53 0.000
timebank -0.482008 0.084016 -5.74 0.000
spl6ml2 -0.487189 0.065384 -7.45 0.000
ssrc4to6 -0.421630 0.070008 -6.02 0.000
loanbal4 -0.511494 0.109147 -4.69 0.000
spsetld -0.543634 0.087728 -6.20 0.000
spl6m4 0.181920 0.347013 0.52 0.600
age -0.662490 0.272898 -2.43 0.015
loanbal 1 0.011567 0.393104 0.03 0.977
timaddl -0.181053 0.518125 -0.35 0.727
inc_surp 0.464560 0.278560 1.67 0.095
searches -0.919852 0.569728 -1.61 0.106
spvaldel -0.595604 0.316545 -1.88 0.060
newbus 62.724010 18.726890 3.35 0.001
loanbal2 -0.414160 0.166981 -2.48 0.013
ccjgt500 -0.552871 0.253251 -2.18 0.029
loanbal6 -0.297256 0.133713 -2.22 0.026
no_amex -0.774748 0.398277 -1.95 0.052
mortbal -0.569620 0.272538 -2.09 0.037
snball6m -0.630163 0.356810 -1.77 0.077
t
spl6m4 -0.337476 0.164042 -2.06 0.040
age 0.133352 0.130695 1.02 0.308
loanbal 1 -0.343889 0.181671 -1.89 0.058
timadd 1 -0.235255 0.244650 -0.96 0.336
inc_surp -0.396712 0.131744 -3.01 0.003
searches 0.224944 0.266081 0.85 0.398
spvaldel 0.085177 0.157460 0.54 0.589
newbus -20.898330 8.402471 -2.49 0.013
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Table C.3: Use time dependent covariates to test the PH assumption, group 3
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\
rh
loanaprl -0.535118 0.035267 -15.17 0.000
cpi -0.727636 0.038858 -18.73 0.000
term -0.933955 0.109345 -8.54 0.000
timebank -0.478003 0.084029 -5.69 0.000
spl6ml2 -0.485434 0.065423 -7.42 0.000
ssrc4to6 -0.420806 0.070154 -6.00 0.000
loanbal4 -0.519484 0.109189 -4.76 0.000
spsetld -0.540068 0.087665 -6.16 0.000
spl6m4 -0.455924 0.117520 -3.88 0.000
age -0.399045 0.106442 -3.75 0.000
loanbal 1 -0.661577 0.138228 -4.79 0.000
timaddl -0.647672 0.180554 -3.59 0.000
inc_surp -0.314581 0.096943 -3.25 0.001
searches -0.492646 0.212988 -2.31 0.021
spvaldel -0.418671 0.119961 -3.49 0.000
newbus 19.862720 5.939985 3.34 0.001
loanbal2 1.287643 0.462279 2.79 0.005
ccjgt500 -0.377414 0.671179 -0.56 0.574
loanbal6 0.279227 0.422757 0.66 0.509
no_amex 5.281398 2.714625 1.95 0.052
mortbal -1.645832 0.823706 -2.00 0.046
snball6m 0.266812 1.050864 0.25 0.800
t
loanbal2 -0.846953 0.209700 -4.04 0.000
ccjgt500 -0.091807 0.312159 -0.29 0.769
loanbal6 -0.270978 0.187536 -1.44 0.148
no_amex -2.624412 1.096511 -2.39 0.017
mortbal 0.544655 0.383709 1.42 0.156
snba!16m -0.445859 0.496056 -0.90 0.369
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Table C.4: Cox with time dependent covariates
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_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\
rh
loanaprl -0.533234 0.035223 -15.14 0.000
cpi -0.730704 0.038830 -18.82 0.000
term -0.461500 0.209891 -2.20 0.028
timebank -0.482071 0.084065 -5.73 0.000
spl6ml2 -0.480955 0.065497 -7.34 0.000
ssrc4to6 -0.412186 0.070195 -5.87 0.000
loanbal4 -0.512284 0.109195 -4.69 0.000
spsetld -1.076827 0.157580 -6.83 0.000
spl6m4 -0.450722 0.117026 -3.85 0.000
age -0.411820 0.106354 -3.87 0.000
loanball -0.663202 0.138259 -4.80 0.000
timaddl -0.648787 0.180652 -3.59 0.000
inc_surp 0.146136 0.185226 0.79 0.430
searches -0.475920 0.212791 -2.24 0.025
spvaldel -0.402630 0.119798 -3.36 0.001
newbus 37.129000 11.699730 3.17 0.002
loanbal2 -0.413006 0.167004 -2.47 0.013
ccjgt500 -0.569515 0.253463 -2.25 0.025
loanbal6 -0.293090 0.133676 -2.19 0.028
no_amex -0.824011 0.401275 -2.05 0.040
mortbal -0.560212 0.272526 -2.06 0.040
snball6m -0.616047 0.357272 -1.72 0.085
t
term -0.052153 0.019884 -2.62 0.009
spsetld 0.063649 0.015800 4.03 0.000
inc_surp -0.051735 0.017526 -2.95 0.003
newbus -1.761389 1.009336 -1.75 0.081
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Table C.5: Estimates from Weibull Model on paying back early
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_t Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P > \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
cpi 0.4783145 0.0303514 -11.62 0.00 0.4223773 0.5416596
age 0.5232625 0.0416314 -8.14 0.00 0.4477102 0.6115644
spsetld 0.3415869 0.0267512 -13.72 0.00 0.2929812 0.3982563
rawJoanaprl 1.0314310 0.0043383 7.36 0.00 1.0229630 1.0399690
netincm 0.7619679 0.0579986 -3.57 0.00 0.6563658 0.8845603
timaddl 0.5139337 0.0411061 -8.32 0.00 0.4393648 0.6011585
gdscde2 0.6077858 0.0362376 -8.35 0.00 0.5407542 0.6831265
spl6m4 0.5101184 0.0441318 -7.78 0.00 0.4305575 0.6043811
snbalall 0.6730424 0.0667519 -3.99 0.00 0.5541417 0.8174553
internet 0.6933863 0.0721658 -3.52 0.00 0.5654374 0.8502879
tosettl4 0.2312880 0.0711647 -4.76 0.00 0.1265459 0.4227253
inc_surp 0.6518582 0.0582058 -4.79 0.00 0.5472018 0.7765307
ssrc4to6 0.5848742 0.0602835 -5.20 0.00 0.4778905 0.7158080
L 0.9872349 0.0029864 -4.25 0.00 0.9813991 0.9931054
loanbal 1 0.5213038 0.0721717 -4.71 0.00 0.3974172 0.6838096
socsett 0.7251686 0.0535427 -4.35 0.00 0.6274666 0.8380835
timebank 0.6892486 0.0629588 -4.07 0.00 0.5762668 0.8243814
mortbal 0.5907617 0.0928403 -3.35 0.00 0.4341531 0.8038624
tosettl6 0.5324472 0.1087102 -3.09 0.00 0.3568503 0.7944509
term 0.5396387 0.0983520 -3.38 0.00 0.3775436 0.7713280
sncais3m 0.4666930 0.1205424 -2.95 0.00 0.2813027 0.7742633
loanbal2 1.9358770 0.5224799 2.45 0.01 1.1406290 3.2855740
alcifdet 0.4239867 0.1454299 -2.50 0.01 0.2164637 0.8304613
wrstnrev 1.8849790 0.4676688 2.56 0.01 1.1591000 3.0654350
loanbal5 0.6761110 0.1118250 -2.37 0.02 0.4889158 0.9349793
mor_rent 0.7562349 0.0895109 -2.36 0.02 0.5996601 0.9536922
spl6ml2 0.7174979 0.1205176 -1.98 0.05 0.5162320 0.9972324
no_amex 0.0080638 0.0199067 -1.95 0.05 0.0000639 1.0182390
tosettB 0.5974401 0.1691200 -1.82 0.07 0.3430370 1.0405140
searches 0.5731514 0.1830554 -1.74 0.08 0.3064849 1.0718390
ccjgt500 0.7543656 0.1227745 -1.73 0.08 0.5483365 1.0378070
/ln_p 0.6049988 0.0112799 53.64 0.00 0.5828907 0.6271069
P 1.8312500 0.0206562 1.7912090 1.8721860
1/p 0.5460751 0.0061596 0.5341349 0.5582822
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Table C.6: Estimates from Exponential Model on paying back early
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_t Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 1.0317790 0.0042606 7.58 0.00 1.0234620 1.0401640
spsetld 0.3745639 0.0292505 -12.57 0.00 0.3214059 0.4365139
age 0.5604360 0.0444372 -7.30 0.00 0.4797708 0.6546636
cpi 0.5295871 0.0336188 -10.01 0.00 0.4676298 0.5997533
gdscde2 0.5946140 0.0353844 -8.74 0.00 0.5291534 0.6681725
netincm 0.7441330 0.0565428 -3.89 0.00 0.6411685 0.8636325
timaddl 0.5359900 0.0429057 -7.79 0.00 0.4581614 0.6270396
spl6m4 0.5524892 0.0477138 -6.87 0.00 0.4664583 0.6543872
snbalall 0.6802004 0.0675157 -3.88 0.00 0.5599482 0.8262775
brand 0.7202345 0.0408486 -5.79 0.00 0.6444621 0.8049158
tosettl4 0.2549042 0.0772423 -4.51 0.00 0.1407479 0.4616493
mortbal 0.5928098 0.0940554 -3.30 0.00 0.4343736 0.8090351
L 0.9882287 0.0029605 -3.95 0.00 0.9824433 0.9940481
ssrc4to6 0.6266343 0.0643042 -4.55 0.00 0.5124661 0.7662370
socsett 0.7445302 0.0553493 -3.97 0.00 0.6435806 0.8613143
loanball 0.5361562 0.0742230 -4.50 0.00 0.4087472 0.7032792
inc_surp 0.7056412 0.0627786 -3.92 0.00 0.5927279 0.8400643
tosettl6 0.5463024 0.1111075 -2.97 0.00 0.3667034 0.8138631
timebank 0.7141295 0.0651024 -3.69 0.00 0.5972810 0.8538377
tenn 0.5528161 0.1002790 -3.27 0.00 0.3874142 0.7888343
internet 0.7541911 0.0782761 -2.72 0.01 0.6153707 0.9243278
alcifdet 0.4113670 0.1411012 -2.59 0.01 0.2100209 0.8057428
spl6ml2 0.6635417 0.1117109 -2.44 0.02 0.4770499 0.9229383
sncais3m 0.5308436 0.1371757 -2.45 0.01 0.3198947 0.8808992
loanbal2 1.7458990 0.4702486 2.07 0.04 1.0297990 2.9599590
mor_rent 0.7579097 0.0896050 -2.34 0.02 0.6011501 0.9555469
loanbal5 0.6995682 0.1158180 -2.16 0.03 0.5057177 0.9677250
wrstnrev 1.6424840 0.4078645 2.00 0.05 1.0095530 2.6722250
searches 0.5529432 0.1763539 -1.86 0.06 0.2959383 1.0331420
no_amex 0.0138717 0.0335481 -1.77 0.08 0.0001212 1.5875410
ccjgt500 0.7530695 0.1224021 -1.74 0.08 0.5476244 1.0355890
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Table C.7: Estimates from PH Cox on paying back early
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_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.0331895 0.0041906 7.92 0.00 0.0249760 0.0414030
cpi -0.7125868 0.0635259 -11.22 0.00 -0.8370953 -0.5880782
spsetld -1.0471870 0.0782786 -13.38 0.00 -1.2006110 -0.8937642
age -0.6291370 0.0794940 -7.91 0.00 -0.7849423 -0.4733317
netincm -0.2752288 0.0761703 -3.61 0.00 -0.4245198 -0.1259377
timaddl -0.6567771 0.0800183 -8.21 0.00 -0.8136102 -0.4999440
gdscde2 -0.5072920 0.0596893 -8.50 0.00 -0.6242808 -0.3903032
spl6m4 -0.6528448 0.0864778 -7.55 0.00 -0.8223382 -0.4833515
snbalall -0.3993167 0.0991956 -4.03 0.00 -0.5937365 -0.2048969
tosettW -1.4370430 0.3076224 -4.67 0.00 -2.0399720 -0.8341147
internet -0.3286043 0.1041256 -3.16 0.00 -0.5326867 -0.1245219
L -0.0128302 0.0030263 -4.24 0.00 -0.0187616 -0.0068989
ssrc4to6 -0.5173966 0.1029967 -5.02 0.00 -0.7192663 -0.3155269
loanbal 1 -0.6439720 0.1384485 -4.65 0.00 -0.9153261 -0.3726180
socsett -0.3146527 0.0744291 -4.23 0.00 -0.4605310 -0.1687743
inc_surp -0.4015945 0.0893214 -4.50 0.00 -0.5766613 -0.2265277
timebank -0.3589438 0.0913087 -3.93 0.00 -0.5379055 -0.1799821
tosettl6 -0.6443927 0.2039511 -3.16 0.00 -1.0441300 -0.2446558
mortbal -0.5263394 0.1589056 -3.31 0.00 -0.8377887 -0.2148902
term -0.6171462 0.1820455 -3.39 0.00 -0.9739488 -0.2603435
sncais3m -0.7243424 0.2584550 -2.80 0.01 -1.2309050 -0.2177799
alcifdet -0.8783158 0.3430178 -2.56 0.01 -1.5506180 -0.2060133
loanbal2 0.6323793 0.2698190 2.34 0.02 0.1035438 1.1612150
morjrent -0.2811207 0.1184289 -2.37 0.02 -0.5132372 -0.0490043
wrstnrev 0.5944406 0.2483537 2.39 0.02 0.1076763 1.0812050
loanbal5 -0.3743662 0.1654424 -2.26 0.02 -0.6986274 -0.0501050
spl6ml2 -0.3573855 0.1681669 -2.13 0.03 -0.6869865 -0.0277845
brand -0.1197260 0.0582199 -2.06 0.04 -0.2338348 -0.0056171
no_amex -4.6559620 2.4409750 -1.91 0.06 -9.4401850 0.1282598
searches -0.5701334 0.3192294 -1.79 0.07 -1.1958110 0.0555447
ccjgt500 -0.2835569 0.1627574 -1.74 0.08 -0.6025556 0.0354417
tosett!3 -0.4766975 0.2832915 -1.68 0.09 -1.0319390 0.0785437
Table C.8: Lunn and McNeil Method A
_t Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P> |z|
type 1.7342980 0.5030923 3.45 0.001
rawJoanaprl 0.1056094 0.0083677 12.62 0.000
Jcpi_2 1.3667740 0.0715040 19.11 0.000
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logLXAPR 0.1939021 0.0461542 4.20 0.000
Jspl6ml2_4 0.5227119 0.0991498 5.27 0.000
Jloanbal4_3 -0.4544236 0.1158050 -3.92 0.000
_Inewbus_l 0.0233963 0.2779477 0.08 0.933
Jspvaldel_2 -0.5375315 0.1419502 -3.79 0.000
_Iinc_surp_6 0.4307904 0.1221332 3.53 0.000
Jspl6m4_3 1.3169650 0.4578020 2.88 0.004
Jinc_surp_4 0.3579988 0.1166776 3.07 0.002
Jssrc4to6_5 0.7878295 0.1760189 4.48 0.000
Jwrst46al_4 0.3899139 0.1012480 3.85 0.000
raw.term 0.0116839 0.0024762 4.72 0.000
Jage_7 -0.8047942 0.2078096 -3.87 0.000
Jtimebank_4 -0.4823400 0.1266012 -3.81 0.000
Jtimebank_5 -0.9284479 0.2371845 -3.91 0.000
Jgdscde 999 -0.4156502 0.1392311 -2.99 0.003
Jsnball6m_8 0.3435823 0.1121660 3.06 0.002
Jssrc4to6_4 0.5870922 0.1741699 3.37 0.001
Jsearches_7 -0.1983133 0.0690195 -2.87 0.004
Jloanbal6_2 -0.2901753 0.1562017 -1.86 0.063
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.1791319 0.1022374 -1.75 0.080
Jssrc4to6_3 0.2682160 0.1207071 2.22 0.026
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.2523361 0.1345237 -1.88 0.061
Jtimaddl_6 0.3422099 0.1095988 3.12 0.002
Jtimebank_2 -0.3048706 0.1086342 -2.81 0.005
Jtimebank_3 -0.3874635 0.1353873 -2.86 0.004
Jwrstnrev_3 0.5020158 0.2801753 1.79 0.073
Jinc_surp_2 -0.1834805 0.1116006 -1.64 0.100
Jinternet_l -0.2412311 0.0791869 -3.05 0.002
Jmortbal_3 -0.1948998 0.1088114 -1.79 0.073
Jtimebank_7 -0.2025196 0.1128873 -1.79 0.073
Jloanball_7 -0.2349395 0.1132119 -2.08 0.038
Jtimaddl_7 -0.0889093 0.1253448 -0.71 0.478
Jssrc4to6_2 0.0976311 0.0852790 1.14 0.252
Jspl6m4_4 -0.0685550 0.0748325 -0.92 0.360
Jspsetld_9 -0.2775613 0.1153120 -2.41 0.016
Jmortbal_2 -0.1187518 0.1152082 -1.03 0.303
Jinc_surp_3 -0.2062980 0.1721408 -1.20 0.231
Jage_6 -0.4211983 0.1573720 -2.68 0.007
Jsocsett_3 -0.0456692 0.1302752 -0.35 0.726
Jage_5 -0.4991570 0.1533945 -3.25 0.001
Jage_4 -0.3713094 0.1357683 -2.73 0.006
Jloanbal5_2 -0.0115215 0.1655331 -0.07 0.945
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_Itosettll_3 -0.0359408 0.0838600 -0.43 0.668
L -0.0094526 0.0123491 -0.77 0.444
Jspsetld_7 0.0632302 0.1381898 0.46 0.647
Jspsetld_8 -0.4357232 0.1868123 -2.33 0.020
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.1183438 0.1193816 0.99 0.322
Jspsetld_5 -0.2331780 0.1327580 -1.76 0.079
Jage_3 -0.3544368 0.1409809 -2.51 0.012
Jmor_rent_8 0.0845732 0.0815182 1.04 0.300
Jtosettl4_3 -0.1738918 0.1559771 -1.11 0.265
Jgdscde 333 0.0955900 0.2348779 0.41 0.684
Jloanball_3 -0.0289744 0.1036110 -0.28 0.780
Jage_2 -0.2965488 0.1314902 -2.26 0.024
_Itimaddl_2 0.0706656 0.1140131 0.62 0.535
Jspsetld_6 -0.2163748 0.1426030 -1.52 0.129
Jmor_rent_5 -0.0912649 0.1234983 -0.74 0.460
Jspsetld_4 -0.1386132 0.1101876 -1.26 0.208
Jloanbal3_4 -0.0206867 0.1079674 -0.19 0.848
Jtimebank_6 -0.0836683 0.1112596 -0.75 0.452
Jsocworst_4 0.0958675 0.2386477 0.40 0.688
Jtimaddl_4 0.2498613 0.1605841 1.56 0.120
Jsnbalall_4 0.1268567 0.1028627 1.23 0.217
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.0647956 0.1077581 -0.60 0.548
Jsocworst_3 0.8537084 0.3504307 2.44 0.015
Jnetincm_6 0.4217224 0.1386253 3.04 0.002
Jnetincm_5 0.4093916 0.1114535 3.67 0.000
Jmor_rent_6 -0.0231949 0.1174985 -0.20 0.844
Jno_store_l -0.2885813 0.1492380 -1.93 0.053
Jnoopen6_4 -0.0973047 0.0814409 -1.19 0.232
Jtosettl3_3 0.1378312 0.1226310 1.12 0.261
_Ibrand_2 -0.2237849 0.0781054 -2.87 0.004
Jspsetld_3 -0.0850318 0.1059072 -0.80 0.422
Jalcifdet_2 -0.2552834 0.2326306 -1.10 0.272
_Iinc_surp_5 0.1233364 0.1048009 1.18 0.239
Jtimaddl_5 0.1842909 0.1161794 1.59 0.113
_Itimaddl_3 0.2003204 0.1195149 1.68 0.094
Jtimadd 1 _9 0.1767211 0.1153878 1.53 0.126
Jccjgt500_3 -0.0339577 0.0805344 -0.42 0.673
JsocbaL3 -0.7390479 0.2819599 -2.62 0.009
Jtosettl5_3 0.1163873 0.1742490 0.67 0.504
_Isnbalall_7 -0.0528594 0.1559737 -0.34 0.735
Jno_store_3 0.2855969 0.5128436 0.56 0.578
Jsnball6m_3 0.0272360 0.2279906 0.12 0.905
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_Imor_rent_7 -0J266391 0.2101062 -0.60 0.547
Jnetincm_7 0.8471922 0.2167660 3.91 0.000
_Inetincm_4 0.2593257 0.1107841 2.34 0.019
covt_raw_l 1 -0.0692539 0.0091211 -7.59 0.000
covtJcpi_2 -1.0237510 0.0774410 -13.22 0.000
covtJogLX R -0.1686547 0.0503393 -3.35 0.001
covtJs 2_4 -0.4759050 0.1085605 -4.38 0.000
covtJ1 4_3 0.5989644 0.1262211 4.75 0.000
covtJnew 1 -0.1366773 0.2896905 -0.47 0.637
covtJspv 2 0.5681898 0.1621687 3.50 0.000
covtJinc 6 -0.3396654 0.1317687 -2.58 0.010
covtJspl3 -0.9917178 0.5660166 -1.75 0.080
covtJinc 4 -0.2104749 0.1253308 -1.68 0.093
covtJssr 5 -1.0647140 0.2352022 -4.53 0.000
covtJwrs 4 -0.4125193 0.1130420 -3.65 0.000
covt_raw_t m -0.0129296 0.0026912 -4.80 0.000
covtJage_7 0.2440877 0.2241867 1.09 0.276
covtJt k_4 0.4268462 0.1373095 3.11 0.002
covtJt k_5 0.7928951 0.2517033 3.15 0.002
covtJg 999 0.6940515 0.1488359 4.66 0.000
covtJsnb 8 -0.3465969 0.1198784 -2.89 0.004
covtJssr 4 -0.3702454 0.1947617 -1.90 0.057
covtJsea 7 0.2053970 0.0738522 2.78 0.005
covtJ1 6_2 0.4807359 0.1884277 2.55 0.011
covtJg 111 0.4297384 0.1095148 3.92 0.000
covtJssr 3 -0.0702706 0.1294920 -0.54 0.587
covtJspl 5 0.1664340 0.1412285 1.18 0.239
covtJt 1_6 -0.1750487 0.1187132 -1.47 0.140
covtJt k_2 0.3344094 0.1183803 2.82 0.005
covtJt k_3 0.2809307 0.1467279 1.91 0.056
covtJwrs 3 -0.5894659 0.3390824 -1.74 0.082
covtJinc 2 0.2208191 0.1187255 1.86 0.063
covtJint 1 0.1145312 0.0854070 1.34 0.180
covtJmor 3 0.1580248 0.1168032 1.35 0.176
covtJt k_7 0.1809508 0.1232679 1.47 0.142
covtJloa 7 0.2170166 0.1203995 1.80 0.071
covtJt1_7 0.1487013 0.1326820 1.12 0.262
covtJssr 2 -0.0859334 0.0919403 -0.93 0.350
covtJs 4_4 -0.1307550 0.0803077 -1.63 0.103
covtJsps 9 0.8394370 0.1237026 6.79 0.000
covtJmor 2 0.2314466 0.1227568 1.89 0.059
covtJinc 3 -0.0020990 0.1884621 -0.01 0.991
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covtJs 1_3 0.5655174 0.2950834 1.92 0.055
covtJt 5_3 -0.3508563 0.2085312 -1.68 0.092
covtJsnb 7 -0.1480735 0.1833198 -0.81 0.419
covt_Ino_ 3 -1.4763410 0.7444203 -1.98 0.047
covtJsnb 3 -0.1979520 0.2433709 -0.81 0.416
covtJmor 7 0.3564586 0.2266045 1.57 0.116
covtJnet 7 -1.1392930 0.2439850 -4.67 0.000
covtJnet 4 -0.3456502 0.1187396 -2.91 0.004
Table C.9: Lunn and McNeil Method B
_t Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>\z\
rawJoanaprl 0.1018492 0.0077413 13.16 0.000
Jcpi_2 1.3401810 0.0699161 19.17 0.000
logLXAPR 0.1954782 0.0433310 4.51 0.000
Jspl6ml2_4 0.4978965 0.0943650 5.28 0.000
Jloanbal4_3 -0.4581498 0.1113537 -4.11 0.000
JnewbusJ 0.0036577 0.2699393 0.01 0.989
Jspvaldel_2 -0.5210826 0.1364245 -3.82 0.000
Jinc_surp_6 0.4246947 0.1187191 3.58 0.000
Jspl6m4_3 1.1855470 0.4446374 2.67 0.008
Jinc_surp_4 0.3515542 0.1134981 3.10 0.002
Jssrc4to6_5 0.7470454 0.1659709 4.50 0.000
Jwrst46al_4 0.3696304 0.0968179 3.82 0.000
raw_term 0.0112665 0.0023777 4.74 0.000
Jage_7 -0.7487323 0.2015493 -3.71 0.000
Jtimebank_4 -0.4690129 0.1228060 -3.82 0.000
Jtimebank_5 -0.9040819 0.2332254 -3.88 0.000
Jgdscde 999 -0.4125727 0.1365413 -3.02 0.003
Jsnball6m_8 0.3363813 0.1075902 3.13 0.002
Jssrc4to6_4 0.5602602 0.1654777 3.39 0.001
Jsearches_7 -0.1910413 0.0665926 -2.87 0.004
Jloanbal6_2 -0.2767611 0.1494603 -1.85 0.064
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.1837640 0.0988876 -1.86 0.063
Jssrc4to6_3 0.2452768 0.1154466 2.12 0.034
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.2574459 0.1313369 -1.96 0.050
Jtimaddl_6 0.3142171 0.1063882 2.95 0.003
Jtimebank_2 -0.2875642 0.1043480 -2.76 0.006
Jtimebank_3 -0.3754827 0.1311226 -2.86 0.004
Jwrstnrev_3 0.4528597 0.2651960 1.71 0.088
Jinc_surp_2 -0.1793502 0.1083827 -1.65 0.098
JinternetJ -0.2320473 0.0764745 -3.03 0.002
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Jmortbal_3 -0.1815954 0.1057444 -1.72 0.086
Jtimebank_7 -0.1772049 0.1079026 -1.64 0.101
_Iloanball_7 -0.2300851 0.1101203 -2.09 0.037
Jtimaddl_7 -0.0945495 0.1204075 -0.79 0.432
Jssrc4to6_2 0.0978606 0.0824605 1.19 0.235
Jspl6m4_4 -0.0585307 0.0726850 -0.81 0.421
Jspsetld_9 -0.3136348 0.1119874 -2.80 0.005
_Imortbal_2 -0.1221811 0.1120054 -1.09 0.275
_Iinc_surp_3 -0.2057809 0.1653342 -1.24 0.213
Jage_6 -0.3879375 0.1507492 -2.57 0.010
Jsocsett_3 -0.0564283 0.1252100 -0.45 0.652
Jage_5 -0.4606872 0.1466367 -3.14 0.002
Jage_4 -0.3325041 0.1290072 -2.58 0.010
Jloanbal5_2 -0.0278742 0.1580253 -0.18 0.860
Jtosettl 1 _3 -0.0447790 0.0808796 -0.55 0.580
L -0.0091777 0.0118207 -0.78 0.438
Jspsetld_7 0.0271836 0.1338319 0.20 0.839
Jspsetld_8 -0.4610055 0.1828833 -2.52 0.012
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.1088255 0.1136678 0.96 0.338
Jspsetld_5 -0.2565591 0.1293131 -1.98 0.047
Jage_3 -0.3244223 0.1343130 -2.42 0.016
Jmor_rent_8 0.0899324 0.0785240 1.15 0.252
Jtosettl4_3 -0.1887153 0.1506497 -1.25 0.210
Jgdscde 333 0.1036904 0.2246205 0.46 0.644
Jloanball_3 -0.0226262 0.1006130 -0.22 0.822
_Iage_2 -0.2723326 0.1246967 -2.18 0.029
Jtimaddl_2 0.0696557 0.1103795 0.63 0.528
Jspsetld_6 -0.2210197 0.1381357 -1.60 0.110
_Imor_rent_5 -0.0851579 0.1194901 -0.71 0.476
Jspsetld_4 -0.1616897 0.1069019 -1.51 0.130
Jloanbal3_4 -0.0344096 0.1040911 -0.33 0.741
_Itimebank_6 -0.0868331 0.1062525 -0.82 0.414
Jsocworst_4 0.0462197 0.2221337 0.21 0.835
Jtimaddl_4 0.2528039 0.1561137 1.62 0.105
Jsnbalall_4 0.1204128 0.0984050 1.22 0.221
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.0453255 0.1033973 -0.44 0.661
Jsocworst_3 0.8298785 0.3444363 2.41 0.016
_Inetincm_6 0.4237077 0.1328997 3.19 0.001
_Inetincm_5 0.3993098 0.1084849 3.68 0.000
Jmor_rent_6 -0.0289022 0.1140158 -0.25 0.800
_Ino_store_l -0.2561560 0.1425755 -1.80 0.072
Jnoopen6_4 -0.0885848 0.0783869 -1.13 0.258
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Jtosettl3_3 OJ197973 0.1172648 1.02 0.307
Jbrand_2 -0J107500 0.0762834 -1.45 0.147
Jspsetld_3 -0J 048208 0.1019879 -1.03 0.304
Jalcifdet_2 -0.2701756 0.2184082 -1.24 0.216
Jinc_surp_5 0.1263974 0.1020875 1.24 0.216
Jtimaddl_5 0.1614716 0.1125719 1.43 0.151
Jtimaddl_3 0.1732643 0.1149247 1.51 0.132
Jtimaddl_9 0.1665754 0.1109827 1.50 0.133
_Iccjgt500_3 -0.0325307 0.0774216 -0.42 0.674
Jsocbal_3 -0.7122386 0.2753442 -2.59 0.010
Jtosettl5_3 0.0955689 0.1699444 0.56 0.574
Jsnbalall_7 -0.0592609 0.1518928 -0.39 0.696
Jno_store_3 0.2730169 0.4865510 0.56 0.575
Jsnball6m_3 0.0664205 0.2167781 0.31 0.759
Jmor_rent_7 -0.1236541 0.2012783 -0.61 0.539
JnetincmJ7 0.8548974 0.2067028 4.14 0.000
Jnetincm_4 0.2371250 0.1076762 2.20 0.028
covt_raw_l 1 -0.0652286 0.0087551 -7.45 0.000
covt_Icpi_2 -0.9920369 0.0765399 -12.96 0.000
covt_logLX R -0.1739539 0.0488316 -3.56 0.000
covtJs 2_4 -0.4481058 0.1054952 -4.25 0.000
covtJ1 4_3 0.6034755 0.1232908 4.89 0.000
covtJnew 1 -0.1184577 0.2836286 -0.42 0.676
covtJspv 2 0.5502057 0.1594124 3.45 0.001
covtJinc 6 -0.3302421 0.1296032 -2.55 0.011
covtJspl 3 -0.8502487 0.5589157 -1.52 0.128
covtJinc 4 -0.2004211 0.1232646 -1.63 0.104
covtJssr 5 -1.0216380 0.2343810 -4.36 0.000
covtJwrs 4 -0.3881525 0.1103690 -3.52 0.000
covt_raw_t m -0.0124616 0.0026199 -4.76 0.000
covtJage_7 0.1782236 0.2199116 0.81 0.418
covtJt k_4 0.4116224 0.1348302 3.05 0.002
covtJt k_5 0.7668584 0.2491529 3.08 0.002
covtJg 999 0.6895132 0.1473491 4.68 0.000
covtJsnb 8 -0.3404504 0.1165280 -2.92 0.003
covtJssr 4 -0.3379901 0.1897342 -1.78 0.075
covtJsea 7 0.1975062 0.0721231 2.74 0.006
covtJ1 6_2 0.4672871 0.1845153 2.53 0.011
covtJg 111 0.4352901 0.1071350 4.06 0.000
covtJssr 3 -0.0440702 0.1259814 -0.35 0.726
covtJspl 5 0.1738089 0.1387490 1.25 0.210
covtJt 1_6 -0.1451626 0.1166595 -1.24 0.213
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covtJt k_2 0.3157187 0.1155460 2.73 0.006
covtJt k_3 0.2660523 0.1439847 1.85 0.065
covtJwrs 3 -0.5314546 0.3316357 -1.60 0.109
covtJinc 2 0.2171301 0.1163558 1.87 0.062
covtJint 1 0.1017433 0.0835493 1.22 0.223
covtJmor 3 0.1421782 0.1148753 1.24 0.216
covtJt k_7 0.1525187 0.1199076 1.27 0.203
covtJloa 7 0.2112519 0.1182785 1.79 0.074
covtJt1_7 0.1554766 0.1290215 1.21 0.228
covtJssr 2 -0.0860001 0.0900370 -0.96 0.339
covtJs 4_4 -0.1425349 0.0788932 -1.81 0.071
covtJsps9 0.8810693 0.1214800 7.25 0.000
covtJmor 2 0.2341004 0.1205643 1.94 0.052
covtJinc 3 -0.0034272 0.1833872 -0.02 0.985
covtJage_6 -0.1532715 0.1680093 -0.91 0.362
covtJ tt_3 -0.1097381 0.1343637 -0.82 0.414
covtJage_5 -0.0326667 0.1622122 -0.20 0.840
covtJage_4 -0.0759479 0.1440631 -0.53 0.598
covtJl5_2 0.1857377 0.1909685 0.97 0.331
covt_ tl 1 _3 0.1277234 0.0886999 1.44 0.150
COVtX -0.0108403 0.0131924 -0.82 0.411
covtJsps 7 0.3979992 0.1461356 2.72 0.006
covtJsps 8 0.8737096 0.1949153 4.48 0.000
covtJg 444 0.1153000 0.1241542 0.93 0.353
covtJsps 5 0.5495661 0.1385855 3.97 0.000
covtJage_3 0.0064088 0.1490909 0.04 0.966
covtJmor 8 -0.1758178 0.0865784 -2.03 0.042
covtJt 4_3 0.4840174 0.1707273 2.84 0.005
covtJg 333 0.2781709 0.2463569 1.13 0.259
covtJl1_3 -0.1348555 0.1103917 -1.22 0.222
covtJage_2 0.0482975 0.1392874 0.35 0.729
covtJt 1_2 -0.1470848 0.1218657 -1.21 0.227
covtJsps 6 0.4786609 0.1483113 3.23 0.001
covtJmor 5 0.2647781 0.1269798 2.09 0.037
covtJsps 4 0.3524015 0.1173359 3.00 0.003
covtJloa 4 0.1783364 0.1121783 1.59 0.112
covtJt k_6 0.1852914 0.1186932 1.56 0.119
covtJsoc 4 0.1968687 0.2361874 0.83 0.405
covtJt1_4 -0.4084757 0.1756138 -2.33 0.020
covtJsnb 4 0.0295850 0.1055809 0.28 0.779
covtJl 1_2 -0.1022837 0.1110202 -0.92 0.357
covtJ st_3 -0.4772427 0.3637950 -1.31 0.190
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covtJnet 6 -0.6383882 0.1440872 -4.43 0.000
covtJnet 5 -0.5673734 0.1176981 -4.82 0.000
covtJmor 6 0.2017022 0.1231247 1.64 0.101
covtJno-1 0.0809213 0.1562615 0.52 0.605
covtJnoo 4 -0.0009676 0.0856405 -0.01 0.991
covtJt 3_3 0.0287035 0.1312643 0.22 0.827
covtJbra 2 0.1874752 0.0841314 2.23 0.026
covtJsps 3 0.2191031 0.1123145 1.95 0.051
covtJalc 2 0.6373848 0.2498938 2.55 0.011
covtJinc 5 -0.0174252 0.1099802 -0.16 0.874
covtJt1_5 0.0351622 0.1217490 0.29 0.773
covt_I d 1 _3 0.0102438 0.1250541 0.08 0.935
covtJtim 9 0.0037435 0.1206338 0.03 0.975
covtJccj 3 0.1159192 0.0841685 1.38 0.168
covtJs L3 0.5342964 0.2900761 1.84 0.065
covtJt 5_3 -0.3301246 0.2070366 -1.59 0.111
covtJsnb 7 -0.1432147 0.1813719 -0.79 0.430
covtJno_ 3 -1.4642190 0.7294338 -2.01 0.045
covtJsnb 3 -0.2378516 0.2346706 -1.01 0.311
covtJmor 7 0.3554686 0.2198754 1.62 0.106
covtJnet 7 -1.1486580 0.2370546 -4.85 0.000
covtJnet 4 -0.3220521 0.1164902 -2.76 0.006
Table C.10: Stata FAQ Model
J Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>\z\
rawJoanaprl 0.055683 0.004230 13.16 0.000
Jcpi_2 0.505078 0.027132 18.62 0.000
logLXAPR 0.089326 0.023508 3.80 0.000
Jspl6ml2_4 0.144212 0.044131 3.27 0.001
Jloanbal4_3 0.048746 0.047381 1.03 0.304
JnewbusJ -0.078673 0.088183 -0.89 0.372
Jspvaldel_2 -0.099098 0.069613 -1.42 0.155
Jinc_surp_6 0.137913 0.046416 2.97 0.003
Jspl6m4_3 0.663937 0.240600 2.76 0.006
Jinc_surp_4 0.170344 0.043592 3.91 0.000
Jssrc4to6_5 0.129881 0.119412 1.09 0.277
Jwrst46aL4 0.053697 0.046053 1.17 0.244
rawJerm 0.000645 0.000968 0.67 0.505
Jagc_7 -0.592572 0.081371 7.28 0.000
Jtimebank_4 -0.129845 0.050243 -2.58 0.010
Jtimebank_5 -0.258509 0.081006 -3.19 0.001
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Jgdscde 999 0J64859 0.048864 3.37 0.001
Jsnball6m_8 0.054399 0.041554 1.31 0.190
Jssrc4to6_4 0.289023 0.079518 3.63 0.000
Jsearches,7 -0.019680 0.025580 -0.77 0.442
Jloanbal6_2 0.052374 0.079495 0.66 0.510
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.180802 0.036669 4.93 0.000
Jssrc4to6_3 0.199101 0.049965 3.98 0.000
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.092973 0.040843 -2.28 0.023
Jtimaddl_6 0.195756 0.042638 4.59 0.000
Jtimebank_2 -0.030673 0.045132 -0.68 0.497
Jtimebank_3 -0.161976 0.054421 -2.98 0.003
Jwrstnrev_3 0.133941 0.143957 0.93 0.352
Jinc_surp_2 0.012753 0.039194 0.33 0.745
Jinternet_l -0.143801 0.030911 -4.65 0.000
Jmortbal_3 -0.072925 0.040656 -1.79 0.073
Jtimebank_7 -0.060121 0.047929 -1.25 0.210
Jloanbal 1 _7 -0.045913 0.038839 -1.18 0.237
Jtimaddl_7 0.043833 0.045247 0.97 0.333
Jssrc4to6_2 0.030462 0.032015 0.95 0.341
Jspl6m4_4 -0.178735 0.028433 -6.29 0.000
Jspsetld_9 0.436150 0.041159 10.60 0.000
Jmortbal_2 0.075838 0.040148 1.89 0.059
Jinc_surp_3 -0.211094 0.071219 -2.96 0.003
Jage_6 -0.501902 0.068013 -7.38 0.000
Jsocsett_3 -0.150272 0.043455 -3.46 0.001
Jage_5 -0.465264 0.065312 -7.12 0.000
Jage_4 -0.382663 0.059924 -6.39 0.000
Jloanbal5_2 0.090305 0.083877 1.08 0.282
Jtosettll_3 0.058035 0.032562 1.78 0.075
L -0.024798 0.005679 -4.37 0.000
Jspsetld_7 0.367219 0.052163 7.04 0.000
Jspsetld_8 0.291699 0.057486 5.07 0.000
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.200880 0.050949 3.94 0.000
Jspsetld_5 0.216137 0.045760 4.72 0.000
Jage_3 -0.303268 0.060306 -5.03 0.000
Jmor_ren1_8 -0.053732 0.033540 -1.60 0.109
Jtosettl4_3 0.212166 0.071832 2.95 0.003
Jgdscde 333 0.311906 0.089070 3.50 0.000
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.134120 0.040211 -3.34 0.001
Jage_2 -0.226981 0.059117 -3.84 0.000
Jtimaddl_2 -0.048786 0.046722 -1.04 0.296
Jspsetld-6 0.184888 0.051168 3.61 0.000
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Jmor_rent_5 0.144775 0.039818 3.64 0.000
Jspsetld_4 0.136617 0.042304 3.23 0.001
Jloanbal3_4 0.122958 0.038491 3.19 0.001
Jtimebank_6 0.056446 0.048971 1.15 0.249
Jsocworst_4 0.189112 0.088832 2.13 0.033
Jtimaddl_4 -0.074600 0.073023 -1.02 0.307
JsnbalalL4 0.147958 0.036221 4.08 0.000
Jloanball_2 -0.128585 0.039635 -3.24 0.001
Jsocworst_3 0.383961 0.106376 3.61 0.000
Jnetincm_6 -0.123720 0.051548 -2.40 0.016
Jnetincm_5 -0.074704 0.042307 -1.77 0.077
Jmor_rent_6 0.137815 0.042063 3.28 0.001
Jno_store_l -0.194089 0.059541 -3.26 0.001
Jnoopen6_4 -0.091062 0.031776 -2.87 0.004
Jtosettl3_3 0.141220 0.052126 2.71 0.007
Jbrand_2 0.036917 0.032006 1.15 0.249
Jspsetld_3 0.076397 0.042349 1.80 0.071
_Ialcifdet_2 0.167155 0.115947 1.44 0.149
Jinc_surp_5 0.109138 0.037634 2.90 0.004
Jtimaddl_5 0.194161 0.043143 4.50 0.000
Jtimaddl_3 0.182268 0.044109 4.13 0.000
Jtimaddl_9 0.166857 0.043923 3.80 0.000
Jccjgt500_3 0.065131 0.030326 2.15 0.032
Jsocbal_3 -0.227640 0.082942 -2.74 0.006
Jtosettl5_3 -0.147957 0.091470 -1.62 0.106
Jsnbalall_7 -0.116830 0.079121 -1.48 0.140
Jno_store_3 -0.494758 0.362736 -1.36 0.173
Jsnball6m_3 -0.145395 0.086918 -1.67 0.094
Jmor_rent_7 0.166009 0.079148 2.10 0.036
Jnetincm_7 -0.042096 0.097994 -0.43 0.668
Jnetincm_4 -0.036089 0.039464 -0.91 0.360
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Table D.1: Model 1 acceptance Non-segmentation
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.109821 0.004722 -23.26 0.00 -0.119075 -0.100567
logLXAPR -0.901505 0.026754 -33.70 0.00 -0.953942 -0.849069
_Icpi_2 -1.086233 0.030306 -35.84 0.00 -1.145630 -1.026835
JnewbusJ -0.538680 0.055403 -9.72 0.00 -0.647268 -0.430092
L 0.107568 0.006538 16.45 0.00 0.094754 0.120383
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.316319 0.041300 7.66 0.00 0.235373 0.397266
Jloanbal3_4 -0.213842 0.057720 -3.70 0.00 -0.326970 -0.100714
Jgdscde2_3 -0.308869 0.049835 -6.20 0.00 -0.406544 -0.211194
raw_term 0.010300 0.001195 8.62 0.00 0.007957 0.012642
Jsnball6m_8 0.006934 0.085466 0.08 0.94 -0.160576 0.174444
_Itosettl2_3 0.266951 0.053825 4.96 0.00 0.161456 0.372446
_Ibrand_2 0.208700 0.030334 6.88 0.00 0.149246 0.268153
Jloanbal4_2 0.359453 0.098042 3.67 0.00 0.167295 0.551612
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.208903 0.040323 -5.18 0.00 -0.287934 -0.129872
Jsocsett_2 -0.991852 0.120655 -8.22 0.00 -1.228331 -0.755374
Jspsetld_9 -0.359439 0.043466 -8.27 0.00 -0.444632 -0.274247
Jtimadd 1 _4 0.238913 0.071136 3.36 0.00 0.099489 0.378337
JspvaldeL4 0.213947 0.888467 0.24 0.81 -1.527416 1.955310
Jtosettl4_3 0.013415 0.112321 0.12 0.91 -0.206731 0.233560
Jgdscde 444 0.699600 0.159527 4.39 0.00 0.386934 1.012266
Jloanbal2_2 0.425217 0.083841 5.07 0.00 0.260892 0.589541
_Imortbal_2 -0.227225 0.043435 -5.23 0.00 -0.312356 -0.142093
Jinternet_l -0.158126 0.031639 -5.00 0.00 -0.220138 -0.096115
Jspvaldel_2 -0.384439 0.084311 -4.56 0.00 -0.549687 -0.219192
Jloanbal6_2 -0.328136 0.087967 -3.73 0.00 -0.500548 -0.155724
Jloanbal 1 _8 -0.102668 0.035766 -2.87 0.00 -0.172768 -0.032568
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Jgdscde 200 0.887350 0.216241 4.10 0.00 0.463526 1.311174
Jsnball6m_5 0.012270 0.114352 0.11 0.92 -0.211856 0.236395
Jnoopen6_2 -0.142901 0.047722 -2.99 0.00 -0.236435 -0.049368
Jloanbal3_3 0.357621 0.093247 3.84 0.00 0.174861 0.540382
Jspl6ml2_3 0.589850 0.137728 4.28 0.00 0.319907 0.859792
Jgdscde2_2 0.174039 0.063780 2.73 0.01 0.049033 0.299046
Jno_storeJ 0.224606 0.069598 3.23 0.00 0.088196 0.361016
Jage_9 -0.144874 0.040451 -3.58 0.00 -0.224157 -0.065591
_Itosettl3_2 -0.054681 0.051128 -1.07 0.29 -0.154889 0.045527
Jloanbal2_4 0.165822 0.050754 3.27 0.00 0.066346 0.265298
Jsocworst_2 -0.368389 0.352973 -1.04 0.30 -1.060204 0.323426
Jsnball6m_7 -0.645688 0.119019 -5.43 0.00 -0.878960 -0.412415
Jsnbalall_2 0.233814 0.053345 4.38 0.00 0.129259 0.338369
Jsnbalall_6 0.187906 0.047879 3.92 0.00 0.094066 0.281747
Jspl6ml2_4 0.324437 0.060326 5.38 0.00 0.206201 0.442673
Jsnrecact_2 -3.472373 0.872165 -3.98 0.00 -5.181784 -1.762961
Jspl6mact_4 3.025700 0.876523 3.45 0.00 1.307746 4.743653
Jtimadd 1 _9 -0.184539 0.041895 -4.40 0.00 -0.266652 -0.102427
Jsnwl2tv_2 0.171833 0.063417 2.71 0.01 0.047538 0.296127
Jtimadd 1 _3 -0.161754 0.045558 -3.55 0.00 -0.251045 -0.072462
Jspsetld_8 -0.239048 0.067212 -3.56 0.00 -0.370780 -0.107315
Jgdscde 111 0.438051 0.168992 2.59 0.01 0.106834 0.769269
Jspl6m4_5 -0.083613 0.032643 -2.56 0.01 -0.147591 -0.019635
Jtimadd 1 _6 -0.128004 0.041991 -3.05 0.00 -0.210304 -0.045704
Jtimadd 1_5 -0.107161 0.042895 -2.50 0.01 -0.191235 -0.023088
Jsnball6m_4 -0.505948 0.115709 -4.37 0.00 -0.732733 -0.279163
Jsnball6m_3 -0.641071 0.169271 -3.79 0.00 -0.972835 -0.309307
Jno_deps_4 0.076175 0.030561 2.49 0.01 0.016278 0.136073
Jmor_rent_5 0.129076 0.044054 2.93 0.00 0.042732 0.215420
Jssrc4to6_5 0.323415 0.128197 2.52 0.01 0.072154 0.574676
Jspsetld_7 -0.178632 0.059096 -3.02 0.00 -0.294457 -0.062807
Jspsetld_6 -0.158857 0.052476 -3.03 0.00 -0.261708 -0.056005
Jspsetld_3 -0.123689 0.041576 -2.98 0.00 -0.205176 -0.042203
Jno_otherJ 0.360534 0.160025 2.25 0.02 0.046892 0.674177
Jmor_rent_2 0.087906 0.037534 2.34 0.02 0.014341 0.161471
Jsnbalall_5 0.113028 0.045306 2.49 0.01 0.024230 0.201827
Jsnball6m_6 -0.349162 0.116654 -2.99 0.00 -0.577800 -0.120524
Jccjgt500_6 -0.064776 0.029624 -2.19 0.03 -0.122838 -0.006714
Jnetincm_9 0.082680 0.040325 2.05 0.04 0.003644 0.161716
Jno_amex_l 0.300576 0.144681 2.08 0.04 0.017007 0.584145
Jloanbal 1 _2 0.223906 0.082826 2.70 0.01 0.061571 0.386241
Jloanbal 1 _7 0.137829 0.048719 2.83 0.01 0.042341 0.233317
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Jsocbal_2 0.241939 0.098483 2.46 0.01 0.048916 0.434962
Jtosettl4_2 -0.237381 0.064534 -3.68 0.00 -0.363866 -0.110897
Jloanbal4_3 -0.238809 0.072886 -3.28 0.00 -0.381663 -0.095956
_Itosettl3_3 0.187901 0.087359 2.15 0.03 0.016681 0.359122
Jsnball6m_2 -0.232633 0.113193 -2.06 0.04 -0.454487 -0.010778
_cons 6.419856 0.253751 25.30 0.00 5.922513 6.917200
Table D.2: Model 1 acceptance on Internet segment
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.133445 0.009172 -14.55 0.00 -0.151423 -0.115468
logLXAPR -0.980643 0.046289 -21.19 0.00 -1.071368 -0.889918
L 0.126448 0.010074 12.55 0.00 0.106705 0.146192
_Icpi_2 -0.618278 0.055028 -11.24 0.00 -0.726130 -0.510425
Jgdscde2_3 -0.408150 0.063024 -6.48 0.00 -0.531675 -0.284626
Jloanbal4_3 -0.202304 0.081425 -2.48 0.01 -0.361894 -0.042714
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.246044 0.068622 3.59 0.00 0.111546 0.380541
raw.term 0.009433 0.001877 5.03 0.00 0.005754 0.013112
Jsnball6m_8 0.148997 0.067384 2.21 0.03 0.016928 0.281066
JnewbusJ -0.340683 0.103804 -3.28 0.00 -0.544136 -0.137230
Jloanbal3_3 0.481369 0.137941 3.49 0.00 0.211010 0.751729
Jtimaddl_8 0.208307 0.066722 3.12 0.00 0.077535 0.339079
Jtimebank_4 0.191424 0.074992 2.55 0.01 0.044444 0.338405
Jspsetld-9 -0.218998 0.063103 -3.47 0.00 -0.342678 -0.095318
Jage_4 0.212976 0.063138 3.37 0.00 0.089228 0.336725
Jno_visa_3 0.287657 0.129558 2.22 0.03 0.033728 0.541585
Jgdscde 200 0.868778 0.284551 3.05 0.00 0.311068 1.426489
Jtimebank_7 -0.193754 0.059924 -3.23 0.00 -0.311204 -0.076305
Jtimebank_9 -0.196182 0.066680 -2.94 0.00 -0.326873 -0.065492
Jsnball6m_7 -0.371057 0.124067 -2.99 0.00 -0.614225 -0.127890
Jsnball6m_4 -0.354434 0.131047 -2.70 0.01 -0.611282 -0.097586
Jworstl2_3 -0.348842 0.130584 -2.67 0.01 -0.604781 -0.092902
Jtosettl2_3 0.166396 0.085755 1.94 0.05 -0.001681 0.334473
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.142044 0.060607 -2.34 0.02 -0.260831 -0.023256
Jmor_rent_2 0.150257 0.062403 2.41 0.02 0.027950 0.272564
Jspl6mact_4 -0.459703 0.142294 -3.23 0.00 -0.738595 -0.180812
_Ibrand_2 -0.126908 0.049863 -2.55 0.01 -0.224638 -0.029179
Jno_amex_l 0.628345 0.282256 2.23 0.03 0.075134 1.181555
Jtimaddl_4 0.273923 0.124562 2.20 0.03 0.029785 0.518060
Jage_6 0.163256 0.072163 2.26 0.02 0.021820 0.304691
Jsocsett22 -0.725949 0.255001 -2.85 0.00 -1.225741 -0.226157
Jsocworst_2 -2.222121 0.684282 -3.25 0.00 -3.563290 -0.880952
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_Inoopen6_2 -0.153640 0.073767 -2.08 0.04 -0.298222 -0.009059
Jspl6mact_3 0.432669 0.206197 2.10 0.04 0.028531 0.836807
Jspl6ml2_4 0.223090 0.100295 2.22 0.03 0.026515 0.419665
Jloanbal3_4 -0.144386 0.065598 -2.20 0.03 -0.272956 -0.015816
Jspsetld_8 -0.212566 0.102629 -2.07 0.04 -0.413715 -0.011417
Jspvaldel_2 -0.257955 0.129977 -1.98 0.05 -0.512705 -0.003204
_cons 6.117873 0.346584 17.65 0.00 5.438581 6.797165
Table D.3: Model 1 acceptance on Non-Internet segment
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Jcpi_2 -1.312067 0.036837 -35.62 0.00 -1.384266 -1.239868
rawJoanaprl -0.093883 0.005602 -16.76 0.00 -0.104862 -0.082903
Jnewbus.l -0.480023 0.065438 -7.34 0.00 -0.608280 -0.351767
logLXAPR -0.763473 0.034492 -22.13 0.00 -0.831076 -0.695869
Jtosettl2_3 0.302263 0.069450 4.35 0.00 0.166144 0.438383
Jgdscde2_3 -0.298025 0.062438 -4.77 0.00 -0.420401 -0.175649
Jloanbal3_4 -0.306247 0.086849 -3.53 0.00 -0.476468 -0.136025
_Ibrand_2 0.381302 0.039405 9.68 0.00 0.304070 0.458534
L 0.074213 0.009311 7.97 0.00 0.055964 0.092462
Jtosettll_3 0.357294 0.051957 6.88 0.00 0.255461 0.459128
raw_term 0.010530 0.001565 6.73 0.00 0.007462 0.013598
Jspl6mact_5 -0.081579 0.045686 -1.79 0.07 -0.171123 0.007964
Jsocsett_2 -0.996011 0.133288 -7.47 0.00 -1.257251 -0.734771
Jmortbal_2 -0.204936 0.044154 -4.64 0.00 -0.291476 -0.118395
Jloanbal4_2 0.426054 0.131156 3.25 0.00 0.168992 0.683115
Jspsetld_9 -0.324407 0.055824 -5.81 0.00 -0.433819 -0.214995
Jsnball6m_8 0.294851 0.059973 4.92 0.00 0.177306 0.412396
Jloanbal2_2 0.690494 0.115789 5.96 0.00 0.463551 0.917437
Jspvaldel_4 -2.815235 0.787105 -3.58 0.00 -4.357932 -1.272537
Jtosettl4_3 0.105045 0.140587 0.75 0.46 -0.170501 0.380591
_Iloanbal2_4 0.328215 0.070846 4.63 0.00 0.189360 0.467069
Jgdscde 444 0.824142 0.186634 4.42 0.00 0.458346 1.189937
Jtimadd 1 _4 0.314060 0.085555 3.67 0.00 0.146375 0.481744
Jloanbal 1 _8 -0.126945 0.045853 -2.77 0.01 -0.216816 -0.037074
Jspvaldel_3 0.496752 0.131822 3.77 0.00 0.238386 0.755119
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.229952 0.062574 -3.67 0.00 -0.352596 -0.107309
Jloanbal6_2 -0.429358 0.118047 -3.64 0.00 -0.660726 -0.197990
Jno_deps_4 0.120105 0.039606 3.03 0.00 0.042478 0.197732
Jtosettl3_3 0.250815 0.096383 2.60 0.01 0.061909 0/139722
Jno_store_l 0.252688 0.073291 3.45 0.00 0.109040 0.396336
Jspl6ml2_4 0.400589 0.075642 5.30 0.00 0.252334 0.548845
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Jspl6mact_4 -0.463244 0.106327 -4.36 0.00 -0.671640 -0.254847
Jloanbal2_3 0.160235 0.064855 2.47 0.01 0.033121 0.287348
_Ispsetld_l 0.197055 0.052663 3.74 0.00 0.093837 0.300273
Jsearches_7 -0.091071 0.036218 -2.51 0.01 -0.162058 -0.020084
Jalcifdet_2 0.349434 0.142317 2.46 0.01 0.070499 0.628370
Jgdscde 200 1.006511 0.355948 2.83 0.01 0.308865 1.704157
Jloanbal3_2 -0.133162 0.082787 -1.61 0.11 -0.295421 0.029097
Jspsetld_2 0.160399 0.052598 3.05 0.00 0.057310 0.263489
Jnoopen6_2 -0.170372 0.062789 -2.71 0.01 -0.293436 -0.047308
Jgdscde2_2 0.181057 0.077835 2.33 0.02 0.028503 0.333612
Jspl6ml2_3 0.504421 0.173686 2.90 0.00 0.164004 0.844839
Jsnball6m_5 0.240316 0.111398 2.16 0.03 0.021979 0.458653
Jsocworst_2 -0.909867 0.325712 -2.79 0.01 -1.548250 -0.271484
_Ino_other_l 0.487456 0.196279 2.48 0.01 0.102756 0.872157
Jtimaddl_9 -0.144725 0.052529 -2.76 0.01 -0.247679 -0.041771
Jtimadd 1 _3 -0.146237 0.058476 -2.50 0.01 -0.260847 -0.031626
Jloanball_2 0.374997 0.113202 3.31 0.00 0.153124 0.596869
Jgdscde 111 0.469818 0.220995 2.13 0.03 0.036676 0.902960
Jtosettl4_2 -0.278986 0.081377 -3.43 0.00 -0.438482 -0.119491
Jloanbal4_3 -0.194389 0.097530 -1.99 0.05 -0.385544 -0.003235
Jnetincm_6 -0.150235 0.064226 -2.34 0.02 -0.276116 -0.024354
Jspl6m4_2 0.201220 0.100117 2.01 0.04 0.004993 0.397447
Jssrc4to6_5 0.362567 0.162964 2.22 0.03 0.043164 0.681971
Jsnball6m_3 -0.656838 0.243934 -2.69 0.01 -1.134939 -0.178736
Jsocworst_4 -0.238795 0.132806 -1.80 0.07 -0.499089 0.021499
Jsnball6m_7 -0.372230 0.136276 -2.73 0.01 -0.639327 -0.105134
Jsnbalall_2 0.242895 0.075466 3.22 0.00 0.094984 0.390806
JsnbalalL6 0.184583 0.063112 2.92 0.00 0.060887 0.308280
Jloanbal3_3 0.270665 0.127982 2.11 0.03 0.019824 0.521506
Jloanball_7 0.178155 0.066555 2.68 0.01 0.047709 0.308600
Jsocbal_2 0.249041 0.113525 2.19 0.03 0.026536 0.471546
_cons 5.056947 0.299245 16.90 0.00 4.470438 5.643456
Table D.4: Model 1 default Non-Segmentation
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
L -0.002947 0.013425 -0.22 0.83 -0.029258 0.023365
rawJoanaprl 0.111734 0.007427 15.05 0.00 0.097178 0.126290
Jcpi_2 1.379818 0.076488 18.04 0.00 1.229904 1.529733
logLXAPR 0.205549 0.045748 4.49 0.00 0.115884 0.295214
Jspl6ml2_4 0.714983 0.095007 7.53 0.00 0.528772 0.901194
Jloanbal4_3 -0.526297 0.092395 -5.70 0.00 -0.707387 -0.345207
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Jspvaldel_2 -0.460430 0.136247 -3.38 0.00 -0.727468 -0.193391
Jspl6m4_3 1.561862 0.378576 4.13 0.00 0.819866 2.303858
Jsocworst_3 1.009246 0.282471 3.57 0.00 0.455613 1.562879
Jinc_surp_6 0.246995 0.093423 2.64 0.01 0.063890 0.430100
Jwrst46al_4 0.392416 0.099135 3.96 0.00 0.198116 0.586717
Jtimebank_4 -0.528957 0.113617 -4.66 0.00 -0.751642 -0.306272
Jtimebank_5 -0.955438 0.251306 -3.80 0.00 -1.447988 -0.462887
Jsocbal_3 -0.894538 0.291042 -3.07 0.00 -1.464971 -0.324106
Jgdscde 999 -0.514257 0.157840 -3.26 0.00 -0.823618 -0.204896
raw_term 0.010933 0.003219 3.40 0.00 0.004623 0.017242
Jinc_surp_2 -0.224989 0.098300 -2.29 0.02 -0.417654 -0.032325
Jssrc4to6_4 0.493364 0.162702 3.03 0.00 0.174474 0.812254
Jsnball6m_8 0.280184 0.100503 2.79 0.01 0.083202 0.477166
Jssrc4to6_5 0.571990 0.179724 3.18 0.00 0.219739 0.924242
Jsearches_7 -0.182298 0.071432 -2.55 0.01 -0.322303 -0.042294
Jtimaddl_6 0.201436 0.094994 2.12 0.03 0.015251 0.387621
Jtimebank_2 -0.289882 0.084325 -3.44 0.00 -0.455155 -0.124609
_Itimebank_3 -0.390592 0.122258 -3.19 0.00 -0.630212 -0.150971
Jmor_rent_7 0.427748 0.174159 2.46 0.01 0.086403 0.769093
Jspl6ml2_3 0.443712 0.190808 2.33 0.02 0.069735 0.817688
_Iinternet_l -0.188297 0.078667 -2.39 0.02 -0.342481 -0.034112
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.266788 0.112795 -2.37 0.02 -0.487863 -0.045714
Jspsetld_8 -0.504540 0.212706 -2.37 0.02 -0.921435 -0.087644
Jsnwl2tv_2 -0.355917 0.158162 -2.25 0.02 -0.665910 -0.045925
Jinc_surp_4 0.197508 0.093938 2.10 0.04 0.013393 0.381623
Jloanbal4_2 0.347772 0.146529 2.37 0.02 0.060580 0.634965
Jage_7 -0.392830 0.184179 -2.13 0.03 -0.753814 -0.031847
Jtimaddl_7 -0.250545 0.115221 -2.17 0.03 -0.476375 -0.024715
Jloanbal2_3 0.200047 0.095267 2.10 0.04 0.013328 0.386766
Table D.5: Model 1 default on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
L -0.017683 0.024936 -0.71 0.48 -0.066557 0.031190
rawJoanaprl 0.103387 0.016790 6.16 0.00 0.070480 0.136294
Jcpi_2 1.463070 0.135094 10.83 0.00 1.198292 1.727849
logLXAPR 0.270360 0.096584 2.80 0.01 0.081059 0.459662
Jspl6ml2_4 0.550518 0.197135 2.79 0.01 0.164140 0.936895
_Iloanbal4_3 -0.338257 0.180530 -1.87 0.06 -0.692089 0.015576
Jspvaldel_2 -0.700212 0.248600 -2.82 0.01 -1.187459 -0.212965
Jspl6m4_3 0.141860 1.141846 0.12 0.90 -2.096116 2.379836
Jsocworst_3 0.623484 0.526380 1.18 0.24 -0.408203 1.655170
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Jinc-surp_6 0.397846 0.184960 2.15 0.03 0.035330 0.760361
Jwrst46al_4 0.497919 0.194110 2.57 0.01 0.117471 0.878367
_Itimebank_4 -0.612971 0.217710 -2.82 0.01 -1.039674 -0.186268
Jtimebank_5 -0.849079 0.468607 -1.81 0.07 -1.767531 0.069373
JsocbaL3 -0.686154 0.588508 -1.17 0.24 -1.839609 0.467301
Jgdscde 999 -1.134135 0.463348 -2.45 0.01 -2.042282 -0.225989
raw_term 0.012880 0.006383 2.02 0.04 0.000370 0.025390
_Iinc_surpJ2 -0.372294 0.178941 -2.08 0.04 -0.723012 -0.021575
Jssrc4to6_4 0.835570 0.322602 2.59 0.01 0.203282 1.467858
Jsnball6m_8 0.327405 0.188383 1.74 0.08 -0.041820 0.696629
Jssrc4to6_5 0.627965 0.321488 1.95 0.05 -0.002140 1.258069
Jsearches_7 -0.005990 0.131743 -0.05 0.96 -0.264202 0.252222
Jtimaddl_6 0.369117 0.169671 2.18 0.03 0.036569 0.701665
_Itimebank_2 -0.276456 0.156095 -1.77 0.08 -0.582395 0.029484
Jtimebank_3 -0.434553 0.276785 -1.57 0.12 -0.977041 0.107935
Jmor_rent_7 0.328145 0.276418 1.19 0.24 -0.213624 0.869914
Jspl6ml2_3 0.262085 0.385126 0.68 0.50 -0.492748 1.016917
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.240032 0.237658 -1.01 0.31 -0.705833 0.225769
Jspsetld_8 -0.700896 0.420451 -1.67 0.10 -1.524964 0.123172
Jsnwl2tv_2 -0.549218 0.274623 -2.00 0.05 -1.087470 -0.010967
Jinc_surp_4 -0.154026 0.203021 -0.76 0.45 -0.551940 0.243889
Jloanbal4_2 0.490375 0.277231 1.77 0.08 -0.052987 1.033737
Jage_7 -0.072276 0.352488 -0.21 0.84 -0.763139 0.618588
_Itimaddl_7 -0.149420 0.227560 -0.66 0.51 -0.595430 0.296590
Jloanbal2_3 0.305914 0.173949 1.76 0.08 -0.035020 0.646847
Table D.6: Model 1 default on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
L 0.002549 0.016507 0.15 0.88 -0.029803 0.034901
rawJoanaprl 0.114501 0.008506 13.46 0.00 0.097830 0.131171
Jcpi_2 1.345353 0.093405 14.40 0.00 1.162282 1.528424
logLXAPR 0.185011 0.053818 3.44 0.00 0.079530 0.290493
Jspl6ml2_4 0.786350 0.109424 7.19 0.00 0.571883 1.000816
Jloanbal4_3 -0.613384 0.108442 -5.66 0.00 -0.825927 -0.400841
Jspvaldel_2 -0.343246 0.165265 -2.08 0.04 -0.667158 -0.019333
Jspl6m4_3 1.893873 0.396858 4.77 0.00 1.116046 2.671701
Jsocworst_3 1.221027 0.340138 3.59 0.00 0.554369 1.887686
_Iinc_surp_6 0.227496 0.109085 2.09 0.04 0.013693 0.441300
Jwrst46al_4 0.374790 0.116376 3.22 0.00 0.146697 0.602884
_Itimebank_4 -0.514158 0.133755 -3.84 0.00 -0.776312 -0.252004
_Itimebank_5 -1.005323 0.298981 -3.36 0.00 -1.591315 -0.419330
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JsocbaL3 -1.085209 0.347168 -3.13 0.00 -1.765646 -0.404772
Jgdscde 999 -0.402630 0.172063 -2.34 0.02 -0.739868 -0.065392
rawJerm 0.010143 0.003768 2.69 0.01 0.002758 0.017528
Jinc_surp_2 -0.146555 0.118584 -1.24 0.22 -0.378975 0.085865
Jssrc4to6_4 0.406334 0.190456 2.13 0.03 0.033047 0.779622
Jsnball6m_8 0.313416 0.121229 2.59 0.01 0.075812 0.551021
Jssrc4to6_5 0.587793 0.219503 2.68 0.01 0.157576 1.018010
Jsearches_7 -0.266020 0.086324 -3.08 0.00 -0.435212 -0.096827
Jtimadd 1 _6 0.146279 0.116046 1.26 0.21 -0.081168 0.373725
Jtimebank_2 -0.305476 0.100639 -3.04 0.00 -0.502724 -0.108228
_Itimebank_3 -0.398373 0.136972 -2.91 0.00 -0.666834 -0.129912
Jmor_rent_7 0.520420 0.227093 2.29 0.02 0.075327 0.965513
Jspl6ml2_3 0.493322 0.221029 2.23 0.03 0.060113 0.926531
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.247913 0.129109 -1.92 0.06 -0.500962 0.005136
Jspsetld_8 -0.413158 0.248055 -1.67 0.10 -0.899336 0.073020
Jsnwl2tv_2 -0.282342 0.195769 -1.44 0.15 -0.666043 0.101358
Jinc_surp_4 0.320907 0.107834 2.98 0.00 0.109558 0.532257
Jloanbal4_2 0.247772 0.175740 1.41 0.16 -0.096673 0.592216
Jage_7 -0.502447 0.217669 -2.31 0.02 -0.929070 -0.075823
Jtimadd 1_7 -0.281407 0.134393 -2.09 0.04 -0.544814 -0.018001
Jloanbal2_3 0.164989 0.114829 1.44 0.15 -0.060072 0.390050
Table D.7: Model 1 paying back early Non-Segmentation
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
logLXAPR -0.000024 0.027349 0.00 1.00 -0.053627 0.053578
rawJoanaprl 0.040366 0.004645 8.69 0.00 0.031262 0.049470
Jcpi_2 0.366036 0.032138 11.39 0.00 0.303047 0.429026
Jspsetld_9 0.582632 0.048080 12.12 0.00 0.488397 0.676868
Jspl6m4_4 -0.193319 0.033077 -5.84 0.00 -0.258149 -0.128488
Jtosettl4_2 0.018049 0.062166 0.29 0.77 -0.103795 0.139893
Jinc_surp_3 -0.265471 0.082465 -3.22 0.00 -0.427100 -0.103843
Jage_6 -0.614028 0.075599 -8.12 0.00 -0.762200 -0.465857
Jage_7 -0.697223 0.091989 -7.58 0.00 -0.877519 -0.516928
Jsocsett_3 -0.119095 0.063585 -1.87 0.06 -0.243720 0.005530
Jage_5 -0.527521 0.072971 -7.23 0.00 -0.670542 -0.384500
Jage_4 -0.447398 0.067182 -6.66 0.00 -0.579073 -0.315724
Jmortbal_2 0.121908 0.045837 2.66 0.01 0.032070 0.211746
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.111819 0.038929 2.87 0.00 0.035519 0.188119
Jloanbal5_2 0.261557 0.115284 2.27 0.02 0.035604 0.487510
Jspsetld_7 0.422466 0.061306 6.89 0.00 0.302308 0.542624
Jspsetld_8 0.430874 0.066529 6.48 0.00 0.300479 0.561269
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L -0.017017 0.007308 -2.33 0.02 -0.031341 -0.002694
Jssrc4to6_3 0.177868 0.055021 3.23 0.00 0.070029 0.285708
_Imor_rent_5 0.254899 0.046212 5.52 0.00 0.164325 0.345473
Jgdscde 999 0.309159 0.057878 5.34 0.00 0.195720 0.422599
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.245662 0.043882 5.60 0.00 0.159656 0.331669
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.233134 0.057811 4.03 0.00 0.119826 0.346442
JsnbalalL4 0.145024 0.040462 3.58 0.00 0.065721 0.224328
Jage_3 -0.303641 0.068180 -4.45 0.00 -0.437271 -0.170011
Jnoopen6_4 -0.095923 0.032242 -2.98 0.00 -0.159117 -0.032729
Jmor_rent_6 0.253668 0.049173 5.16 0.00 0.157291 0.350046
_Inetincm_5 -0.209360 0.049091 -4.26 0.00 -0.305577 -0.113143
Jnetincm_6 -0.220895 0.058299 -3.79 0.00 -0.335159 -0.106630
Jgdscde 333 0.352904 0.104600 3.37 0.00 0.147891 0.557917
Jloanball_3 -0.139578 0.045578 -3.06 0.00 -0.228910 -0.050247
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.139254 0.044157 -3.15 0.00 -0.225800 -0.052708
Jspsetld_5 0.254810 0.053780 4.74 0.00 0.149403 0.360217
Jspsetld_6 0.272157 0.058415 4.66 0.00 0.157665 0.386648
Jspsetld_4 0.200906 0.049757 4.04 0.00 0.103385 0.298427
Jtimaddl_4 -0.296150 0.084623 -3.50 0.00 -0.462007 -0.130292
Jtimaddl22 -0.166998 0.050186 -3.33 0.00 -0.265361 -0.068636
Jage_2 -0.200534 0.067267 -2.98 0.00 -0.332374 -0.068694
Jloanbal6_2 0.230300 0.110892 2.08 0.04 0.012956 0.447643
Jtimebank_6 0.138349 0.044199 3.13 0.00 0.051721 0.224977
JinternetJ -0.106486 0.034607 -3.08 0.00 -0.174316 -0.038657
Jtimebank_2 0.084104 0.032901 2.56 0.01 0.019619 0.148588
Jtosettl3_2 -0.090896 0.039121 -2.32 0.02 -0.167572 -0.014220
Jssrc4to6_5 -0.422647 0.170375 -2.48 0.01 -0.756576 -0.088718
Jsocworst_4 0.266780 0.093047 2.87 0.00 0.084411 0.449149
Jsocworst_3 0.307496 0.085530 3.60 0.00 0.139861 0.475131
Jbrand_2 0.095833 0.038458 2.49 0.01 0.020457 0.171209
Jinc_surp-4 0.115157 0.041086 2.80 0.01 0.034630 0.195683
Jinc_surp_5 0.085930 0.033125 2.59 0.01 0.021007 0.150854
Jmor_rent_7 0.325197 0.092857 3.50 0.00 0.143200 0.507194
Jalcifdet_2 0.374900 0.150137 2.50 0.01 0.080637 0.669164
JsocbaL3 -0.234455 0.088774 -2.64 0.01 -0.408448 -0.060461
Jmor_rent_4 0.107339 0.044623 2.41 0.02 0.019879 0.194798
Jnetincm_7 -0.322168 0.122298 -2.63 0.01 -0.561869 -0.082468
Jnetincm_4 -0.107155 0.045540 -2.35 0.02 -0.196412 -0.017897
Jno_store_l -0.167949 0.069014 -2.43 0.02 -0.303213 -0.032685
Jspsetld_3 0.112417 0.049119 2.29 0.02 0.016145 0.208689
Jtosettl4_3 0.422810 0.096828 4.37 0.00 0.233030 0.612590
Jloanbal4_3 0.224973 0.068570 3.28 0.00 0.090579 0.359367
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Jtimaddl_8 -0.097285 0.045660 -2.13 0.03 -0.186776 -0.007793
_Iccjgt500_3 0.075616 0.035110 2.15 0.03 0.006802 0.144430
Jssrc4to6_4 0.205185 0.096120 2.13 0.03 0.016793 0.393577
Jtosettl5_3 -0.275430 0.131459 -2.10 0.04 -0.533085 -0.017775
_Ispl6ml2_5 -0.096507 0.046489 -2.08 0.04 -0.187622 -0.005391
_Isocnoact_2 0.258502 0.119641 2.16 0.03 0.024010 0.492994
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.413088 0.207918 -1.99 0.05 -0.820600 -0.005577
Jspl6ml2_3 -0.313816 0.156468 -2.01 0.05 -0.620487 -0.007145
Jsocsett_2 0.170080 0.086439 1.97 0.05 0.000663 0.339496
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Table D.8: Model 1 paying back early Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
logLXAPR 0.023693 0.047634 0.50 0.62 -0.069667 0.117054
rawJoanaprl 0.054035 0.008816 6.13 0.00 0.036756 0.071313
Jcpi_2 0.332499 0.066272 5.02 0.00 0.202608 0.462389
Jspsetld_9 0.617580 0.079404 7.78 0.00 0.461952 0.773208
Jspl6m4_4 -0.286388 0.056862 -5.04 0.00 -0.397835 -0.174941
Jtosettl4_2 0.005251 0.105341 0.05 0.96 -0.201213 0.211716
Jinc_surp_3 -0.257968 0.112914 -2.28 0.02 -0.479276 -0.036660
Jage_6 -0.841356 0.132373 -6.36 0.00 -1.100802 -0.581909
Jage_7 -0.773945 0.165683 -4.67 0.00 -1.098678 -0.449212
Jsocsett_3 -0.276923 0.149297 -1.85 0.06 -0.569539 0.015694
Jage_5 -0.617040 0.120445 -5.12 0.00 -0.853107 -0.380972
_IageA -0.568565 0.106124 -5.36 0.00 -0.776565 -0.360565
Jmortbal_2 0.283546 0.263619 1.08 0.28 -0.233138 0.800230
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.154911 0.069969 2.21 0.03 0.017774 0.292048
Jloanbal5_2 0.509999 0.205572 2.48 0.01 0.107086 0.912913
Jspsetld_7 0.439562 0.101029 4.35 0.00 0.241550 0.637574
Jspsetld_8 0.445578 0.114013 3.91 0.00 0.222116 0.669039
L -0.017997 0.011427 -1.58 0.12 -0.040393 0.004399
Jssrc4to6_3 0.144949 0.094669 1.53 0.13 -0.040600 0.330497
_lmor_rent_5 0.313544 0.072608 4.32 0.00 0.171236 0.455853
Jgdscde 999 0.148624 0.119724 1.24 0.21 -0.086032 0.383279
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.256887 0.081003 3.17 0.00 0.098124 0.415650
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.359118 0.121031 2.97 0.00 0.121902 0.596334
Jsnbalall_4 0.150493 0.067770 2.22 0.03 0.017666 0.283319
Jage_3 -0.464874 0.106652 -4.36 0.00 -0.673907 -0.255841
Jnoopen6_4 -0.118744 0.054657 -2.17 0.03 -0.225870 -0.011618
Jmor_rent_6 0.304849 0.077166 3.95 0.00 0.153607 0.456091
Jnetincm_5 -0.225261 0.077621 -2.90 0.00 -0.377395 -0.073128
_Inetincm_6 -0.150346 0.086082 -1.75 0.08 -0.319064 0.018372
Jgdscde 333 0.271526 0.165990 1.64 0.10 -0.053808 0.596860
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.209886 0.075763 -2.77 0.01 -0.358379 -0.061393
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.171325 0.076166 -2.25 0.02 -0.320607 -0.022043
Jspsetld_5 0.337497 0.091641 3.68 0.00 0.157884 0.517111
Jspsetld_6 0.225623 0.102987 2.19 0.03 0.023772 0.427474
Jspsetld_4 0.135554 0.084688 1.60 0.11 -0.030431 0.301539
Jtimaddl_4 -0.226954 0.166822 -1.36 0.17 -0.553918 0.100010
Jtimadd 1 _2 -0.191470 0.090720 -2.11 0.04 -0.369278 -0.013663
Jage_2 -0.329367 0.104061 -3.17 0.00 -0.533323 -0.125410
Jloanbal6_2 0.163633 0.183741 0.89 0.37 -0.196493 0.523760
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Jtimebank_6 0.028617 0.072765 0.39 0.69 -0.114000 0.171235
Jtimebank_2 0.088835 0.054840 1.62 0.11 -0.018649 0.196320
_Itosettl322 -0.024790 0.065053 -0.38 0.70 -0.152292 0.102711
Jssrc4to6_5 -0.506939 0.294751 -1.72 0.09 -1.084641 0.070763
Jsocworst_4 0.039629 0.263158 0.15 0.88 -0.476152 0.555410
Jsocworst_3 0.474396 0.244466 1.94 0.05 -0.004749 0.953541
Jbrand_2 0.119087 0.064939 1.83 0.07 -0.008191 0.246364
Jinc_surp_4 0.173210 0.074252 2.33 0.02 0.027679 0.318740
_Iinc_surp_5 0.120514 0.058102 2.07 0.04 0.006635 0.234392
_Imor_rent_7 0.315154 0.132749 2.37 0.02 0.054972 0.575336
Jalcifdet_2 0.302875 0.238555 1.27 0.20 -0.164685 0.770434
Jsocbal_3 -0.500347 0.264208 -1.89 0.06 -1.018184 0.017491
Jmor_rent_4 0.068922 0.076446 0.90 0.37 -0.080909 0.218754
Jnetincm_7 -0.330149 0.172484 -1.91 0.06 -0.668211 0.007913
Jnetincm_4 -0.040886 0.073860 -0.55 0.58 -0.185648 0.103876
_Ino_store_l -0.109241 0.227030 -0.48 0.63 -0.554212 0.335730
Jspsetld_3 0.086128 0.083837 1.03 0.30 -0.078189 0.250445
Jtosettl4_3 0.639678 0.182985 3.50 0.00 0.281035 0.998321
_Iloanbal4_3 0.247648 0.117180 2.11 0.04 0.017979 0.477317
Jtimaddl_8 -0.140317 0.082266 -1.71 0.09 -0.301556 0.020922
Jccjgt500_3 0.081505 0.061901 1.32 0.19 -0.039818 0.202828
Jssrc4to6_4 0.160136 0.172282 0.93 0.35 -0.177531 0.497803
_Itosettl5_3 -0.549697 0.306408 -1.79 0.07 -1.150245 0.050852
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.106917 0.072305 -1.48 0.14 -0.248631 0.034798
JsocnoactJ2 0.574077 0.428333 1.34 0.18 -0.265440 1.413594
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.600977 0.385613 -1.56 0.12 -1.356763 0.154810
Jspl6ml2_3 -0.347583 0.307906 -1.13 0.26 -0.951068 0.255902
Jsocsett_2 0.221144 0.224640 0.98 0.33 -0.219142 0.661430
Table D.9: Model 1 paying back early Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
logLXAPR -0.013317 0.035131 -0.38 0.71 -0.082173 0.055540
rawJoanaprl 0.032299 0.005625 5.74 0.00 0.021274 0.043324
_Icpi_2 0.376484 0.037072 10.16 0.00 0.303824 0.449145
Jspsetld_9 0.556231 0.060624 9.18 0.00 0.437411 0.675051
Jspl6m4_4 -0.150434 0.040840 -3.68 0.00 -0.230480 -0.070389
Jtosettl4_2 0.017340 0.077662 0.22 0.82 -0.134874 0.169554
Jinc_surp_3 -0.266633 0.122080 -2.18 0.03 -0.505906 -0.027360
Jage_6 -0.495145 0.095292 -5.20 0.00 -0.681914 -0.308376
Jage_7 -0.624804 0.113514 -5.50 0.00 -0.847288 -0.402320
Jsocsett_3 -0.084992 0.070776 -1.20 0.23 -0.223710 0.053727
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Jage_5 -0.456859 0.093490 -4.89 0.00 -0.640097 -0.273622
Jage_4 -0.365401 0.087828 -4.16 0.00 -0.537541 -0.193262
Jmortbal_2 0.127119 0.048433 2.62 0.01 0.032192 0.222046
Jtosettll_3 0.084515 0.047207 1.79 0.07 -0.008009 0.177039
Jloanbal522 0.128378 0.140808 0.91 0.36 -0.147601 0.404357
Jspsetld_7 0.416424 0.077443 5.38 0.00 0.264638 0.568210
Jspsetld_8 0.420344 0.082238 5.11 0.00 0.259161 0.581526
L -0.017575 0.009977 -1.76 0.08 -0.037129 0.001979
Jssrc4to6_3 0.202225 0.067979 2.97 0.00 0.068989 0.335461
Jmor_rent_5 0.213661 0.060531 3.53 0.00 0.095023 0.332300
Jgdscde 999 0.360825 0.068056 5.30 0.00 0.227438 0.494211
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.241490 0.052800 4.57 0.00 0.138003 0.344977
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.210886 0.066221 3.18 0.00 0.081096 0.340677
Jsnbalall_4 0.147556 0.050701 2.91 0.00 0.048185 0.246928
Jage_3 -0.199216 0.089520 -2.23 0.03 -0.374673 -0.023760
Jnoopen6_4 -0.079717 0.040150 -1.99 0.05 -0.158409 -0.001025
Jmor_rent_6 0.218267 0.064481 3.39 0.00 0.091888 0.344647
Jnetincm_5 -0.198993 0.063944 -3.11 0.00 -0.324320 -0.073665
Jnetincm_6 -0.290316 0.081712 -3.55 0.00 -0.450468 -0.130164
Jgdscde 333 0.434455 0.135384 3.21 0.00 0.169108 0.699801
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.097932 0.057349 -1.71 0.09 -0.210335 0.014470
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.131879 0.054437 -2.42 0.02 -0.238575 -0.025184
Jspsetld_5 0.215265 0.066764 3.22 0.00 0.084409 0.346120
Jspsetld_6 0.299342 0.071264 4.20 0.00 0.159668 0.439016
Jspsetld_4 0.240434 0.061726 3.90 0.00 0.119453 0.361415
Jtimaddl_4 -0.322452 0.098646 -3.27 0.00 -0.515795 -0.129109
Jtimaddl_2 -0.157077 0.060504 -2.60 0.01 -0.275663 -0.038491
Jage_2 -0.115869 0.089020 -1.30 0.19 -0.290345 0.058606
Jloanbal6_2 0.279944 0.139792 2.00 0.05 0.005956 0.553932
Jtimebank_6 0.206602 0.056082 3.68 0.00 0.096684 0.316521
Jtimebank_2 0.084814 0.041327 2.05 0.04 0.003815 0.165813
Jtosettl3_2 -0.124774 0.049320 -2.53 0.01 -0.221440 -0.028108
Jssrc4to6_5 -0.379489 0.209718 -1.81 0.07 -0.790529 0.031552
Jsocworst_4 0.322821 0.100728 3.20 0.00 0.125397 0.520244
Jsocworst_3 0.294586 0.093262 3.16 0.00 0.111797 0.477376
Jbrand_2 0.095639 0.048413 1.98 0.05 0.000752 0.190526
Jinc_surp_4 0.086388 0.049543 1.74 0.08 -0.010713 0.183490
Jinc_surp_5 0.068937 0.040514 1.70 0.09 -0.010469 0.148342
Jmor_rent_7 0.335205 0.131765 2.54 0.01 0.076950 0.593459
lalcifdet 2 0.405830 0.193923 2.09 0.04 0.025748 0.785912
JsocbaL3 -0.233263 0.095517 -2.44 0.02 -0.420473 -0.046054
Jmor_rent_4 0.132816 0.055347 2.40 0.02 0.024338 0.241295
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_Inetincm_7 -0.305949 0.175952 -1.74 0.08 -0.650807 0.038910
_Inetincm_4 -0.144659 0.058305 -2.48 0.01 -0.258936 -0.030383
_Ino_store_l -0.163857 0.072828 -2.25 0.02 -0.306598 -0.021117
Jspsetld_3 0.121432 0.060836 2.00 0.05 0.002196 0.240668
Jtosettl4_3 0.328819 0.115510 2.85 0.00 0.102423 0.555214
Jloanbal4_3 0.214643 0.085232 2.52 0.01 0.047591 0.381695
Jtimadd 1 _8 -0.074040 0.055095 -1.34 0.18 -0.182025 0.033945
Jccjgt500_3 0.068557 0.042818 1.60 0.11 -0.015365 0.152479
Jssrc4to6_4 0.230956 0.116585 1.98 0.05 0.002454 0.459458
Jtosettl5_3 -0.185113 0.146685 -1.26 0.21 -0.472610 0.102385
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.086341 0.061080 -1.41 0.16 -0.206056 0.033375
Jsocnoact_2 0.228274 0.125666 1.82 0.07 -0.018027 0.474575
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.353070 0.248203 -1.42 0.16 -0.839540 0.133399
Jspl6ml2_3 -0.309199 0.182254 -1.70 0.09 -0.666411 0.048013
Jsocsett_2 0.189098 0.094391 2.00 0.05 0.004096 0.374100
Table D.10: Model 2 acceptance Non-Segmentation
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.186747 0.004125 -45.27 0.00 -0.194833 -0.178662
Jcpi_2 -1.028874 0.029599 -34.76 0.00 -1.086888 -0.970860
Jnewbus_l -0.465375 0.053941 -8.63 0.00 -0.571097 -0.359652
L -0.082166 0.003141 -26.16 0.00 -0.088322 -0.076011
Jgdscde2_3 -0.257687 0.047973 -5.37 0.00 -0.351712 -0.163661
Jloanbal3_4 -0.174507 0.046875 -3.72 0.00 -0.266382 -0.082633
Jsnball6m_8 0.000685 0.083729 0.01 0.99 -0.163421 0.164791
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.240704 0.039894 6.03 0.00 0.162514 0.318895
Jsocsett_2 -0.993333 0.117533 -8.45 0.00 -1.223693 -0.762972
Jtosettl2_3 0.219455 0.051789 4.24 0.00 0.117951 0.320959
Jloanbal4_2 0.352175 0.092720 3.80 0.00 0.170448 0.533902
Jage_9 -0.136106 0.043770 -3.11 0.00 -0.221893 -0.050318
Jspsetld_9 -0.247431 0.040667 -6.08 0.00 -0.327136 -0.167725
Jnetincm_9 0.165102 0.040752 4.05 0.00 0.085230 0.244974
_Ibrand_2 0.153272 0.029752 5.15 0.00 0.094959 0.211584
JinternetJ -0.202607 0.031190 -6.50 0.00 -0.263739 -0.141476
Jmortbal_2 -0.223320 0.043562 -5.13 0.00 -0.308699 -0.137941
Jloanbal2_2 0.443349 0.080535 5.51 0.00 0.285504 0.601195
Jsnrecact_2 -2.125331 0.510226 -4.17 0.00 -3.125356 -1.125307
Jspl6ml2_4 0.319347 0.059428 5.37 0.00 0.202870 0.435824
Jspl6macl_5 -0.090989 0.035659 -2.55 0.01 -0.160878 -0.021099
Jtimadd 1_9 -0.239596 0.042125 -5.69 0.00 -0.322160 -0.157033
Jspl6mact_4 1.533386 0.517730 2.96 0.00 0.518654 2.548117
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Jsnball6m_5 -0.015443 0.111702 -0.14 0.89 -0.234374 0.203488
Jtimadd 1 _3 -0.216363 0.045605 -4.74 0.00 -0.305747 -0.126979
Jspl6mact-2 -0.344037 0.056091 -6.13 0.00 -0.453973 -0.234100
JspvaldeU -0.359988 0.081412 -4.42 0.00 -0.519552 -0.200423
Jtosettl3_3 0.202780 0.067947 2.98 0.00 0.069607 0.335954
Jtimadd 1_4 0.261120 0.071754 3.64 0.00 0.120486 0.401755
Jloanbal6_2 -0.265935 0.083727 -3.18 0.00 -0.430036 -0.101834
Jgdscde 444 0.570504 0.151782 3.76 0.00 0.273018 0.867990
Jgdscde 200 0.791283 0.206501 3.83 0.00 0.386548 1.196017
Jloanbal 1 _8 -0.097923 0.034725 -2.82 0.01 -0.165982 -0.029865
Jloanbal3_3 0.344621 0.088707 3.88 0.00 0.170759 0.518482
Jnoopen6_2 -0.208043 0.047553 -4.37 0.00 -0.301245 -0.114840
Jno-Store. 1 0.226586 0.068345 3.32 0.00 0.092633 0.360539
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.160724 0.045385 -3.54 0.00 -0.249677 -0.071771
Jnoopen6_3 -0.253670 0.076606 -3.31 0.00 -0.403815 -0.103524
Jgdscde2_2 0.181232 0.061517 2.95 0.00 0.060662 0.301802
Jloanbal 1_2 0.339243 0.080208 4.23 0.00 0.182037 0.496449
Jloanbal2_4 0.153267 0.048929 3.13 0.00 0.057368 0.249166
Jtimadd 1 _5 -0.134123 0.043002 -3.12 0.00 -0.218404 -0.049841
Jtimadd 1 _6 -0.131883 0.042032 -3.14 0.00 -0.214263 -0.049502
Jmor_rent_8 -0.132444 0.034174 -3.88 0.00 -0.199424 -0.065464
Jsnball6m_7 -0.702971 0.115334 -6.10 0.00 -0.929021 -0.476922
Jsnball6m_4 -0.577425 0.110956 -5.20 0.00 -0.794895 -0.359956
Jtosettl4_2 -0.252892 0.051773 -4.88 0.00 -0.354365 -0.151420
Jloanbal4_3 -0.221737 0.061383 -3.61 0.00 -0.342045 -0.101428
Jtimebank_9 -0.155843 0.041775 -3.73 0.00 -0.237720 -0.073966
Jtimebank_7 -0.132608 0.041519 -3.19 0.00 -0.213985 -0.051232
Jsnball6m_3 -0.709800 0.162020 -4.38 0.00 -1.027354 -0.392247
Jgdscde 111 0.428192 0.161639 2.65 0.01 0.111385 0.744999
Jwrst46al_4 0.232124 0.068555 3.39 0.00 0.097758 0.366490
Jsocbal_2 0.312375 0.093994 3.32 0.00 0.128150 0.496600
Jloanbal 1_7 0.131736 0.047146 2.79 0.01 0.039331 0.224141
Jsnbalall_2 0.154777 0.050156 3.09 0.00 0.056473 0.253081
Jsnball6m_6 -0.427998 0.112505 -3.80 0.00 -0.648503 -0.207493
Jsnball6m_2 -0.274680 0.110548 -2.48 0.01 -0.491350 -0.058009
Jinc_surp_7 -0.084863 0.040444 -2.10 0.04 -0.164131 -0.005594
JsnbalalL6 0.105910 0.044817 2.36 0.02 0.018071 0.193749
Jtimebank_8 -0.083388 0.041634 -2.00 0.05 -0.164988 -0.001787
Jsnwl2tv_2 0.152156 0.062146 2.45 0.01 0.030352 0.273961
Jccjgt500_6 -0.068556 0.029032 -2.36 0.02 -0.125458 -0.011654
Jno_amex_l 0.330360 0.139008 2.38 0.02 0.057909 0.602811
Jno_other_l 0.352490 0.156159 2.26 0.02 0.046425 0.658555
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Jssrc4to6_2 -0.072103 0.031691 -2.28 0.02 -0.134217 -0.009989
Jwrst46al_5 0.298393 0.103709 2.88 0.00 0.095127 0.501658
Jspl6m4_3 -0.812068 0.297248 -2.73 0.01 -1.394664 -0.229472
_Imor_rent_4 -0.085613 0.039731 -2.15 0.03 -0.163484 -0.007743
Jno_deps_4 0.072504 0.031247 2.32 0.02 0.011262 0.133747
Jspsetld_8 -0.138877 0.065050 -2.13 0.03 -0.266373 -0.011380
Jage_5 0.151833 0.044982 3.38 0.00 0.063671 0.239996
Jage_4 0.128983 0.041708 3.09 0.00 0.047236 0.210730
Jage_6 0.142541 0.046053 3.10 0.00 0.052278 0.232804
Jinc_surp_9 0.089274 0.042237 2.11 0.04 0.006490 0.172058
Jage_7 0.096151 0.046576 2.06 0.04 0.004864 0.187438
_cons 5.356435 0.235670 22.73 0.00 4.894530 5.818341
Table D.11: Model 2 acceptance on Internet segment
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.252919 0.007259 -34.84 0.00 -0.267145 -0.238692
L -0.061755 0.004303 -14.35 0.00 -0.070190 -0.053321
Jcpi_2 -0.583965 0.054170 -10.78 0.00 -0.690135 -0.477794
Jgdscde2_3 -0.357327 0.060686 -5.89 0.00 -0.476269 -0.238385
Jsnball6m_8 0.318231 0.071952 4.42 0.00 0.177207 0.459255
Jloanbal3_4 -0.191535 0.054500 -3.51 0.00 -0.298353 -0.084717
Jage_9 -0.163269 0.062353 -2.62 0.01 -0.285480 -0.041059
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.207082 0.063611 3.26 0.00 0.082406 0.331757
Jloanbal3_3 0.432219 0.136846 3.16 0.00 0.164006 0.700433
Jtimebank_9 -0.307694 0.065036 -4.73 0.00 -0.435163 -0.180225
Jtimebank_7 -0.238275 0.060206 -3.96 0.00 -0.356276 -0.120274
Jbrand_2 -0.229492 0.048462 -4.74 0.00 -0.324475 -0.134509
Jtimadd 1 _9 -0.153331 0.060824 -2.52 0.01 -0.272544 -0.034118
Jspl6mact_2 -0.459336 0.087444 -5.25 0.00 -0.630723 -0.287950
Jtimadd 1_8 0.240554 0.067437 3.57 0.00 0.108380 0.372727
Jspl6mact_4 -0.674999 0.141005 -4.79 0.00 -0.951363 -0.398635
Jspl6mact_5 -0.158189 0.048082 -3.29 0.00 -0.252427 -0.063951
Jsnball6m_5 0.288931 0.145599 1.98 0.05 0.003563 0.574299
Jtimebank_4 0.167045 0.075494 2.21 0.03 0.019079 0.315011
Jage_4 0.271567 0.064493 4.21 0.00 0.145163 0.397970
Jnetincm_9 0.217295 0.076138 2.85 0.00 0.068067 0.366524
Jgdscde 200 0.828426 0.276131 3.00 0.00 0.287219 1.369633
Jsocsett_2 -0.769603 0.243284 -3.16 0.00 -1.246431 -0.292776
Jspl6m4 3 -1.651193 0.464851 -3.55 0.00 -2.562283 -0.740103
Jspsetld_9 -0.145787 0.061976 -2.35 0.02 -0.267258 -0.024315
Jloanbal4_2 0.333513 0.132538 2.52 0.01 0.073743 0.593283
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Jno_amex_l 0.699701 0.265324 2.64 0.01 0.179675 1.219727
Jsnball6m_7 -0.384338 0.123164 -3.12 0.00 -0.625734 -0.142941
Jsnball6m_4 -0.376168 0.129523 -2.90 0.00 -0.630027 -0.122308
Jnoopen6_2 -0.171729 0.072663 -2.36 0.02 -0.314146 -0.029313
Jspl6ml2_4 0.237750 0.099069 2.40 0.02 0.043578 0.431922
Jsocworst_3 -0.233986 0.099013 -2.36 0.02 -0.428049 -0.039924
Jmor_rent_2 0.162981 0.061934 2.63 0.01 0.041593 0.284369
Jtimadd 1 _2 0.173683 0.071149 2.44 0.02 0.034234 0.313133
Jinc_surp_7 -0.149591 0.065082 -2.30 0.02 -0.277150 -0.022033
Jno_visa_3 0.272387 0.121621 2.24 0.03 0.034014 0.510760
Jspsetld_5 0.167931 0.076328 2.20 0.03 0.018332 0.317531
Jwrst46al_4 0.224770 0.107318 2.09 0.04 0.014430 0.435110
Jtimadd 1 _4 0.288863 0.124708 2.32 0.02 0.044441 0.533286
Jmor_rent_5 0.134038 0.064104 2.09 0.04 0.008396 0.259680
Jage_6 0.179094 0.073652 2.43 0.02 0.034738 0.323450
Jage_5 0.159727 0.070122 2.28 0.02 0.022290 0.297163
_cons 4.600866 0.292018 15.76 0.00 4.028521 5.173211
Table D.12: Model 2 acceptance on Non-Internet segment
paid Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Jcpi_2 -1.296857 0.036304 -35.72 0.00 -1.368012 -1.225702
rawJoanaprl -0.148856 0.004981 -29.89 0.00 -0.158617 -0.139094
JnewbusJ -0.419175 0.060831 -6.89 0.00 -0.538401 -0.299948
L -0.101040 0.004471 -22.60 0.00 -0.109803 -0.092278
Jtosettl2_3 0.284297 0.065974 4.31 0.00 0.154990 0.413604
Jloanbal3_4 -0.416144 0.081290 -5.12 0.00 -0.575469 -0.256819
Jgdscde2_3 -0.275953 0.060799 -4.54 0.00 -0.395117 -0.156788
Jbrand_2 0.329204 0.038931 8.46 0.00 0.252900 0.405508
Jsnball6m_8 0.005983 0.103523 0.06 0.95 -0.196918 0.208883
Jtosettll_3 0.284460 0.050695 5.61 0.00 0.185100 0.383820
Jsocsett_2 -0.999528 0.130091 -7.68 0.00 -1.254502 -0.744553
Jloanbal422 0.401786 0.131427 3.06 0.00 0.144194 0.659378
Jmortbal_2 -0.207635 0.045252 -4.59 0.00 -0.296326 -0.118943
Jspsetld_9 -0.276418 0.055164 -5.01 0.00 -0.384537 -0.168299
Jloanbal2_2 0.730403 0.113760 6.42 0.00 0.507437 0.953369
Jsocworst_2 -1.060231 0.308972 -3.43 0.00 -1.665805 -0.454657
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.254204 0.054245 -4.69 0.00 -0.360522 -0.147887
Jtimadd 1_4 0.326463 0.086703 3.77 0.00 0.156529 0.496397
Jtosettl4_3 0.108212 0.130256 0.83 0.41 -0.147085 0.363509
Jloanbal2_4 0.328251 0.069291 4.74 0.00 0.192443 0.464060
Jgdscde 444 0.747054 0.181041 4.13 0.00 0.392219 1.101888
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Jsncais3m_3 -0.334102 0.105146 -3.18 0.00 -0.540184 -0.128020
_Iloanball_8 -0.168157 0.045586 -3.69 0.00 -0.257504 -0.078810
_IspvaldeL3 0.488763 0.128436 3.81 0.00 0.237034 0.740492
_Iloanbal6_2 -0.463886 0.138156 -3.36 0.00 -0.734668 -0.193105
Jnetincm_9 0.160887 0.047361 3.40 0.00 0.068062 0.253713
JloanballJ2 0.426398 0.105931 4.03 0.00 0.218777 0.634019
Jspl6m4_5 -0.106425 0.042884 -2.48 0.01 -0.190476 -0.022375
Jsearches_7 -0.105385 0.035807 -2.94 0.00 -0.175565 -0.035205
_Iloanbal3_2 -0.141454 0.080578 -1.76 0.08 -0.299384 0.016476
Jgdscde 200 0.963059 0.341995 2.82 0.01 0.292762 1.633356
Jalcifdet_2 0.300993 0.140151 2.15 0.03 0.026302 0.575684
Jno_deps_4 0.136974 0.039829 3.44 0.00 0.058910 0.215038
Jage_9 -0.158092 0.054300 -2.91 0.00 -0.264518 -0.051666
Jno_store_l 0.232273 0.072796 3.19 0.00 0.089597 0.374950
Jtosettl3_2 -0.122339 0.056910 -2.15 0.03 -0.233880 -0.010798
Jloanbal2_3 0.171810 0.064044 2.68 0.01 0.046286 0.297333
Jsnball6m_5 -0.075644 0.138492 -0.55 0.59 -0.347083 0.195795
Jgdscde 111 0.523840 0.214349 2.44 0.02 0.103725 0.943956
Jtimaddl_3 -0.214798 0.058782 -3.65 0.00 -0.330009 -0.099588
Jtimaddl_9 -0.212015 0.053243 -3.98 0.00 -0.316370 -0.107661
Jspl6mact_4 -0.522538 0.104464 -5.00 0.00 -0.727283 -0.317792
Jspl6ml2_4 0.385739 0.074645 5.17 0.00 0.239437 0.532041
Jsocworst_4 -0.354192 0.127356 -2.78 0.01 -0.603805 -0.104579
Jspsetld_l 0.171913 0.052111 3.30 0.00 0.069777 0.274049
Jspsetld_2 0.161104 0.051946 3.10 0.00 0.059292 0.262916
Jspvaldel_4 -2.098463 0.765812 -2.74 0.01 -3.599427 -0.597499
Jno_other_l 0.469742 0.193015 2.43 0.02 0.091440 0.848044
Jgdscde2_2 0.172161 0.075629 2.28 0.02 0.023932 0.320391
Jspl6ml2_3 0.367650 0.168334 2.18 0.03 0.037721 0.697579
Jmor_rent_8 -0.113617 0.043297 -2.62 0.01 -0.198479 -0.028756
Jnetincm_6 -0.149335 0.063590 -2.35 0.02 -0.273969 -0.024701
Jtosettl6_2 -0.272999 0.111713 -2.44 0.02 -0.491951 -0.054046
Jsnball6m_3 -0.956257 0.250601 -3.82 0.00 -1.447426 -0.465087
Jsnball6m_7 -0.700510 0.159388 -4.39 0.00 -1.012905 -0.388115
Jsnball6m_4 -0.524130 0.144576 -3.63 0.00 -0.807494 -0.240766
Jnoopen6_2 -0.127085 0.063155 -2.01 0.04 -0.250867 -0.003303
Jtimaddl_5 -0.116877 0.056797 -2.06 0.04 -0.228198 -0.005556
Jloanbal3_3 0.258979 0.124216 2.08 0.04 0.015521 0.502438
Jsnbalall_2 0.199339 0.073677 2.71 0.01 0.054934 0.343744
JsnbalalL6 0.171298 0.062652 2.73 0.01 0.048503 0.294093
Jsnball6m_6 -0.499885 0.150542 -3.32 0.00 -0.794942 -0.204827
Jsnball6m_2 -0.327515 0.141546 -2.31 0.02 -0.604940 -0.050091
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_Itosettl4_2 -0.256427 0.084455 -3.04 0.00 -0.421956 -0.090897
_Iloanbal4_3 -0.222456 0.096919 -2.30 0.02 -0.412413 -0.032499
_Iloanbal5_2 -0.298005 0.135494 -2.20 0.03 -0.563569 -0.032442
_cons 5.537923 0.314941 17.58 0.00 4.920650 6.155196
Table D.13: Model 2 default Non-Segmentation
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P > \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.123655 0.006579 18.80 0.00 0.110761 0.136548
_Icpi_2 1.372879 0.077416 17.73 0.00 1.221147 1.524610
L 0.039693 0.007385 5.37 0.00 0.025219 0.054168
Jspl6ml2_4 0.715035 0.095187 7.51 0.00 0.528472 0.901599
Jloanbal4_3 -0.536693 0.092167 -5.82 0.00 -0.717336 -0.356049
raw_term 0.016223 0.003020 5.37 0.00 0.010305 0.022142
Jspvaldel_2 -0.495112 0.135739 -3.65 0.00 -0.761155 -0.229069
Jspl6m4_3 1.658914 0.380107 4.36 0.00 0.913919 2.403909
Jsocworst_3 1.050004 0.282522 3.72 0.00 0.496271 1.603737
Jtimebank_4 -0.571067 0.113130 -5.05 0.00 -0.792797 -0.349336
Jwrst46al_4 0.394551 0.099653 3.96 0.00 0.199234 0.589868
Jtimebank_5 -1.015976 0.251137 -4.05 0.00 -1.508195 -0.523757
JsocbaL3 -0.926586 0.290915 -3.19 0.00 -1.496768 -0.356404
Jinc_surp_2 -0.285370 0.093495 -3.05 0.00 -0.468617 -0.102124
Jgdscde 999 -0.520624 0.161119 -3.23 0.00 -0.836412 -0.204837
_Issrc4to6_4 0.465124 0.164418 2.83 0.01 0.142871 0.787378
_Itimebank_2 -0.310455 0.084056 -3.69 0.00 -0.475201 -0.145708
Jtimebank_3 -0.433393 0.121776 -3.56 0.00 -0.672069 -0.194718
Jspl6ml2_3 0.531265 0.190994 2.78 0.01 0.156925 0.905606
Jsearches_7 -0.187989 0.071392 -2.63 0.01 -0.327915 -0.048063
Jtimaddl_6 0.223362 0.095004 2.35 0.02 0.037158 0.409565
Jssrc4to6_5 0.601267 0.181064 3.32 0.00 0.246388 0.956147
Jsnball6m_8 0.348931 0.108924 3.20 0.00 0.135443 0.562418
Jloanbal5_2 -0.348930 0.141964 -2.46 0.01 -0.627174 -0.070686
Jspsetld_8 -0.512172 0.213014 -2.40 0.02 -0.929671 -0.094673
_Itimaddl_7 -0.269574 0.115593 -2.33 0.02 -0.496132 -0.043015
Jage_7 -0.397718 0.183814 -2.16 0.03 -0.757987 -0.037448
_Iinternet_l -0.250119 0.084364 -2.96 0.00 -0.415469 -0.084769
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.270488 0.113525 -2.38 0.02 -0.492993 -0.047982
Jloanbal2_3 0.213506 0.095165 2.24 0.03 0.026986 0.400027
Jspsetld_l 0.207529 0.091410 2.27 0.02 0.028368 0.386689
Jsnwl2tvJZ -0.341937 0.158222 -2.16 0.03 -0.652046 -0.031827
Jnoopen6_4 -0.160652 0.076655 -2.10 0.04 -0.310894 -0.010410
JmortbaL4 0.189382 0.083779 2.26 0.02 0.025178 0.353587
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_Imor_rent_7 0.349061 0.174336 2.00 0.05 0.007368 0.690754
Jgdscde3_ 4 0.482910 0.243127 1.99 0.05 0.006391 0.959429
Table D.14 Model 2 default on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P > \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.139803 0.012730 10.98 0.00 0.114853 0.164754
Jcpi_2 1.489309 0.135541 10.99 0.00 1.223655 1.754963
raw_term 0.016919 0.006021 2.81 0.01 0.005117 0.028720
JsnbalalL7 0.436572 0.228427 1.91 0.06 -0.011137 0.884281
Jspvaldel_2 -0.873972 0.234021 -3.73 0.00 -1.332645 -0.415298
_Ibrand_2 -0.449351 0.140855 -3.19 0.00 -0.725423 -0.173280
_Isncais3m_3 0.622983 0.258648 2.41 0.02 0.116042 1.129924
Jtimebank_4 -0.495144 0.204565 -2.42 0.02 -0.896084 -0.094204
Jwrst46al_4 0.444881 0.191883 2.32 0.02 0.068796 0.820965
L 0.040553 0.013223 3.07 0.00 0.014637 0.066469
Jinc_surp_6 0.375270 0.174395 2.15 0.03 0.033462 0.717079
Jssrc4to6_4 0.649260 0.315400 2.06 0.04 0.031087 1.267433
Jspl6ml2_4 0.610427 0.210700 2.90 0.00 0.197462 1.023392
Jtimaddl_6 0.410436 0.166195 2.47 0.01 0.084700 0.736172
Jwrstnrev_2 0.375824 0.192607 1.95 0.05 -0.001678 0.753327
Jgdscde3_ 4 1.455844 0.527746 2.76 0.01 0.421481 2.490207
Jno_visa_3 -1.412567 0.483670 -2.92 0.00 -2.360543 -0.464591
Jloanbal3_4 -0.594260 0.201468 -2.95 0.00 -0.989129 -0.199390
-Igdscde 999 -0.947874 0.453800 -2.09 0.04 -1.837304 -0.058443
Jtosettl3_2 -0.389409 0.192987 -2.02 0.04 -0.767655 -0.011162
Jinc_surp_2 -0.353737 0.173586 -2.04 0.04 -0.693959 -0.013515
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.522644 0.263391 -1.98 0.05 -1.038880 -0.006408
Table D.15: Model 2 default on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P > \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
raw_loanaprl 0.124267 0.007729 16.08 0.00 0.109120 0.139415
Jcpi_2 1.332967 0.093873 14.20 0.00 1.148981 1.516954
L 0.042188 0.009095 4.64 0.00 0.024362 0.060015
Jspl6ml2_4 0.775229 0.110522 7.01 0.00 0.558610 0.991849
Jloanbal4_3 -0.606028 0.109081 -5.56 0.00 -0.819823 -0.392233
Jspl6m4_3 2.034859 0.395641 5.14 0.00 1.259417 2.810300
Jsocworst_3 1.264048 0.338940 3.73 0.00 0.599737 1.928359
raw_term 0.013788 0.003525 3.91 0.00 0.006880 0.020696
Jage_7 -0.664115 0.219215 -3.03 0.00 -1.093768 -0.234462
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Jspvaldel_2 -0.373276 0.164735 -2.27 0.02 -0.696150 -0.050401
Jsocbal_3 -1.063016 0.346464 -3.07 0.00 -1.742074 -0.383959
Jsearches_7 -0.266996 0.086105 -3.10 0.00 -0.435758 -0.098234
Jage_6 -0.368638 0.134010 -2.75 0.01 -0.631294 -0.105983
Jspl6ml2_2 0.333582 0.106074 3.14 0.00 0.125682 0.541483
Jtimebank_6 0.270381 0.106079 2.55 0.01 0.062470 0.478292
JspsetldJj -0.462065 0.178273 -2.59 0.01 -0.811474 -0.112656
Jspl6m4_2 0.360381 0.155725 2.31 0.02 0.055166 0.665596
Jssrc4to6_5 0.621142 0.220375 2.82 0.01 0.189216 1.053069
Jssrc4to6_4 0.470180 0.191656 2.45 0.01 0.094542 0.845818
Jsnball6m_8 0.284289 0.119964 2.37 0.02 0.049164 0.519414
Jinc_surp_4 0.235631 0.098352 2.40 0.02 0.042866 0.428397
Jmor_rent_7 0.515629 0.228994 2.25 0.02 0.066809 0.964450
Jage_5 -0.193118 0.117064 -1.65 0.10 -0.422559 0.036323
Jspsetld_2 -0.301928 0.125942 -2.40 0.02 -0.548769 -0.055087
Jmortbal_4 0.198182 0.085844 2.31 0.02 0.029931 0.366433
Jwrst46aL3 -0.568206 0.263792 -2.15 0.03 -1.085228 -0.051184
Jgdscde 888 1.093775 0.505921 2.16 0.03 0.102188 2.085361
_Itimebank_5 -0.736537 0.300775 -2.45 0.01 -1.326045 -0.147029
Jtimebank_4 -0.299999 0.129528 -2.32 0.02 -0.553870 -0.046128
Jgdscde 999 -0.376723 0.169581 -2.22 0.03 -0.709095 -0.044351
Jspl6ml2_3 0.452383 0.225101 2.01 0.04 0.011193 0.893572
Jtimaddl_7 -0.271861 0.133302 -2.04 0.04 -0.533128 -0.010594
Jloanbal5_2 -0.332372 0.168280 -1.98 0.05 -0.662194 -0.002549
Table D.16: Model 2 paying back early Non-Segmentation
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.040364 0.004504 8.96 0.00 0.031537 0.049192
Jcpi_2 0.366037 0.032130 11.39 0.00 0.303063 0.429011
Jspsetld_9 0.582635 0.047979 12.14 0.00 0.488598 0.676672
Jspl6m4_4 -0.193319 0.033077 -5.84 0.00 -0.258149 -0.128488
Jtosettl4_2 0.018048 0.062141 0.29 0.77 -0.103747 0.139842
Jinc_surp_3 -0.265470 0.082459 -3.22 0.00 -0.427086 -0.103854
Jage_6 -0.614025 0.075495 -8.13 0.00 -0.761991 -0.466058
Jage_7 -0.697220 0.091905 -7.59 0.00 -0.877350 -0.517090
Jsocsett_3 -0.119095 0.063583 -1.87 0.06 -0.243715 0.005525
Jage_5 -0.527518 0.072900 -7.24 0.00 -0.670400 -0.384636
Jage_4 -0.447396 0.067143 -6.66 0.00 -0.578993 -0.315799
[morthal 2 0.121907 0.045832 2.66 0.01 0.032079 0.211736
Jtosettll_3 0.111816 0.038787 2.88 0.00 0.035794 0.187837
Jloanbal5_2 0.261558 0.115282 2.27 0.02 0.035608 0.487507
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Jtosettl4_3 0.422811 0.096824 4.37 0.00 0.233040 0.612582
Jloanbal4_3 0.224974 0.068563 3.28 0.00 0.090592 0.359355
Jtimaddl_8 -0.097284 0.045640 -2.13 0.03 -0.186735 -0.007832
Jccjgt500_3 0.075616 0.035108 2.15 0.03 0.006805 0.144426
_Issrc4to6_4 0.205182 0.096074 2.14 0.03 0.016880 0.393485
Jtosettl5_3 -0.275432 0.131437 -2.10 0.04 -0.533044 -0.017819
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.096506 0.046484 -2.08 0.04 -0.187614 -0.005398
Jsocnoact_2 0.258502 0.119640 2.16 0.03 0.024011 0.492992
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.413087 0.207911 -1.99 0.05 -0.820585 -0.005589
_Ispl6ml2_3 -0.313824 0.156231 -2.01 0.05 -0.620031 -0.007616
Jsocsett_2 0.170080 0.086439 1.97 0.05 0.000663 0.339496
Table D.17: Model 2 paying back early on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.050680 0.007842 6.46 0.00 0.035310 0.066050
Jspl6m4_4 -0.306019 0.056283 -5.44 0.00 -0.416332 -0.195706
_Ispsetld_9 0.552519 0.068427 8.07 0.00 0.418405 0.686634
Jinc_surp_3 -0.323689 0.102306 -3.16 0.00 -0.524206 -0.123173
Jloanbal5_2 0.675272 0.188290 3.59 0.00 0.306231 1.044313
Jcpi_2 0.325011 0.065698 4.95 0.00 0.196246 0.453775
Jage_6 -0.754534 0.130744 -5.77 0.00 -1.010789 -0.498280
Jtimaddl_9 0.277242 0.072478 3.83 0.00 0.135187 0.419297
Jtimadd 1 _5 0.313188 0.074870 4.18 0.00 0.166446 0.459930
Jsocsett_3 -0.396365 0.114792 -3.45 0.00 -0.621354 -0.171376
Jspsetld_7 0.374640 0.094385 3.97 0.00 0.189649 0.559630
Jtimadd 1 _3 0.216929 0.076805 2.82 0.01 0.066394 0.367464
Jtimadd 1 _6 0.238031 0.075427 3.16 0.00 0.090196 0.385866
Jtosettll_3 0.160507 0.065183 2.46 0.01 0.032751 0.288264
Jinc_surp_4 0.260030 0.075550 3.44 0.00 0.111956 0.408105
Jgdscde3_ 1 0.652203 0.193959 3.36 0.00 0.272051 1.032355
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.317455 0.119956 2.65 0.01 0.082345 0.552565
Jspsetld_8 0.366509 0.107257 3.42 0.00 0.156290 0.576729
Jloanbal3_4 0.126134 0.071907 1.75 0.08 -0.014802 0.267070
Jtosettl4_3 0.487484 0.151694 3.21 0.00 0.190169 0.784799
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.255295 0.079930 3.19 0.00 0.098635 0.411954
Jspsetld_5 0.266116 0.084429 3.15 0.00 0.100637 0.431594
L -0.012332 0.005648 -2.18 0.03 -0.023402 -0.001262
Jmor_rent_5 0.244225 0.068622 3.56 0.00 0.109729 0.378720
Jsnbalall_4 0.197882 0.067792 2.92 0.00 0.065012 0.330751
Jinc_surp_6 0.196659 0.085282 2.31 0.02 0.029509 0.363808
Jinc_surp_5 0.171190 0.059690 2.87 0.00 0.054199 0.288180
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_Inoopen6_4 -0J57311 0.052964 -2.97 0.00 -0.261119 -0.053504
_Isnball6m_3 -0.376221 0.162825 -2.31 0.02 -0.695352 -0.057090
Jage_7 -0.720826 0.163839 -4.40 0.00 -1.041943 -0.399708
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.204607 0.075258 -2.72 0.01 -0.352109 -0.057104
Jloanball_2 -0.160795 0.076062 -2.11 0.04 -0.309874 -0.011717
Jloanbal4_3 0.176276 0.098146 1.80 0.07 -0.016086 0.368638
Jmor_rent_6 0.189496 0.071170 2.66 0.01 0.050006 0.328986
Jnetincm_5 -0.138751 0.071708 -1.93 0.05 -0.279297 0.001794
Jage_4 -0.493420 0.103218 -4.78 0.00 -0.695723 -0.291117
Jage_5 -0.540051 0.118462 -4.56 0.00 -0.772233 -0.307869
Jage_3 -0.405970 0.104037 -3.90 0.00 -0.609878 -0.202061
JageJ2 -0.303761 0.103262 -2.94 0.00 -0.506151 -0.101371
Jgdscde2_ 0 -0.727619 0.355528 -2.05 0.04 -1.424442 -0.030797
Jsearches_3 -0.151376 0.075608 -2.00 0.05 -0.299565 -0.003186
Table D.18: Model 2 paying back early on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
_Icpi_2 0.382095 0.036945 10.34 0.00 0.309685 0.454505
raw_loanaprl 0.026656 0.005424 4.91 0.00 0.016025 0.037287
Jspsetld_9 0.565946 0.059444 9.52 0.00 0.449437 0.682455
Jspl6m4_4 -0.159976 0.041370 -3.87 0.00 -0.241059 -0.078892
Jtosettl4_2 -0.138628 0.059942 -2.31 0.02 -0.256113 -0.021143
Jage_2 -0.120700 0.088718 -1.36 0.17 -0.294585 0.053185
Jage_3 -0.210818 0.089318 -2.36 0.02 -0.385879 -0.035757
Jsocsett_2 0.274819 0.074237 3.70 0.00 0.129318 0.420320
_Imortbal_2 0.124466 0.048430 2.57 0.01 0.029546 0.219387
Jinc_surp_3 -0.402240 0.111049 -3.62 0.00 -0.619892 -0.184588
Jloanbal6_2 0.424850 0.119903 3.54 0.00 0.189846 0.659855
Jgdscde 999 0.298989 0.062927 4.75 0.00 0.175656 0.422323
Jtimebank_6 0.212495 0.055938 3.80 0.00 0.102858 0.322132
Jtimaddl_4 -0.307114 0.098253 -3.13 0.00 -0.499687 -0.114540
Jsocworst_4 0.333176 0.096801 3.44 0.00 0.143449 0.522902
Jtimaddl_2 -0.146388 0.060099 -2.44 0.02 -0.264180 -0.028596
L -0.020839 0.004952 -4.21 0.00 -0.030546 -0.011133
_Itosettl2_3 0.155605 0.052357 2.97 0.00 0.052986 0.258223
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.228163 0.050581 4.51 0.00 0.129026 0.327299
Jspsetld_7 0.422333 0.076852 5.50 0.00 0.271706 0.572960
Jspsetld_8 0.418580 0.081737 5.12 0.00 0.258379 0.578781
_Igdscde2_ 4 0.214787 0.065202 3.29 0.00 0.086994 0.342580
Jssrc4to6_3 0.203021 0.067625 3.00 0.00 0.070479 0.335564
Jgdscde 333 0.427274 0.135151 3.16 0.00 0.162384 0.692165
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Jage_7 -0.642436 0.113175 -5.68 0.00 -0.864254 -0.420618
Jage_6 -0.515010 0.094825 -5.43 0.00 -0.700864 -0.329157
Jspsetld_6 0.305977 0.070670 4.33 0.00 0.167466 0.444489
Jnetincm_6 -0.290031 0.078289 -3.70 0.00 -0.443475 -0.136588
Jspsetld_4 0.237757 0.061715 3.85 0.00 0.116797 0.358716
Jage_5 -0.469589 0.093130 -5.04 0.00 -0.652120 -0.287057
Jage_4 -0.377751 0.087484 -4.32 0.00 -0.549216 -0.206285
Jspsetld_5 0.218588 0.066689 3.28 0.00 0.087880 0.349295
Jtosettl3_2 -0.133351 0.048649 -2.74 0.01 -0.228700 -0.038001
Jsnbalall_4 0.133125 0.050073 2.66 0.01 0.034985 0.231266
_Iloanball_5 0.147953 0.053223 2.78 0.01 0.043637 0.252269
Jssrc4to6_4 0.260601 0.116231 2.24 0.03 0.032793 0.488409
_Itimebank_2 0.093708 0.041231 2.27 0.02 0.012897 0.174520
_Itimaddl_3 0.120416 0.054665 2.20 0.03 0.013275 0.227557
Jnetincm_5 -0.206017 0.062879 -3.28 0.00 -0.329257 -0.082777
Jmor_rent_5 0.207245 0.060226 3.44 0.00 0.089205 0.325285
Jsocnoact_2 0.299761 0.124990 2.40 0.02 0.054786 0.544736
Jwrstnrev_2 -0.152886 0.056140 -2.72 0.01 -0.262917 -0.042855
Jspsetld_3 0.123062 0.060740 2.03 0.04 0.004014 0.242109
Jno_store_l -0.162763 0.072470 -2.25 0.03 -0.304803 -0.020724
Jmor_rent_6 0.193629 0.063595 3.04 0.00 0.068985 0.318274
Jnetincm_4 -0.136085 0.057742 -2.36 0.02 -0.249258 -0.022912
Jmor_rent_4 0.135223 0.055100 2.45 0.01 0.027228 0.243217
Jloanbal 1 _4 0.112162 0.051015 2.20 0.03 0.012175 0.212149
Jnoopen6_4 -0.090290 0.040111 -2.25 0.02 -0.168907 -0.011674
Jsnball6m_2 -0.668508 0.319297 -2.09 0.04 -1.294319 -0.042697
Jmor_rent_7 0.264458 0.125344 2.11 0.04 0.018788 0.510129
Jbrand_2 0.094824 0.046555 2.04 0.04 0.003578 0.186071
Jalcifdet_2 0.391284 0.193796 2.02 0.04 0.011451 0.771118
Table D.19: Model 3 Acceptance on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.133517 0.009173 -14.56 0.00 -0.151496 -0.115538
logLXAPR -0.981518 0.046292 -21.20 0.00 -1.072249 -0.890787
L 0.126633 0.010074 12.57 0.00 0.106889 0.146377
_Icpi_2 -0.617480 0.055009 -11.23 0.00 -0.725296 -0.509664
Jgdscde2_3 -0.408587 0.063017 -6.48 0.00 -0.532097 -0.285076
Jloanbal4_3 -0.205962 0.081389 -2.53 0.01 -0.365482 .0.046443
Jtosettll_3 0.245406 0.068616 3.58 0.00 0.110920 0.379892
raw_term 0.009455 0.001877 5.04 0.00 0.005777 0.013134
Jsnball6m_8 0.148790 0.067382 2.21 0.03 0.016724 0.280856
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JnewbusJ -0.340044 0.103813 -3.28 0.00 -0.543513 -0.136575
_Iloanbal3_3 0.478583 0.137937 3.47 0.00 0.208232 0.748934
Jtimadd 1 _8 0.207503 0.066722 3.11 0.00 0.076730 0.338277
Jtimebank_4 0.191083 0.074994 2.55 0.01 0.044098 0.338069
Jspsetld_9 -0.220432 0.063097 -3.49 0.00 -0.344099 -0.096764
Jage_4 0.214345 0.063122 3.40 0.00 0.090629 0.338061
Jno_visa_3 0.285653 0.129553 2.20 0.03 0.031734 0.539573
Jgdscde 200 0.868026 0.284561 3.05 0.00 0.310297 1.425756
Jtimebank_7 -0.193162 0.059919 -3.22 0.00 -0.310601 -0.075724
Jtimebank_9 -0.195015 0.066662 -2.93 0.00 -0.325670 -0.064360
Jsnball6m_7 -0.372247 0.124069 -3.00 0.00 -0.615418 -0.129076
Jsnball6m_4 -0.355494 0.131052 -2.71 0.01 -0.612351 -0.098636
Jworstl2_3 -0.349450 0.130593 -2.68 0.01 -0.605408 -0.093492
Jtosettl2_3 0.168083 0.085714 1.96 0.05 0.000086 0.336080
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.141325 0.060593 -2.33 0.02 -0.260085 -0.022565
_Imor_rent_2 0.149741 0.062406 2.40 0.02 0.027429 0.272054
Jspl6mact_4 -0.459521 0.142304 -3.23 0.00 -0.738431 -0.180611
Jbrand_2 -0.126119 0.049864 -2.53 0.01 -0.223851 -0.028388
Jno_amex_l 0.626536 0.282282 2.22 0.03 0.073274 1.179797
Jtimadd 1 _4 0.273189 0.124560 2.19 0.03 0.029056 0.517322
Jage_6 0.162680 0.072164 2.25 0.02 0.021242 0.304119
Jsocsett_2 -0.726378 0.255020 -2.85 0.00 -1.226207 -0.226548
Jsocworst_2 -2.225803 0.684320 -3.25 0.00 -3.567045 -0.884561
Jnoopen6_2 -0.152731 0.073755 -2.07 0.04 -0.297288 -0.008174
Jspl6mact_3 0.432539 0.206229 2.10 0.04 0.028337 0.836740
Jspl6ml2_4 0.223060 0.100301 2.22 0.03 0.026474 0.419647
Jloanbal3_4 -0.144898 0.065605 -2.21 0.03 -0.273481 -0.016315
Jspsetld_8 -0.213785 0.102629 -2.08 0.04 -0.414933 -0.012636
Jspvaldel_2 -0.261749 0.129832 -2.02 0.04 -0.516214 -0.007283
_cons 6.126946 0.346538 17.68 0.00 5.447745 6.806147
Table D.20: Model 3 Acceptance on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
Jcpi_2 -1.312067 0.036837 -35.62 0.00 -1.384266 -1.239868
rawJoanaprl -0.093883 0.005602 -16.76 0.00 -0.104862 -0.082903
JnewbusJ -0.480023 0.065438 -7.34 0.00 -0.608280 -0.351767
logLXAPR -0.763473 0.034492 -22.13 0.00 -0.831076 -0.695869
Jtosettl2_3 0.302263 0.069450 4.35 0.00 0.166144 0.438383
Jgdscde2 3 -0.298025 0.062438 -4.77 0.00 -0.420401 -0.175649
Jloanbal3_4 -0.306247 0.086849 -3.53 0.00 -0.476468 -0.136025
Jbrand_2 0.381302 0.039405 9.68 0.00 0.304070 0.458534
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Jloanbal4_3 -0J94389 0.097530 -1.99 0.05 -0.385544 -0.003235
Jnetincm_6 -0J50235 0.064226 -2.34 0.02 -0.276116 -0.024354
Jspl6m4_2 0.201220 0.100117 2.01 0.04 0.004993 0.397447
Jssrc4to6_5 0.362567 0.162964 2.22 0.03 0.043164 0.681971
Jsnball6m_3 -0.656838 0.243934 -2.69 0.01 -1.134939 -0.178736
Jsocworst_4 -0.238795 0.132806 -1.80 0.07 -0.499089 0.021499
Jsnball6m_7 -0.372230 0.136276 -2.73 0.01 -0.639327 -0.105134
Jsnbalall_2 0.242895 0.075466 3.22 0.00 0.094984 0.390806
Jsnbalall_6 0.184583 0.063112 2.92 0.00 0.060887 0.308280
Jloanbal3_3 0.270665 0.127982 2.11 0.03 0.019824 0.521506
Jloanball_7 0.178155 0.066555 2.68 0.01 0.047709 0.308600
Jsocbal_2 0.249041 0.113525 2.19 0.03 0.026536 0.471546
_cons 5.056947 0.299245 16.90 0.00 4.470438 5.643456
Table D.21: Model 3 default on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
L -0.021079 0.024094 -0.87 0.38 -0.068302 0.026144
rawJoanaprl 0.106788 0.016148 6.61 0.00 0.075139 0.138436
_Icpi_2 1.496162 0.134666 11.11 0.00 1.232221 1.760103
logLXAPR 0.361478 0.089314 4.05 0.00 0.186426 0.536530
Jbrand_2 -0.518876 0.141040 -3.68 0.00 -0.795310 -0.242441
Jspvaldel_2 -0.840232 0.236445 -3.55 0.00 -1.303656 -0.376808
_Iinc_surp_6 0.587514 0.169818 3.46 0.00 0.254677 0.920350
Jno_visa_4 0.743148 0.370407 2.01 0.05 0.017163 1.469133
Jwrst46al_4 0.469294 0.189254 2.48 0.01 0.098363 0.840224
Jgdscde3_ 4 1.533292 0.524284 2.92 0.00 0.505715 2.560869
Jtimaddl _6 0.399572 0.165500 2.41 0.02 0.075198 0.723946
Jno_visa_3 -1.263757 0.471880 -2.68 0.01 -2.188624 -0.338890
Jloanbal3_4 -0.430360 0.143537 -3.00 0.00 -0.711686 -0.149033
Jspl6ml2_4 0.591284 0.194393 3.04 0.00 0.210281 0.972286
Jtimebank_4 -0.449019 0.204577 -2.19 0.03 -0.849983 -0.048055
Jgdscde 999 -1.005572 0.453667 -2.22 0.03 -1.894743 -0.116400
_Issrc4to6_4 0.599881 0.315654 1.90 0.06 -0.018790 1.218552
Table D.22: Model 3 default on Non-Internet segment
A Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
L 0.001599 0.016398 0.10 0.92 -0.030541 0.033739
rawJoanaprl 0.120355 0.008324 14.46 0.00 0.104041 0.136670
Jcpi_2 1.354850 0.093655 14.47 0.00 1.171290 1.538410
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logLXAPR 0J79764 0.052347 3.43 0.00 0.077165 0.282363
Jspl6ml2_4 0.688068 0.108847 6.32 0.00 0.474731 0.901404
Jloanbal4_3 -0.691368 0.100326 -6.89 0.00 -0.888003 -0.494733
Jspl6m4_3 1.933147 0.398092 4.86 0.00 1.152902 2.713393
Jsocworst_3 1.261844 0.339156 3.72 0.00 0.597111 1.926577
Jage_7 -0.584655 0.218170 -2.68 0.01 -1.012260 -0.157049
Jspvaldel_2 -0.425868 0.163649 -2.60 0.01 -0.746614 -0.105122
Jsocbal_3 -1.043541 0.346644 -3.01 0.00 -1.722950 -0.364132
Jsearches_7 -0.272728 0.086237 -3.16 0.00 -0.441748 -0.103707
Jwrst46al_4 0.352244 0.116681 3.02 0.00 0.123552 0.580935
Jage_6 -0.295713 0.130775 -2.26 0.02 -0.552028 -0.039398
raw_term 0.010251 0.003680 2.79 0.01 0.003037 0.017464
Jwrstnrev_3 0.587874 0.253431 2.32 0.02 0.091159 1.084588
_Itimebank_6 0.254988 0.106067 2.40 0.02 0.047100 0.462875
_Imor_rent_7 0.579757 0.227447 2.55 0.01 0.133969 1.025546
Jspsetld_5 -0.486962 0.178532 -2.73 0.01 -0.836878 -0.137047
Jinc_surp_2 -0.242150 0.112453 -2.15 0.03 -0.462554 -0.021746
Jtimebank_5 -0.748668 0.299020 -2.50 0.01 -1.334737 -0.162599
_Isnball6m_8 0.288124 0.120229 2.40 0.02 0.052480 0.523769
Jssrc4to6_5 0.540856 0.219979 2.46 0.01 0.109706 0.972006
Jtimebank_4 -0.293287 0.128645 -2.28 0.02 -0.545427 -0.041148
Jgdscde 888 1.130709 0.505529 2.24 0.03 0.139890 2.121528
Jwrst46al_3 -0.557558 0.263418 -2.12 0.03 -1.073848 -0.041269
Jspsetld_2 -0.282796 0.125557 -2.25 0.02 -0.528884 -0.036709
Jgdscde 999 -0.362563 0.169278 -2.14 0.03 -0.694342 -0.030783
Jssrc4to6_4 0.442982 0.190737 2.32 0.02 0.069144 0.816820
Jmor_rent_8 0.175816 0.085080 2.07 0.04 0.009062 0.342570
Jno_mastr_l -0.248112 0.125559 -1.98 0.05 -0.494204 -0.002021
Table D.23: Model 3 paying back early on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> \z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
logLXAPR 0.024548 0.046884 0.52 0.60 -0.067342 0.116438
rawJoanaprl 0.048841 0.008653 5.64 0.00 0.031882 0.065800
Jspl6m4_4 -0.306129 0.056285 -5.44 0.00 -0.416446 -0.195811
Jspsetld_9 0.553844 0.068476 8.09 0.00 0.419633 0.688055
Jinc_surp_3 -0.320325 0.102485 -3.13 0.00 -0.521192 -0.119458
Jloanbal5_2 0.677806 0.188347 3.60 0.00 0.308652 1.046960
Jcpi_2 0.324146 0.065700 4.93 0.00 0.195376 0.452916
Jage_6 -0.752116 0.130774 -5.75 0.00 -1.008429 -0.495803
Jtimadd 1 _9 0.275035 0.072600 3.79 0.00 0.132741 0.417329
Jtimaddl_5 0.312150 0.074888 4.17 0.00 0.165371 0.458928
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Jsocsett_3 -0.400003 0.114977 -3.48 0.00 -0.625354 -0.174652
Jspsetld_7 0.376461 0.094449 3.99 0.00 0.191345 0.561578
_Itimaddl_3 0.215000 0.076889 2.80 0.01 0.064301 0.365699
Jtimaddl_6 0.237168 0.075441 3.14 0.00 0.089306 0.385031
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.158217 0.065316 2.42 0.02 0.030200 0.286234
_Iinc_surp_4 0.259728 0.075547 3.44 0.00 0.111659 0.407797
Jgdscde3_ 1 0.650810 0.193988 3.35 0.00 0.270600 1.031020
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.314638 0.120091 2.62 0.01 0.079265 0.550012
Jspsetld_8 0.368990 0.107346 3.44 0.00 0.158596 0.579384
Jloanbal3_4 0.126488 0.071895 1.76 0.08 -0.014423 0.267399
Jtosettl4_3 0.487501 0.151693 3.21 0.00 0.190188 0.784814
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.254127 0.079958 3.18 0.00 0.097413 0.410841
Jspsetld_5 0.267672 0.084476 3.17 0.00 0.102103 0.433242
L -0.017337 0.011125 -1.56 0.12 -0.039141 0.004468
_Imor_rent_5 0.243877 0.068623 3.55 0.00 0.109378 0.378376
Jsnbalall_4 0.198686 0.067800 2.93 0.00 0.065799 0.331572
Jinc_surp_6 0.199383 0.085397 2.33 0.02 0.032009 0.366758
Jinc_surp_5 0.171051 0.059692 2.87 0.00 0.054057 0.288044
Jnoopen6_4 -0.155911 0.053037 -2.94 0.00 -0.259862 -0.051960
Jsnball6m_3 -0.379491 0.162964 -2.33 0.02 -0.698894 -0.060088
Jage_7 -0.717821 0.163914 -4.38 0.00 -1.039087 -0.396555
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.204037 0.075264 -2.71 0.01 -0.351552 -0.056522
Jloanball_2 -0.161329 0.076064 -2.12 0.03 -0.310412 -0.012245
_Iloanbal4_3 0.178239 0.098204 1.81 0.07 -0.014238 0.370716
Jmor_rent_6 0.190717 0.071206 2.68 0.01 0.051155 0.330278
Jnetincm_5 -0.139522 0.071722 -1.95 0.05 -0.280094 0.001050
Jage_4 -0.491473 0.103213 -4.76 0.00 -0.693767 -0.289179
Jage_5 -0.537734 0.118487 -4.54 0.00 -0.769963 -0.305504
Jage_3 -0.404384 0.104016 -3.89 0.00 -0.608252 -0.200516
Jage_2 -0.303818 0.103201 -2.94 0.00 -0.506088 -0.101548
Jgdscde2_ 0 -0.726914 0.355530 -2.04 0.04 -1.423739 -0.030088
Jsearches_3 -0.152417 0.075633 -2.02 0.04 -0.300656 -0.004178
Table D.24: Model 3 paying back early on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
logLXAPR -0.016163 0.034528 -0.47 0.64 -0.083836 0.051511
_Icpi_2 0.381626 0.036965 10.32 0.00 0.309177 0.454076
raw_loanaprl 0.027194 0.005535 4.91 0.00 0.016346 0.038041
Jspsetld_9 0.564048 0.059584 9.47 0.00 0.447266 0.680831
Jspl6m4_4 -0.160041 0.041371 -3.87 0.00 -0.241126 -0.078955
Jtosettl4_2 -0.137298 0.060010 -2.29 0.02 -0.254915 -0.019682
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Jage_2 -0J22558 0.088811 -1.38 0.17 -0.296624 0.051508
Jage_3 -0.212179 0.089370 -2.37 0.02 -0.387341 -0.037017
Jsocsett_2 0.275157 0.074237 3.71 0.00 0.129655 0.420659
Jmortbal_2 0.124587 0.048430 2.57 0.01 0.029666 0.219507
Jinc_surp_3 -0.403503 0.111105 -3.63 0.00 -0.621264 -0.185742
Jloanbal6_2 0.424934 0.119909 3.54 0.00 0.189918 0.659951
Jgdscde 999 0.300115 0.062982 4.77 0.00 0.176674 0.423557
Jtimebank_6 0.213128 0.055958 3.81 0.00 0.103451 0.322804
Jtimaddl_4 -0.307426 0.098253 -3.13 0.00 -0.499998 -0.114854
Jsocworst_4 0.332521 0.096818 3.43 0.00 0.142761 0.522281
Jtimaddl_2 -0.146731 0.060105 -2.44 0.02 -0.264534 -0.028928
L -0.016848 0.009845 -1.71 0.09 -0.036144 0.002448
Jtosettl2_3 0.156676 0.052415 2.99 0.00 0.053944 0.259407
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.228971 0.050613 4.52 0.00 0.129772 0.328171
Jspsetld_7 0.421281 0.076885 5.48 0.00 0.270590 0.571972
Jspsetld_8 0.416492 0.081863 5.09 0.00 0.256043 0.576940
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.215440 0.065216 3.30 0.00 0.087619 0.343262
_Issrc4to6_3 0.203889 0.067646 3.01 0.00 0.071305 0.336473
Jgdscde 333 0.429579 0.135234 3.18 0.00 0.164526 0.694632
Jage_7 -0.644983 0.113305 -5.69 0.00 -0.867057 -0.422909
Jage_6 -0.517459 0.094972 -5.45 0.00 -0.703602 -0.331317
Jspsetld_6 0.304223 0.070767 4.30 0.00 0.165522 0.442924
Jnetincm_6 -0.289539 0.078298 -3.70 0.00 -0.443000 -0.136078
Jspsetld_4 0.236906 0.061743 3.84 0.00 0.115893 0.357919
Jage_5 -0.471449 0.093219 -5.06 0.00 -0.654154 -0.288743
Jage_4 -0.379059 0.087534 -4.33 0.00 -0.550622 -0.207496
Jspsetld_5 0.217520 0.066729 3.26 0.00 0.086733 0.348307
Jtosettl3_2 -0.133808 0.048662 -2.75 0.01 -0.229184 -0.038431
JsnbalalL4 0.133196 0.050077 2.66 0.01 0.035047 0.231345
Jloanbal 1 _5 0.149586 0.053333 2.80 0.01 0.045055 0.254116
Jssrc4to6_4 0.263036 0.116344 2.26 0.02 0.035007 0.491066
Jtimebank_2 0.093939 0.041235 2.28 0.02 0.013121 0.174757
Jtimaddl_3 0.121093 0.054685 2.21 0.03 0.013911 0.228274
Jnetincm_5 -0.206326 0.062886 -3.28 0.00 -0.329580 -0.083072
Jmorjrent_5 0.206930 0.060225 3.44 0.00 0.088892 0.324968
Jsocnoact_2 0.299289 0.124999 2.39 0.02 0.054296 0.544283
Jwrstnrev_2 -0.153658 0.056164 -2.74 0.01 -0.263738 -0.043579
Jspsetld_3 0.122249 0.060764 2.01 0.04 0.003155 0.241344
Jno_store_l -0.162026 0.072486 -2.24 0.03 -0.304096 -0.019956
Jmor_rent_6 0.193063 0.063603 3.04 0.00 0.068403 0.317723
Jnetincm_4 -0.136683 0.057758 -2.37 0.02 -0.249886 -0.023479
Jmor_rent_4 0.134657 0.055113 2.44 0.02 0.026638 0.242676
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Jloanbal 1 _4 0J13544 0.051102 2.22 0.03 0.013387 0.213701
Jnoopen6_4 -0.091364 0.040175 -2.27 0.02 -0.170104 -0.012623
Jsnball6m_2 -0.668339 0.319299 -2.09 0.04 -1.294153 -0.042524
Jmor_rent_7 0.261830 0.125485 2.09 0.04 0.015884 0.507776
Jbrand_2 0.096208 0.046653 2.06 0.04 0.004770 0.187647
Jalcifdet_2 0.390993 0.193796 2.02 0.04 0.011160 0.770826
Table D.25: Model 4 Acceptance on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.254640 0.007491 -33.99 0.00 -0.269323 -0.239958
_Icpi_2 -0.614224 0.054554 -11.26 0.00 -0.721149 -0.507299
JnewbusJ -0.347534 0.114356 -3.04 0.00 -0.571668 -0.123400
L -0.064418 0.004474 -14.40 0.00 -0.073187 -0.055649
Jgdscde2_3 -0.289881 0.081567 -3.55 0.00 -0.449748 -0.130014
Jloanbal3_4 -0.140200 0.072949 -1.92 0.06 -0.283176 0.002777
Jsnball6m_8 0.055378 0.145931 0.38 0.70 -0.230641 0.341398
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.154207 0.067971 2.27 0.02 0.020986 0.287428
Jsocsett_2 -0.850096 0.256579 -3.31 0.00 -1.352981 -0.347211
Jtosettl2_3 0.094379 0.087647 1.08 0.28 -0.077406 0.266164
Jloanbal4_2 0.249436 0.144140 1.73 0.08 -0.033075 0.531946
Jage_9 -0.132706 0.065461 -2.03 0.04 -0.261007 -0.004404
Jspsetld_9 -0.192510 0.062879 -3.06 0.00 -0.315751 -0.069269
Jnetincm_9 0.218626 0.079954 2.73 0.01 0.061919 0.375334
Jbrand_2 -0.222160 0.049213 -4.51 0.00 -0.318615 -0.125705
JmortbaU 0.395094 0.265098 1.49 0.14 -0.124489 0.914676
Jloanbal2_2 0.173438 0.123219 1.41 0.16 -0.068068 0.414944
Jsnrecact_2 -0.077173 0.940674 -0.08 0.94 -1.920861 1.766514
Jspl6ml2_4 0.217551 0.100397 2.17 0.03 0.020775 0.414326
Jspl6mact_5 -0.085811 0.056529 -1.52 0.13 -0.196605 0.024983
Jtimadd 1 _9 -0.312264 0.067045 -4.66 0.00 -0.443670 -0.180859
Jspl6mact_4 -0.527298 0.952074 -0.55 0.58 -2.393329 1.338733
Jsnball6m_5 0.057622 0.193846 0.30 0.77 -0.322308 0.437553
Jtimadd 1_3 -0.216025 0.071493 -3.02 0.00 -0.356149 -0.075901
Jspl6mact_2 -0.503977 0.091246 -5.52 0.00 -0.682815 -0.325138
Jspvaldel_2 -0.232262 0.126706 -1.83 0.07 -0.480602 0.016078
Jtosettl3_3 0.099824 0.113449 0.88 0.38 -0.122531 0.322179
Jtimadd 1_4 0.164018 0.127762 1.28 0.20 -0.086390 0.414427
Jloanbal6_2 -0.188372 0.130240 -1.45 0.15 -0.443638 0.066895
Jgdscde 444 0.078296 0.324611 0.24 0.81 -0.557930 0.714522
Jgdscde 200 0.823129 0.275108 2.99 0.00 0.283927 1.362331
Jloanbal 1_8 -0.063103 0.055147 -1.14 0.25 -0.171190 0.044984
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Jloanbal3_3 0.376816 0.139961 2.69 0.01 0.102499
_Inoopen6_2 -0.202081 0.075071 -2.69 0.01 -0.349217
Jno_store_l 0.184065 0.222781 0.83 0.41 -0.252579
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.102859 0.069481 -1.48 0.14 -0.239039
Jnoopen6_3 -0.148003 0.119331 -1.24 0.22 -0.381887
Jgdscde2_2 0.116029 0.109091 1.06 0.29 -0.097785
Jloanbal 1 _2 0.223123 0.121324 1.84 0.07 -0.014668
_Iloanbal2_4 -0.035290 0.076279 -0.46 0.64 -0.184794
_Itimaddl_5 -0.174481 0.065441 -2.67 0.01 -0.302744
Jtimadd 1 _6 -0.227128 0.065651 -3.46 0.00 -0.355802
Jmor_rent_8 -0.172536 0.055984 -3.08 0.00 -0.282263
Jsnball6m_7 -0.660607 0.182616 -3.62 0.00 -1.018527
Jsnball6m_4 -0.616171 0.182276 -3.38 0.00 -0.973426
Jtosettl4_2 -0.155133 0.080532 -1.93 0.05 -0.312974
Jloanbal4_3 -0.156092 0.096828 -1.61 0.11 -0.345872
Jtimebank_9 -0.330771 0.066331 -4.99 0.00 -0.460776
Jtimebank_7 -0.268634 0.061909 -4.34 0.00 -0.389972
Jsnball6m_3 -0.424392 0.232953 -1.82 0.07 -0.880972
Jgdscde 111 0.353347 0.252943 1.40 0.16 -0.142412
Jwrst46al_4 0.276228 0.111266 2.48 0.01 0.058152
Jsocbal_2 0.522910 0.212510 2.46 0.01 0.106398
Jloanbal 1_7 0.119134 0.070702 1.69 0.09 -0.019439
Jsnbalall_2 0.090119 0.072733 1.24 0.22 -0.052434
Jsnball6m_6 -0.354342 0.181823 -1.95 0.05 -0.710708
Jsnball6m_2 -0.186447 0.185474 -1.01 0.32 -0.549969
Jinc_surp_7 -0.150983 0.065668 -2.30 0.02 -0.279690
Jsnbalall_6 0.018393 0.067400 0.27 0.79 -0.113709
Jtimebank-8 -0.091846 0.066500 -1.38 0.17 -0.222183
Jsnwl2tv_2 0.117013 0.097687 1.20 0.23 -0.074450
Jccjgt500_6 -0.064982 0.045087 -1.44 0.15 -0.153351
Jno_amexJ 0.629394 0.268342 2.35 0.02 0.103454
Jno_other_ 1 0.251210 0.271379 0.93 0.36 -0.280684
Jssrc4to6_2 -0.065877 0.049865 -1.32 0.19 -0.163611
Jwrst46al_5 0.278939 0.168512 1.66 0.10 -0.051339
Jspl6m4_3 -1.648736 0.633871 -2.60 0.01 -2.891100
Jmor_rent_4 -0.105389 0.061184 -1.72 0.09 -0.225307
Jno_deps_4 0.021881 0.049189 0.44 0.66 -0.074526
Jspsetld_8 -0.186939 0.101497 -1.84 0.07 -0.385870
Jage_5 0.167457 0.072601 2.31 0.02 0.025161
Jage_4 0.265553 0.067460 3.94 0.00 0.133334
Jage_6 0.195262 0.075662 2.58 0.01 0.046967
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Jage_7 0.069690 0.080455 0.87 0.39 -0.088000 0.227379
_cons 5.203634 0.428880 12.13 0.00 4.363045 6.044223
Table D.26: Model 4 Acceptance on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl -0.148112 0.005116 -28.95 0.00 -0.158139 -0.138085
Jcpi_2 -1.288077 0.036348 -35.44 0.00 -1.359318 -1.216836
Jnewbus-l -0.415036 0.063486 -6.54 0.00 -0.539466 -0.290605
L -0.100407 0.004575 -21.95 0.00 -0.109373 -0.091441
_Igdscde2_3 -0.278908 0.060800 -4.59 0.00 -0.398074 -0.159741
Jloanbal3_4 -0.238483 0.062761 -3.80 0.00 -0.361492 -0.115473
Jsnball6m_8 -0.015294 0.103901 -0.15 0.88 -0.218936 0.188349
Jtosettll_3 0.281968 0.050739 5.56 0.00 0.182521 0.381415
Jsocsett_2 -1.015261 0.132755 -7.65 0.00 -1.275457 -0.755066
Jtosettl2_3 0.303854 0.066034 4.60 0.00 0.174430 0.433278
Jloanbal4_2 0.440524 0.126177 3.49 0.00 0.193222 0.687826
Jage_9 -0.112384 0.060845 -1.85 0.07 -0.231637 0.006869
Jspsetld_9 -0.332013 0.054846 -6.05 0.00 -0.439509 -0.224517
Jnetincm_9 0.146572 0.047920 3.06 0.00 0.052649 0.240494
Jbrand_2 0.323813 0.038982 8.31 0.00 0.247409 0.400217
Jmortbal_2 -0.186045 0.046123 -4.03 0.00 -0.276444 -0.095645
Jloanbal2_2 0.669819 0.111545 6.00 0.00 0.451195 0.888444
Jsnrecact_2 -3.176604 0.669603 -4.74 0.00 -4.489001 -1.864206
Jspl6ml2_4 0.378220 0.074749 5.06 0.00 0.231715 0.524724
Jspl6mact_5 -0.088585 0.046958 -1.89 0.06 -0.180621 0.003452
Jtimaddl_9 -0.203636 0.055572 -3.66 0.00 -0.312554 -0.094718
Jspl6mact_4 2.622550 0.678540 3.86 0.00 1.292635 3.952465
Jsnball6m_5 -0.075287 0.138534 -0.54 0.59 -0.346809 0.196235
Jtimaddl_3 -0.217859 0.060918 -3.58 0.00 -0.337256 -0.098462
Jspl6mact22 -0.222808 0.073239 -3.04 0.00 -0.366353 -0.079263
Jspvaldel_2 -0.436648 0.107962 -4.04 0.00 -0.648249 -0.225048
_Itosettl3_3 0.246957 0.088253 2.80 0.01 0.073984 0.419929
_Itimaddl_4 0.333111 0.087721 3.80 0.00 0.161181 0.505041
_Iloanbal6_2 -0.378285 0.113831 -3.32 0.00 -0.601390 -0.155180
Jgdscde 444 0.772789 0.180967 4.27 0.00 0.418101 1.127477
Jgdscde 200 0.971510 0.339643 2.86 0.00 0.305823 1.637198
Jloanball_8 -0.144240 0.045779 -3.15 0.00 -0.233966 -0.054515
Jloanbal3_3 0.342946 0.118169 2.90 0.00 0.111340 0.574553
Jnoopen6_2 -0.216416 0.062961 -3.44 0.00 -0.339818 -0.093014
Jno_store_l 0.206363 0.072327 2.85 0.00 0.064604 0.348121
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.219866 0.061645 -3.57 0.00 -0.340689 -0.099044
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Jnoopen6_3 -0.305604 0.103320 -2.96 0.00 -0.508107 -0.103101
Jgdscde2_2 0.168698 0.075716 2.23 0.03 0.020297 0.317100
Jloanbal 1 _2 0.490642 0.110930 4.42 0.00 0.273223 0.708061
Jloanbal2_4 0.279077 0.065561 4.26 0.00 0.150580 0.407573
Jtimadd 1 _5 -0.110920 0.058890 -1.88 0.06 -0.226342 0.004502
Jtimadd 1 _6 -0.064137 0.056053 -1.14 0.25 -0.173997 0.045724
Jmor_rent_8 -0.111362 0.044013 -2.53 0.01 -0.197625 -0.025099
Jsnball6m_7 -0.660460 0.159221 -4.15 0.00 -0.972527 -0.348393
Jsnball6m_4 -0.500300 0.144591 -3.46 0.00 -0.783693 -0.216906
Jtosettl4_2 -0.311039 0.069672 -4.46 0.00 -0.447594 -0.174483
_Iloanbal4_3 -0.231015 0.081564 -2.83 0.01 -0.390877 -0.071153
Jtimebank_9 -0.028959 0.055224 -0.52 0.60 -0.137195 0.079278
_Itimebank_7 0.002228 0.057827 0.04 0.97 -0.111111 0.115566
Jsnball6m_3 -0.931458 0.250414 -3.72 0.00 -1.422260 -0.440657
Jgdscde 111 0.489132 0.213728 2.29 0.02 0.070233 0.908031
Jwrst46aL4 0.216627 0.089740 2.41 0.02 0.040741 0.392514
Jsocbal_2 0.256581 0.109653 2.34 0.02 0.041664 0.471497
Jloanbal 1 _7 0.168870 0.065241 2.59 0.01 0.040999 0.296740
Jsnbalall_2 0.243426 0.072406 3.36 0.00 0.101513 0.385339
Jsnball6m_6 -0.433124 0.149801 -2.89 0.00 -0.726729 -0.139520
Jsnball6m_2 -0.326548 0.141425 -2.31 0.02 -0.603735 -0.049361
Jinc_surp_7 -0.025391 0.052595 -0.48 0.63 -0.128476 0.077694
JsnbalalL6 0.192122 0.061877 3.10 0.00 0.070845 0.313399
Jtimebank_8 -0.065583 0.054564 -1.20 0.23 -0.172526 0.041360
Jsnwl2tv_2 0.154682 0.082738 1.87 0.06 -0.007481 0.316846
Jccjgt500_6 -0.082615 0.038917 -2.12 0.03 -0.158891 -0.006340
Jno_amex_l 0.215555 0.166320 1.30 0.20 -0.110427 0.541537
Jno_otherJ 0.435893 0.192808 2.26 0.02 0.057997 0.813789
Jssrc4to6_2 -0.079337 0.042021 -1.89 0.06 -0.161698 0.003023
Jwrst46al_5 0.297321 0.134490 2.21 0.03 0.033725 0.560917
Jspl6m4_3 -0.553984 0.357421 -1.55 0.12 -1.254515 0.146548
Jmor_rent_4 -0.086901 0.053500 -1.62 0.10 -0.191759 0.017957
Jno_deps_4 0.127808 0.041544 3.08 0.00 0.046383 0.209232
Jspsetld_8 -0.129429 0.086600 -1.49 0.14 -0.299162 0.040304
Jage_5 0.092388 0.058482 1.58 0.11 -0.022236 0.207011
Jage_4 0.032058 0.054338 0.59 0.56 -0.074443 0.138559
Jage_6 0.090479 0.059344 1.52 0.13 -0.025833 0.206790
Jinc_surp_9 0.068322 0.050795 1.35 0.18 -0.031235 0.167878
Jage_7 0.065728 0.058356 1.13 0.26 -0.048649 0.180104
_cons 5.360419 0.297923 17.99 0.00 4.776501 5.944337
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Table D.27: Model 4 default on Internet segment
299
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0J23936 0.013656 9.08 0.00 0.097172 0.150700
Jcpi_2 1.488281 0.135566 10.98 0.00 1.222576 1.753986
L 0.035435 0.013006 2.72 0.01 0.009943 0.060928
Jspl6ml2_4 0.567339 0.197965 2.87 0.00 0.179335 0.955342
Jloanbal4_3 -0.352716 0.175408 -2.01 0.04 -0.696510 -0.008923
raw_term 0.019082 0.006007 3.18 0.00 0.007309 0.030855
Jspvaldel_2 -0.712389 0.251289 -2.83 0.01 -1.204907 -0.219872
Jspl6m4_3 -0.026417 1.143924 -0.02 0.98 -2.268467 2.215633
Jsocworst_3 0.478129 0.521272 0.92 0.36 -0.543546 1.499804
_Itimebank_4 -0.673665 0.216474 -3.11 0.00 -1.097945 -0.249384
Jwrst46al_4 0.479822 0.196891 2.44 0.02 0.093923 0.865722
Jtimebank_5 -0.896321 0.467179 -1.92 0.06 -1.811975 0.019332
Jsocbal_3 -0.554029 0.586005 -0.95 0.34 -1.702578 0.594520
_Iinc_surp_2 -0.397275 0.171420 -2.32 0.02 -0.733252 -0.061298
Jgdscde 999 -1.035133 0.462025 -2.24 0.03 -1.940687 -0.129580
Jssrc4to6_4 0.753783 0.322470 2.34 0.02 0.121754 1.385811
Jtimebank_2 -0.311506 0.154381 -2.02 0.04 -0.614087 -0.008925
Jtimebank_3 -0.586266 0.285501 -2.05 0.04 -1.145838 -0.026694
Jspl6ml2_3 0.760222 0.379992 2.00 0.05 0.015452 1.504993
Jsearches_7 -0.018869 0.131530 -0.14 0.89 -0.276664 0.238926
Jtimadd 1 _6 0.389828 0.169895 2.29 0.02 0.056839 0.722817
Jssrc4to6_5 0.871025 0.318303 2.74 0.01 0.247163 1.494887
Jsnball6m_8 0.396031 0.203959 1.94 0.05 -0.003721 0.795783
Jloanbal5_2 -0.312743 0.271993 -1.15 0.25 -0.845840 0.220355
Jspsetld_8 -0.771282 0.423840 -1.82 0.07 -1.601993 0.059428
Jtimadd 1_7 -0.145889 0.228202 -0.64 0.52 -0.593157 0.301378
Jage_7 -0.107800 0.351576 -0.31 0.76 -0.796876 0.581276
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.251489 0.238721 -1.05 0.29 -0.719373 0.216395
Jloanbal2_3 0.291530 0.173928 1.68 0.09 -0.049362 0.632423
JspsetldJ 0.206549 0.173234 1.19 0.23 -0.132984 0.546082
Jsnwl2tv_2 -0.517527 0.273841 -1.89 0.06 -1.054245 0.019192
Jnoopen6_4 -0.264340 0.145888 -1.81 0.07 -0.550274 0.021594
Jmortbal_4 1.095349 0.758045 1.44 0.15 -0.390391 2.581090
Jmor_rent_7 0.273244 0.273993 1.00 0.32 -0.263773 0.810261
Jgdscde3_ 4 1.297023 0.548753 2.36 0.02 0.221487 2.372560
Table D.28: Model 4 default on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
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rawJoanaprl 0J23843 0.007698 16.09 0.00 0.108755 0.138931
_Icpi_2 1.320721 0.094054 14.04 0.00 1.136379 1.505064
L 0.041120 0.009097 4.52 0.00 0.023291 0.058949
Jspl6ml2_4 0.777575 0.109567 7.10 0.00 0.562827 0.992322
_Iloanbal4_3 -0.609707 0.109348 -5.58 0.00 -0.824024 -0.395389
raw_term 0.015040 0.003543 4.25 0.00 0.008096 0.021983
Jspvaldel_2 -0.407116 0.164356 -2.48 0.01 -0.729247 -0.084984
Jspl6m4_3 2.002906 0.395268 5.07 0.00 1.228194 2.777617
Jsocworst_3 1.264901 0.339899 3.72 0.00 0.598711 1.931090
Jtimebank_4 -0.542912 0.133410 -4.07 0.00 -0.804391 -0.281433
Jwrst46al_4 0.366698 0.117154 3.13 0.00 0.137081 0.596316
Jtimebank_5 -1.061217 0.298802 -3.55 0.00 -1.646857 -0.475576
JsocbaL3 -1.123392 0.346895 -3.24 0.00 -1.803293 -0.443491
_Iinc_surp_2 -0.233512 0.112098 -2.08 0.04 -0.453220 -0.013803
Jgdscde 999 -0.414522 0.175683 -2.36 0.02 -0.758854 -0.070189
Jssrc4to6_4 0.385773 0.193086 2.00 0.05 0.007331 0.764215
Jtimebank_2 -0.308917 0.100642 -3.07 0.00 -0.506171 -0.111663
Jtimebank_3 -0.430660 0.136402 -3.16 0.00 -0.698003 -0.163318
Jspl6ml2_3 0.502831 0.221400 2.27 0.02 0.068895 0.936767
Jsearches_7 -0.266937 0.086375 -3.09 0.00 -0.436228 -0.097646
_Itimaddl_6 0.165209 0.116058 1.42 0.16 -0.062260 0.392678
Jssrc4to6_5 0.569614 0.221471 2.57 0.01 0.135539 1.003690
Jsnball6m_8 0.354738 0.130857 2.71 0.01 0.098263 0.611214
Jloanbal5_2 -0.334261 0.168282 -1.99 0.05 -0.664088 -0.004434
Jspsetld_8 -0.413513 0.248406 -1.66 0.10 -0.900379 0.073353
Jtimadd 1 _7 -0.297089 0.134978 -2.20 0.03 -0.561641 -0.032536
Jage_7 -0.512910 0.216928 -2.36 0.02 -0.938082 -0.087738
Jgdscde2_ 1 -0.239360 0.129709 -1.85 0.07 -0.493586 0.014866
Jloanbal2_3 0.193613 0.114756 1.69 0.09 -0.031305 0.418530
_Ispsetld_l 0.208221 0.108363 1.92 0.06 -0.004165 0.420608
Jsnwl2tv_2 -0.258445 0.195902 -1.32 0.19 -0.642407 0.125516
Jnoopen6_4 -0.114703 0.090614 -1.27 0.21 -0.292303 0.062898
JmortbaL4 0.179472 0.085848 2.09 0.04 0.011213 0.347731
Jmor_rent_7 0.442967 0.228957 1.93 0.05 -0.005781 0.891714
Jgdscde3_ 4 0.306764 0.275048 1.12 0.27 -0.232319 0.845847
Table D.29: Model 4 paying back early on Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.055628 0.008158 6.82 0.00 0.039639 0.071616
Jcpi22 0.333386 0.066264 5.03 0.00 0.203510 0.463261
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Jspsetld_9 0.615343 0.079271 7.76 0.00 0.459976 0.770711
Jspl6m4_4 -0.286531 0.056860 -5.04 0.00 -0.397975 -0.175088
Jtosettl4_2 0.006099 0.105333 0.06 0.95 -0.200351 0.212548
_Iinc_surp_3 -0.258632 0.112927 -2.29 0.02 -0.479964 -0.037300
_Iage_6 -0.843473 0.132363 -6.37 0.00 -1.102900 -0.584046
Jage_7 -0.776320 0.165643 -4.69 0.00 -1.100974 -0.451665
Jsocsett_3 -0.276914 0.149313 -1.85 0.06 -0.569563 0.015735
Jage_5 -0.618593 0.120472 -5.13 0.00 -0.854713 -0.382472
Jage_4 -0.569434 0.106189 -5.36 0.00 -0.777560 -0.361308
Jmortbal_2 0.284348 0.263612 1.08 0.28 -0.232322 0.801017
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.157040 0.069843 2.25 0.03 0.020151 0.293930
_Iloanbal5_2 0.506712 0.205380 2.47 0.01 0.104175 0.909248
Jspsetld_7 0.436983 0.100889 4.33 0.00 0.239244 0.634722
Jspsetld_8 0.442091 0.113811 3.88 0.00 0.219026 0.665155
L -0.013104 0.005771 -2.27 0.02 -0.024414 -0.001793
Jssrc4to6_3 0.147553 0.094520 1.56 0.12 -0.037703 0.332808
_Imor_rent_5 0.314449 0.072591 4.33 0.00 0.172174 0.456725
Jgdscde 999 0.150868 0.119622 1.26 0.21 -0.083587 0.385324
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.258441 0.080944 3.19 0.00 0.099794 0.417087
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.361686 0.120909 2.99 0.00 0.124709 0.598662
JsnbalalL4 0.149796 0.067774 2.21 0.03 0.016961 0.282630
Jage_3 -0.465274 0.106725 -4.36 0.00 -0.674451 -0.256096
Jnoopen6_4 -0.120112 0.054586 -2.20 0.03 -0.227098 -0.013125
Jmor_rent_6 0.304391 0.077166 3.94 0.00 0.153148 0.455633
Jnetincm_5 -0.225180 0.077626 -2.90 0.00 -0.377325 -0.073035
Jnetincm_6 -0.151910 0.086035 -1.77 0.08 -0.320535 0.016715
Jgdscde 333 0.273546 0.165935 1.65 0.10 -0.051681 0.598773
Jloanbal 1 _3 -0.210312 0.075762 -2.78 0.01 -0.358802 -0.061822
Jloanbal 1 _2 -0.170823 0.076164 -2.24 0.03 -0.320102 -0.021545
Jspsetld_5 0.335652 0.091573 3.67 0.00 0.156174 0.515131
Jspsetld_6 0.221784 0.102694 2.16 0.03 0.020507 0.423062
Jspsetld_4 0.134714 0.084666 1.59 0.11 -0.031228 0.300656
Jtimaddl_4 -0.228007 0.166804 -1.37 0.17 -0.554937 0.098923
Jtimaddl22 -0.192363 0.090699 -2.12 0.03 -0.370130 -0.014597
Jage_2 -0.328309 0.104115 -3.15 0.00 -0.532371 -0.124247
Jloanbal6_2 0.165756 0.183640 0.90 0.37 -0.194172 0.525685
Jtimebank_6 0.028010 0.072789 0.38 0.70 -0.114654 0.170675
Jtimebank_2 0.087259 0.054747 1.59 0.11 -0.020043 0.194561
Jtosettl3_2 -0.024020 0.065056 -0.37 0.71 -0.151527 0.103488
Jssrc4to6_5 -0.498108 0.294184 -1.69 0.09 -1.074698 0.078483
Jsocworst_4 0.042037 0.263097 0.16 0.87 -0.473624 0.557698
Jsocworst_3 0.471756 0.244356 1.93 0.05 -0.007174 0.950685
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Jbrand22 0.122322 0.064609 1.89 0.06 -0.004308 0.248953
Jinc_surp_4 0.174286 0.074212 2.35 0.02 0.028833 0.319738
_Iinc_surp_5 0.121224 0.058079 2.09 0.04 0.007390 0.235057
_Imor_rent_7 0.313040 0.132692 2.36 0.02 0.052968 0.573111
Jalcifdet_2 0.303238 0.238565 1.27 0.20 -0.164341 0.770817
Jsocbal_3 -0.497193 0.264105 -1.88 0.06 -1.014829 0.020444
Jmor_rent_4 0.068703 0.076450 0.90 0.37 -0.081136 0.218542
_Inetincm_7 -0.335513 0.172204 -1.95 0.05 -0.673026 0.002000
Jnetincm_4 -0.041142 0.073861 -0.56 0.58 -0.185907 0.103623
Jno_store_l -0.111476 0.227058 -0.49 0.62 -0.556502 0.333550
Jspsetld_3 0.086048 0.083835 1.03 0.31 -0.078265 0.250361
Jtosettl4_3 0.639930 0.182950 3.50 0.00 0.281355 0.998505
Jloanbal4_3 0.245851 0.117124 2.10 0.04 0.016292 0.475411
Jtimadd 1 _8 -0.142080 0.082196 -1.73 0.08 -0.303181 0.019020
_Iccjgt500_3 0.080876 0.061888 1.31 0.19 -0.040423 0.202174
Jssrc4to6_4 0.159480 0.172311 0.93 0.36 -0.178244 0.497203
_Itosettl5_3 -0.550424 0.306429 -1.80 0.07 -1.151015 0.050167
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.106735 0.072303 -1.48 0.14 -0.248446 0.034977
Jsocnoact_2 0.589262 0.427374 1.38 0.17 -0.248376 1.426899
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.601198 0.385620 -1.56 0.12 -1.356999 0.154602
Jspl6ml2_3 -0.333338 0.306520 -1.09 0.28 -0.934105 0.267430
_Isocsett_2 0.212194 0.224009 0.95 0.34 -0.226856 0.651243
Table D.30: Model 4 paying back early on Non-Internet segment
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
rawJoanaprl 0.031840 0.005501 5.79 0.00 0.021059 0.042621
Jcpi_2 0.376970 0.037046 10.18 0.00 0.304361 0.449578
Jspsetld_9 0.557654 0.060507 9.22 0.00 0.439062 0.676246
Jspl6m4_4 -0.150461 0.040841 -3.68 0.00 -0.230508 -0.070415
Jtosettl4_2 0.016420 0.077619 0.21 0.83 -0.135712 0.168551
Jinc_surp_3 -0.266164 0.122057 -2.18 0.03 -0.505391 -0.026937
Jage_6 -0.493233 0.095156 -5.18 0.00 -0.679735 -0.306731
Jage_7 -0.622869 0.113400 -5.49 0.00 -0.845129 -0.400608
Jsocsett_3 -0.085353 0.070771 -1.21 0.23 -0.224063 0.053356
Jage_5 -0.455380 0.093406 -4.88 0.00 -0.638453 -0.272308
Jage_4 -0.364367 0.087781 -4.15 0.00 -0.536413 -0.192320
Jmortbal22 0.126971 0.048432 2.62 0.01 0.032046 0.221896
Jtosettl 1 _3 0.082902 0.047011 1.76 0.08 -0.009239 0.175042
Jloanbal5_2 0.127925 0.140797 0.91 0.36 -0.148031 0.403881
Jspsetld_7 0.417191 0.077418 5.39 0.00 0.265455 0.568927
Jspsetld_8 0.422096 0.082103 5.14 0.00 0.261178 0.583015
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L -0.020827 0.005116 -4.07 0.00 -0.030854 -0.010800
Jssrc4to6_3 0.201625 0.067963 2.97 0.00 0.068419 0.334831
Jmor_rent_5 0.213825 0.060533 3.53 0.00 0.095182 0.332467
Jgdscde 999 0.360476 0.068045 5.30 0.00 0.227110 0.493843
Jgdscde2_ 1 0.241203 0.052791 4.57 0.00 0.137736 0.344671
Jgdscde2_ 4 0.210699 0.066219 3.18 0.00 0.080912 0.340486
Jsnbalall_4 0.147495 0.050697 2.91 0.00 0.048132 0.246858
Jage_3 -0.198157 0.089474 -2.21 0.03 -0.373522 -0.022792
Jnoopen6_4 -0.078698 0.040063 -1.96 0.05 -0.157219 -0.000177
Jmor_rent_6 0.218466 0.064480 3.39 0.00 0.092087 0.344845
Jnetincm_5 -0.198733 0.063937 -3.11 0.00 -0.324047 -0.073420
Jnetincm_6 -0.290827 0.081691 -3.56 0.00 -0.450938 -0.130715
Jgdscde 333 0.432409 0.135280 3.20 0.00 0.167264 0.697553
Jloanball_3 -0.097750 0.057352 -1.70 0.09 -0.210157 0.014657
Jloanbal 122 -0.132176 0.054430 -2.43 0.02 -0.238856 -0.025496
Jspsetld_5 0.216261 0.066712 3.24 0.00 0.085509 0.347014
Jspsetld_6 0.300590 0.071185 4.22 0.00 0.161069 0.440111
Jspsetld_4 0.241130 0.061698 3.91 0.00 0.120204 0.362055
Jtimaddl_4 -0.322037 0.098642 -3.26 0.00 -0.515372 -0.128702
Jtimaddl22 -0.156688 0.060495 -2.59 0.01 -0.275255 -0.038120
Jage_2 -0.114436 0.088936 -1.29 0.20 -0.288747 0.059875
Jloanbal6_2 0.280068 0.139796 2.00 0.05 0.006074 0.554062
Jtimebank_6 0.206089 0.056063 3.68 0.00 0.096207 0.315970
Jtimebank_2 0.084634 0.041324 2.05 0.04 0.003640 0.165627
Jtosettl3_2 -0.124450 0.049308 -2.52 0.01 -0.221092 -0.027809
Jssrc4to6_5 -0.377999 0.209567 -1.80 0.07 -0.788743 0.032745
Jsocworst_4 0.323424 0.100705 3.21 0.00 0.126046 0.520801
Jsocworst_3 0.292311 0.093063 3.14 0.00 0.109912 0.474710
Jbrand_2 0.094813 0.048359 1.96 0.05 0.000031 0.189595
Jinc_surp_4 0.086053 0.049535 1.74 0.08 -0.011034 0.183140
Jinc_surp_5 0.068835 0.040512 1.70 0.09 -0.010567 0.148237
Jmor_rent_7 0.336915 0.131665 2.56 0.01 0.078857 0.594974
Jalcifdet_2 0.406191 0.193923 2.09 0.04 0.026109 0.786272
Jsocbal_3 -0.230412 0.095224 -2.42 0.02 -0.417048 -0.043776
Jmor_rent_4 0.133249 0.055336 2.41 0.02 0.024793 0.241704
Jnetincm_7 -0.304668 0.175873 -1.73 0.08 -0.649374 0.040037
Jnetincm_4 -0.144123 0.058285 -2.47 0.01 -0.258359 -0.029886
Jno_store_l -0.164431 0.072813 -2.26 0.02 -0.307141 -0.021721
Jspsetld_3 0.122144 0.060808 2.01 0.05 0.002963 0.241325
Jtosettl4_3 0.329474 0.115464 2.85 0.00 0.103170 0.555779
Jloanbal4_3 0.214878 0.085226 2.52 0.01 0.047838 0.381917
Jtimaddl_8 -0.073447 0.055073 -1.33 0.18 -0.181387 0.034494
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_Iccjgt500_3 0.068213 0.042809 1.59 0.11 -0.015691 0.152117
Jssrc4to6_4 0.229106 0.116486 1.97 0.05 0.000797 0.457415
_Itosettl5_3 -0.186668 0.146613 -1.27 0.20 -0.474024 0.100689
Jspl6ml2_5 -0.085915 0.061071 -1.41 0.16 -0.205610 0.033781
Jsocnoact_2 0.228590 0.125667 1.82 0.07 -0.017712 0.474892
Jgdscde3_ 2 -0.352478 0.248197 -1.42 0.16 -0.838935 0.133980
Jspl6ml2_3 -0.312152 0.182088 -1.71 0.09 -0.669037 0.044733
Jsocsett_2 0.188781 0.094387 2.00 0.05 0.003786 0.373776
The actual symbolic function used to calculated the expected profit in Matlab is
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"exp (1014624516889591/9007199254740992*x+7827322445356437/590295810358705651712*L-1297761051646769/18014398509481984)
*L*(.681292069057961285497988*(100.+x)"(1/12)-1.)*(100.+x)"2/(.999999999999999999999994e-4*(100.+x)"2-1.)
+.971941106741852159354823*(8983141115603571/9007199254740992) "exp(1014624516889591/9007199254740992*x+
7827322445356437/590295810358705651712*L-1297761051646769/18014398509481984) *((4457337796314217/4503599627370496)
"exp (5595364410765473/144115188075855872*x-5176894256845849/295147905179352825856*L+5425581046685411/4503599627370496)
-1.* (8878938178505361/9007199254740992) "exp(5595364410765473/144115188075855872*x-5176894256845849/
295147905179352825856*L+5425581046685411/4503599627370496)) *(.681292069057961285497988e-l*L*(100.+x)
"(7/12)-.999999999999999999999994e-4*L*(100.+x) "2/(.999999999999999999999994e-4*(100.+x)"2-1.)
*(.681292069057961285497988e-l*(100.+x)"(7/12)-1.)) *(-1.+1.36258413811592257099598*(100.+x)"(1/12))
+.991229424627723266231798e-4*(8837970463919045/9007199254740992) "exp(5595364410765473/144115188075855872*x-
5176894256845849/295147905179352825856*L+5425581046685411/4503599627370496) *(2244442328010009/2251799813685248)
"exp(1014624516889591/9007199254740992*x+7827322445356437/590295810358705651712*L-1297761051646769/18014398509481984)
*L*(.681292069057961285497988*(100.+x)"(1/12)-1.)*(100.+x)"2/(.999999999999999999999994e-4*(100.+x)"2-1.))
*exp(2.71908869999999991406980-.177276789999999989655421*x-.817499999999999948712900e-4*L) /
(1.+exp(2.71908869999999991406980-.17727678999999998965542l*x-.817499999999999948712900e-4*L))
